On Tuesday, January 5, 2021, it was announced that Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt will restore diplomatic relations with Qatar and lift the blockade of this country that began in June 2017. Theoretically, the situation could be the beginning of the end of the diplomatic crisis between the close allies of the United States in the Gulf region, which has been dragging on for three and a half years. At this point it is worthwhile to analyze what led to this conflict.

To understand the causes of this crisis, it is necessary to go back to 1995, when Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, father of the incumbent Emir Tamim, seized power in Qatar. Until now, Qatar’s policy has largely been in line with that of much larger Saudi Arabia. It can even be said that it has largely been subjugated to it. However, Sheikh Hamad began to take a much more ambitious and independent course, taking advantage of the enormous wealth accumulated because of natural resources (thanks to them this small country is considered one of the major players in the region). Frequently, this course of action was contrary to that of the neighboring Saudi kingdom. The bone of contention was, among others, the different attitude towards Iran, with which Qatar hoped to cooperate on certain issues, as opposed to consistently anti-Iranian Saudi Arabia. Qatar was also anticipating to cooperate with Turkey, which is competing with Saudi Arabia for the leadership of the Sunni world.

• Read also: A Summary of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Conflicts of interest have intensified after the events of the so-called Arab Spring, which swept through the region in 2011, allowing Qatar to increase its influence by filling the political vacuum of that time. Consequently, some Arab states overthrew long-standing dictators, other protests turned into civil wars that continue to this day, and yet other saw both the fall of old regimes and internal conflicts. Nevertheless, the main opposition forces of these revolutions were usually represented by groups motivated by political Islam, also known as Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. In most cases, Qatar supported these groups, which was contrary to Saudi Arabia, where the growing regional position of the Brotherhood is perceived as a threat to its own stability (especially by the royal family). This conflict was clearly visible in the case of Egypt where Mohamed Morsi, affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, won the presidential election following the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak. At the time, Qatar became Egypt’s main ally and was generously supporting it financially. However, after the military coup in July 2013, which has brought incumbent President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to power, the Muslim Brotherhood and Qatar became the top public enemy. Consequently, Saudi Arabia, which had actively fought against the “spring” protests, became the new main ally and “sponsor.” It announced enormous financial package to Egypt precisely when the USA and the European Union were considering to withdraw their own as a punishment for overthrowing the democratically elected President Morsi. Since then, Egypt has joined Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which likewise was not pleased with the growing ambitions and importance of Doha, as one of the core members of the anti-Qatar coalition. The following conflict of their interests occurs is Libya, where Qatar and the aforementioned three countries are supporting the opposing sides of the ongoing civil war.

Another issue that negatively influenced Doha’s relations not only with Riyadh but also with the other members of the anti-Qatar front is the activity of the Al Jazeera Media Network. This largest and most watched TV station in the Middle East was accused of spreading pro-Qatar propaganda whilst its journalists were frequently arrested. Furthermore, it had repeatedly criticized the governments of other countries in the region and, for instance, presented the Arab Spring in a positive light. Its coverage of the protests against the Saudi-backed Al Khalifa royal family in Bahrain caused concern that Qatar is seeking to overthrow the ruling family with its soft power. The protests were brutally suppressed by the Saudi military intervention, among others, and the case resulted in even greater resentment.

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These issues were the reasons behind the crisis that began on June 5, 2017. On that day, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt announced that they are breaking diplomatic relations with Qatar. Yemen and the Maldives acted in the same way. Saudi Arabia and the UAE declared that they would not allow Qatari ships to enter their ports. Additionally, the Saudi Kingdom closed the only land border crossing point connecting a small emirate with the rest of the Arabian Peninsula, refused to conduct financial transactions related to that country and banned Qatar Airways from its airspace (flights between the African countries and Qatar had to take a detour through Iran). The primary cause for the ban was Qatar’s alleged support for terrorist groups linked to Muslim extremism. Moreover, Saudi Arabia wanted to force through the idea of armed intervention, but the United States did not agree to this. Nevertheless, Donald Trump very quickly expressed his support for the coalition’s actions, despite the fact that the largest US military base in the Middle East, Al Udeid, is located in Qatar.

The purpose of the blockade and breaking off relations was to put pressure on Qatar and force it to accept the demands that the four members of the coalition made on June 22, 2017. The 13 points included, among others, shutting down the Al Jazeera network, limiting the cooperation with Iran, terminating Turkish military presence, ceasing to support terrorist groups and to “interfere in the internal and external affairs of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain.” Qatar rejected all of these demands and the deadlock continued. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia had a rather extravagant idea to dig a canal along its border with Qatar, turning it into an island, yet the plan did not materialize. In the meantime, the small emirate enhanced its cooperation with Turkey and Iran, which offered their help, for instance, in terms of food supplies (about 99% of Qatar’s food is imported). Consequently, the blockade was completely counterproductive in this matter. Efforts to internationally isolate Qatar have also failed. It seemed that none of the objectives of the blockade have been achieved.

• Read also: An Outline of the History of the Polish Underground State and the Tragic Fate of the Cursed Soldiers

For this reason, the normalization of relations announced on January 5 indicates, for the time being, the victory of Doha in this standoff, although some details of the agreement still have not been made public yet. Therefore, it is unknown whether Qatar has agreed to any concessions and if so – what they concerned. This seems to be an attempt to at least formally end the crisis before Joe Biden becomes the President of the United States. He announced that he would be less tolerant towards the actions of the Saudis than Donald Trump, which could put them in an even less favorable negotiating position. However, despite the undoubtedly positive nature of the agreement, it is difficult to say whether the crisis is over and the members of the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) would speak with one voice. Some of Qatar’s interests are still different from those of Saudi Arabia, the Emirates or Egypt, thus, it can be expected that tensions among them will continue to escalate. On the other hand, all four countries are strategic allies of the United States in the region therefore the arguments among them have been and will be of great importance for American politics, especially in the context of the recent Arab-Israeli rapprochement. Poland should also keep a close eye on the situation in the Persian Gulf, especially because of LNG deliveries from Qatar to the terminal in Świnoujście. Nevertheless, a series of “breakthrough” agreements, which is recently sweeping through the Middle East, indicates a positive trend in this most conflicted region in the world.

Author: Maciej Śmigiel

A graduate of the Arabic and Islamic Studies at the University of Warsaw, currently a PhD candidate at the Doctoral School of Humanities (culture and religious studies). He gained his professional experience as a trainee at the Counter-Terrorism Center in Internal Security Agency, Embassy of Poland in Cairo and National Security Agency. Project Coordinator at Polish think-tank Warsaw Institute.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

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On December 1, 2020, the Azerbaijanis seized the Lachin District, which has been controlled by Armenians for the past quarter of a century. Earlier, on November 25, Azerbaijani troops took control of the Kalbajar District, connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, and five days earlier the Azerbaijanis seized the Agdam District. These territorial changes resulted from an agreement signed by Armenia and Azerbaijan under the auspices of Russia on the night of November 11-12, 2020.

The conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh began with the fall of the Soviet Union. The enclave, partially inhabited by Armenians, located on Azerbaijani territory, has been under Armenian control since the victorious war in the early 1990s. For the past three decades, although it was not a “frozen conflict,” the military action was incidental, and neither side could break the deadlock.

The events that occurred in the fall of 2020 are a breakthrough for this region, which has undergone multiple geopolitical changes. More widely, from a perspective of security, several new phenomena in interstate relations can be observed, in particular, the exclusion of international organizations from the decision-making process on the future of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The regional context

The military action taken by Baku in September of this year fundamentally changed the distribution of forces and determined the victory of Azerbaijan, which seized all of its territories that are not part of Nagorno-Karabakh and were previously controlled by Armenian forces. On the other hand, the Armenians maintained control over only 25% of the entire territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, losing even the city of Shusha, located only a dozen or so kilometers from the capital of the region – Stepanakert, where the road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia was situated.

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Although the losses of Armenia were considerable, prolonging military action in case of failure to sign an agreement with Azerbaijan would have allowed the Azerbaijani armed forces to gain full control over Nagorno-Karabakh. The army of this country is better equipped than Armenian troops. Modern unmanned aerial vehicles, which were at the disposal of Azerbaijani forces (the equipment came mainly from Turkey, which supports Baku in the conflict with Yerevan, and from Israel), were of great importance in the actions against the Armenians. An additional factor that determined the defeat of the Armenian army was the attitude of Russia. Moscow supports Armenia militarily and has army bases on its territory. However, the Russians wanted to maintain its dominant position as a mediator in the conflict and did not provide the Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh with military support. Simultaneously, Moscow claimed that its obligations to ensure Armenia’s security concern only the territory of the Republic of Armenia and not the territories that are the de jure part of Azerbaijan.

Taking into account the credibility of Russia among allied countries, for instance Armenia and Belarus, such a decision may seem illogical since Russia’s position as an entity that ensures security in the post-Soviet zone has been limited. However, given the fact that the current political system in Armenia, headed by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, which exists as a result of the determination of civil society in that country rather than thanks to the support from Russia, it can be assumed that one of the Kremlin’s political goals is to weaken the government in Armenia. The defeat in the Nagorno-Karabakh war and the possibility of further displacement of Armenians from the region is a considerable burden for the government of Nikol Pashinyan, which has to deal with numerous protests in Armenia, which also puts him at disadvantage towards Moscow.

The agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan was a diplomatic victory for Russia, which still has the capacity to maintain its influence in the South Caucasus (Transcaucasia). As part of the treaty, the security of the new, reduced Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan will be guaranteed by Russia, which will be responsible for the transport routes between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. To date, Armenia has controlled the Lachin corridor, allowing for free transport between Stepanakert and the Republic of Armenia. Moreover, the Russian troops will be responsible for providing a passage through the territory of the Republic of Armenia between Azerbaijan and its exclave in Nakhchivan.

Militarily, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was a clear victory for Azerbaijan and Turkey, which supported it. The possibility of a free passage between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan, bordering Turkey, will certainly strengthen the cooperation of both sides. Due to common cultural ties, these countries are the closest allies in the region. Following the recent events, it has become a field of strategic rivalry between Russia and Turkey, both of which had a decisive influence on the resolution of this conflict. Russia in the diplomatic dimension, while Turkey in the military dimension, as an ally of the victorious Azerbaijan.

• Read also: An Outline of the History of the Polish Underground State and the Tragic Fate of the Cursed Soldiers

The involvement of European Union countries and the United States was not observable in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. The Minsk Group, established in the 1990s in order to resolve this dispute, which includes the United States and France under the auspices of the OSCE, did not play any role in this conflict. The countries of the European Union solely called for a de-escalation of the conflict, but they did not carry out any mediation activities. It seems that this attitude is primarily a result of the limited capabilities of Western countries to influence policy concerning the South Caucasus. The inclusion of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the Eastern Partnership initiative as well as the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was implemented in the context of Turkey’s European integration process. Currently, the European Union has very limited political influence on Ankara, which autonomously implements cooperation policy in the South Caucasus, the Middle East and the Western Balkans.

Summary

In the short and medium term, the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh will depend on the longevity of the agreement. A certain status quo and the desire to “freeze” this conflict were nullified by the actions of the Azerbaijani troops, carrying out a victorious offensive. Taking into account the attitude of Russia and Turkey as well as the military capabilities of Armenia and Azerbaijan, it cannot be ruled out that Baku will take control of its entire territory in the coming years. The military advantage of Azerbaijan allows it to win the war with Armenia, which has no possibility to carry out any offensive actions against its eastern neighbor without Russian support.

Author: Jakub Lachert

Jakub Lachert is a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Political Sciences and International Studies at the University of Warsaw. His research interests include: European Union neighborhood policy, including, in particular, Eastern policy, Eastern Partnership, Western Balkans in the process of integration with the EU.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

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On 14 December, the Baltic states and Poland signed a EUR 720 mln agreement within the Baltic Synchronisation Project. The aim is to integrate the electricity grids of the Baltic states with Europe in order to strengthen the region’s energy independence from third countries. This marks the largest ever amount of funding allocated by the Connecting Europe Facility – Energy (CEF-E). 

The Baltics’ energy transformation has been given a higher priority on the political agenda since the building of Belarusian Ostrovets Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) gained momentum. Lithuania has been particularly active in condemning the project, since the power plant is located a mere 45km (28mi) from its capital, Vilnius. Moreover, numerous accidents occurred during the construction and Belarusian authorities denied the factuality of any only to later assure that the mishaps did not cause any long-term deficiencies. Furthermore, no independent, international agency has been allowed to evaluate the NPP’s safety. In recognition of the danger, Lithuania named the power plant “a threat to national security” in June 2017 and forbid the purchase of electricity from Belarus. As a consequence, Baltic countries lost touch not only with the recently committed NPP, but also with a pipeline that goes through Belarus from mainland Russia. These circumstances might have contributed to bringing forward the states’ commitment to synchronise with European power grids and further disconnect from post-Soviet ties.

Read also: Over two decades of Poland in NATO – the path to membership and future prospects

In 2018, the Heads of State or Government of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia together with the President of the European Commission signed the Political Roadmap[i] – a document outlining the steps towards full synchronisation of the Baltic states’ electricity grid with that of Continental European Network. Until 2020, the initiative focused on establishing a legal framework for cooperation and setting the “obligations with respect to the steps and measures for the synchronisation.” Moreover, coordination among appropriate regulatory authorities in the countries involved was settled. Agreements have been reached with transmission system operators in each country, analyses of the technologies and available solutions have been conducted, and preparation for the investment request have been made – including a cost-benefit analysis regarding the Harmony Link, a high-voltage submarine cable between Poland and Lithuania. Of the EUR 720 mln grant nearly EUR 500 mln will be dedicated to the construction of the Link, which will enable the integration of offshore renewable energy resources, helping the Baltic Rim to fulfil the European Green Deal.

The Baltic countries have long identified their connectedness to Russian power systems as a threat to their national security. The post-Soviet states have been operating on Russian and Belarusian electricity networks and have been largely dependent on the supplies of energy from those countries. The Kremlin has therefore held a significant political leverage which had to be accounted for in the policymaking of the emerging economies. After the Political Roadmap has been signed, Dalia Grybauskaite, Lithuania’s president at the time, commented: “That tool of blackmail, which was used [by Moscow] to buy our politicians and meddle in our politics, will no longer exist.”[ii]

With technology progressing rapidly and the use of hybrid- and cyber-operations ever more common, energy security has been receiving more attention in the public debate. It has been especially salient since the events in Crimea from 2014 when Russia used numerous means of unconventional warfare. In 2015, for example, “unidentified individuals” [iii] destroyed the power lines which connected the peninsula with the Ukrainian grid. Only a year later Moscow announced that the final line of electricity from Russia to the disputed region had been completed – at that point Crimea was disconnected from Ukrainian supplies of power, making it further tied to Russia. Those events have made post-Soviet countries, and especially those with European bonds and aspirations, more aware of the threats related to their past associations with Moscow. By renovating their energy infrastructure, the Baltic states and Poland could kill two birds with one stone – disconnect from Russian networks thus ensuring better energy security, and connect to the European one, simultaneously contributing to their integration with the rest of the EU as well as helping them to fully join the internal market.

• Read also: An Outline of the History of the Polish Underground State and the Tragic Fate of the Cursed Soldiers

According to the Political Roadmap, the Baltic Three is to disconnect from all Russian energy networks by 2025. On 21 December 2020, Latvia completed a new high-voltage power line to Estonia – “the latest step in aligning electricity grids in the Baltic states with European Union neighbours instead of Russia.”[iv] Although the line is currently being tested and its full commencement is planned for 2021, the project is a sign of the region’s vast dedication to transform its energy sector – on both technological and political level.

These circumstances could also be a chance for Poland, which aims to commit the first bloc of its own NPP in 2033. The now coal-dependent country could soon emerge as a significant actor on the electricity market in Central and Eastern Europe, thus further strengthening its cooperation with the Baltic states. It is a huge opportunity for the region, as the countries involved share common history, culture, and are at a similar stage of development. Notably, the nations are all cautious of a too large influence from the West. Instead of treating it as an argument in internal public debates, this could be better utilised as a factor uniting the region within its membership in the EU. The recent circumstances could pose a good environment for a fresh geopolitical initiative for the region, such as the Baltic Fund established by Warsaw Institute and partnering think-tanks from each of the Baltic states, to gain momentum.

Author: Jędrzej Duszyński

Alumnus of Worth School, a British Independent School, where he pursued Sixth Form education on a full academic scholarship. Alumnus and Volunteer at United World Colleges Poland. He gained professional experience during a research internship at Institute of Economic Affairs and a consulting work placement at Oliver Wyman, London. He currently works as a Project Assistant at the Warsaw Institute think tank.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

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The North Atlantic Treaty, establishing NATO, was signed in Washington on April 4, 1949. After the fall of the so-called Iron Curtain, Poland could begin its efforts to join the Alliance. On March 12, 1999, Poland became a full member of NATO – the most powerful collective defense organization in the world, currently comprising 30 countries. However, from the historical perspective, the path of our country to the membership in the North Atlantic Alliance was not easy and certain.

The collapse of the Cold War world

The long-term process of integrating Poland into Western defense structures was initiated when the Cold War had ended. The Polish parliamentary election on June 4, 1989, and the first non-communist, pro-western government in this part of Europe, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 are just few of the dates symbolizing this event.

Initially, it was not clear in what direction the former countries of the Eastern Bloc would head (e.g., the controversial “NATO-bis” idea). In the following years, the NATO members were becoming increasingly open towards the potential negotiations with Poland, although there was still a long way to the membership. The Partnership for Peace program (1994) did not fully satisfy Poland, yet it was a significant step. As a result of further efforts, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were invited to join the Alliance in 1997.

• Read also: An Outline of the History of the Polish Underground State and the Tragic Fate of the Cursed Soldiers

Efforts to become a member and invaluable support of the Polish diaspora in the USA

The support of the Polish community all over the world for the compatriots living in the country during the period of martial law is commonly recognized. Meanwhile, the knowledge about the help of Polish communities, especially the American and Canadian ones, concerning Poland’s accession to NATO is not so widespread. Their backing can even be assessed as crucial. Although Poland was respected in Washington, the North American politicians were quite skeptical about NATO expansion.

The Polish diaspora in the USA, up to then quite divided, had united to achieve this goal. Its members were sending letters to members of the US Congress, collecting signatures for a petition and using the emerging Internet. The Polish American Congress (PAC) played a key role in this respect. One of the most active members of the Polish lobby in Washington, D.C., which was striving for Poland’s integration with NATO, was the US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzeziński and the courier of the Polish Government in London Jan Nowak-Jeziorański. They collaborated and remained in close contact with each other almost throughout the whole 1990s.

Poland as an active member of NATO

Clearly, the assessment of 20 years of Poland in NATO is positive and favorable also for our allies. The army had been professionalized, modernized and reached the standards of the partners. Warsaw stood out as one of the few members of the Alliance, which allocated at least 2% of the GDP on the armed forces. Furthermore, Poland’s position in the Alliance had been systematically growing, which was evidenced by the largest ever NATO Summit held in Warsaw in July 2016.

Polish soldiers took an active part in NATO missions in Albania, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan as well as Iraq. Numerous military exercises of the allied forces, including “Anaconda,” took place in Poland. The NATO Joint Force Training Center in Bydgoszcz, the NATO Counter Intelligence Center of Excellence (CI COE) in Cracow and the NATO Multinational Division North East (MNDNE) in Elbląg were established. Polish fighter planes are patrolling the airspace of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia (Air Policing missions).

For Warsaw, the most important benefit is the mutual security guarantees of the states that signed the Washington Treaty (the North Atlantic Treaty). Moreover, these guarantees, resulting from NATO membership, were the foundation for Poland’s deepened integration with the West in political and economic terms, undoubtedly facilitating the subsequent accession of our country to the European Union.

• Read also: Assessment of the Polish Presidency in the Visegrád Group

The Alliance in 2021 and future prospects

NATO faces a challenge to uphold its cohesion (statements of the French President, cooperation between Turkey and Russia), maintain its readiness to face new threats (the hybrid ones, including the cyberspace) and the conventional ones, which, as observed on the examples of regional armed conflicts in Europe, have not become obsolete. Meanwhile, many of the European NATO members do not allocate at least 2% of their GDP to defense, as agreed. Furthermore, countries that may be a potential threat to NATO in Europe, although generally weaker in terms of overall defense capabilities, often have dangerous tactical advantage in terms of speed as well as integrity in the enforcement and implementation of their strategies.

Poland became a member of NATO in 1999 not only thanks to the diplomatic efforts but also because of the support of the Polish community in the USA and Canada, which proved invaluable. Perhaps it would be worth to reiterate that act of the Polish diaspora in the future (e.g., to defend Poland’s good reputation in North America and internationally). Yet, the question is whether it would be possible to unite our compatriots under the common goal.

It is worthwhile to continue building the position of Poland basing on the aforementioned historical accomplishments. However, as we approach yet another anniversary, marking more than two decades of Poland in NATO, we should not lose sight of new challenges to security and peace in Europe. Poland is developing its independent military capabilities (some say that the number of soldiers needs to be significantly increased). Additionally, it can count on guarantees under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Doubts about the future of the Alliance do not seem to take into account the real strength of this Organization, which is well exemplified by the nearly threefold expansion of the joint defense zone in terms of the number of member states – from 12 countries in 1949 to 30 nowadays.

This article was created in cooperation with the Kazimierz Wielki Association (Stowarzyszenie im. Kazimierza Wielkiego).

Tomasz Kijewski – Executive Director, the Warsaw Institute

For several years, he actively promoted Poland and the Polish community in North America as a part of his diplomatic duties. A graduate of international relations at the University of Łódź and postgraduate studies at the War Studies University in Warsaw. A fellow at the Maastricht Center for Transatlantic Studies and the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (Garmisch-Partenkirchen / Washington, D.C.). He completed a course at the International Energy Agency (Paris) and was an advisor on energy in Calgary. Currently, he is preparing a doctoral dissertation.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

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During World War II, Poles created underground resistance structures, which were a worldwide phenomenon. They fulfilled nearly all functions of the state for the Poles struggling with the cruelty of the occupying forces. After the end of the war, the patriotic part of the nation, forming the Polish Underground State, continued the struggle for a free Poland until the 1960s. However, their tragic fate, especially that of the so-called cursed soldiers, was then determined by geopolitics.

When considering World War II, one of our first thoughts is that hardly any country in Europe, or perhaps even in the world, sacrificed as much as Poland. Nearly six million citizens of the Second Polish Republic died. Despite the preparations for defense and increasing the country’s military potential, Poland did not manage to resist the invaders. On September 1, 1939, Poland was attacked by the Third Reich, while only two weeks later, on September 17, the Red Army attacked our country from the East. When the armies defending the state were forced to surrender, the underground organization began to function.

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Polish Underground operates

The Polish underground structures can be described as a “copy of the state,” which had characteristic – in many terms equal to the pre-war organization – state administration, judiciary, educational system, and armed forces (including intelligence and counterintelligence). They were supported by the Government Delegation for Poland (Delegatura Rządu na Kraj), constituted of civilians. Moreover, the Underground State included an army that operated under various names – it became the renowned Home Army (Armia Krajowa, AK) in February 1942.

The Underground State addressed many needs that were created as a result of the occupants’ destructive activity in Poland. The political parties were banned, restrictions were imposed on education, numerous cultural institutions were closed down, and the press was entirely controlled by foreign propaganda. Terror was used to intimidate the society. The occupants plundered Polish cultural property. Simultaneously, Poles had to face the difficulties associated with religious practices, which the occupants regarded as an element uniting the nation.

• Read also: Assessment of the Polish Presidency in the Visegrád Group

The cursed soldiers do not lay down arms

When the war was over and it became clear that Poland was in the Soviet sphere of geopolitical influence, preparations to fight the most patriotic Poles have started. This group included, in particular, the soldiers of the Polish Underground State and people involved in the Polish resistance. The NKVD arrested the leaders of the Polish Underground State under the pretext of, among others, false accusations of cooperation with the Germans. Prison sentences were issued, some commanders died in unexplained circumstances in Soviet captivity. A communist Provisional Government of National Unity (Tymczasowy Rząd Jedności Narodowej), completely subordinated to the Soviet Union, was established in Poland. Consequently, the international support for the Polish government in exile was withdrawn.

In January 1945, when most of Poland’s territory was already occupied by the Red Army, the last commander of the Home Army, General Leopold Okulicki (nom de guerre – Niedźwiadek), decided to disband it. However, many of its soldiers and other Polish military organizations were eager to continue fighting. They were later referred to as the “cursed” or “indomitable” soldiers. It is estimated that these underground groups comprised between 120,000 and 180,000 individuals. The last member of the resistance, Józef Franczak (nom de guerre – Lalek), died in a manhunt in Lubelskie Region, as many as 18 years after the war (in 1963).

A worldwide phenomenon

It is worth recalling that – apart from Poland – there was no such a deeply covert and active organization as the Polish Underground State in any other occupied country or territory. Its operations were possible thanks to the sacrifice of the patriotic Poles. In many cases, they risked their own lives as well as the lives of their families and loved ones in extremely hostile conditions (under German and Soviet occupation).

Despite the great economic effort and expansion of the defense sector during the 20 years of the interwar period, Poland was defeated by the overwhelming forces of the enemy. This example, along with the cruel fate of the cursed soldiers, illustrates the geopolitical threats to small and medium-sized countries such as Poland, which, despite their great courage and heroic struggle for independence, often become hostages to big politics.

Nowadays, our country on the Vistula is safe thanks to the sacrifice of such generations of Poles as the builders of the Polish Underground State and later the so-called cursed soldiers, among others. The heroes of the underground resistance had to live in a difficult period not only during World War II, but also throughout the times of the post-war communist terror. However, their efforts were not in vain. The memory of them shows the real value and price of freedom, motivating next generations of Poles, at home and abroad, to act. Poland is not yet lost!

This article was created in cooperation with the Kazimierz Wielki Association (Stowarzyszenie im. Kazimierza Wielkiego).

Tomasz Kijewski – Executive Director, the Warsaw Institute

For several years, he actively promoted Poland and the Polish community in North America as a part of his diplomatic duties. A graduate of international relations at the University of Łódź and postgraduate studies at the War Studies University in Warsaw. A fellow at the Maastricht Center for Transatlantic Studies and the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (Garmisch-Partenkirchen / Washington, D.C.). He completed a course at the International Energy Agency (Paris) and was an advisor on energy in Calgary. Currently, he is preparing a doctoral dissertation.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

More information:
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The sixth Polish Presidency in the Visegrád Group (V4) began on July 1, 2020. It will last until June 30, 2021, and its motto is “Back on track.” The slogan refers to the return to the pre-pandemic path of development. The program is based on four main pillars: the policy of the Visegrád Group on the forum of the European Union (EU), the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic and its consequences, integration within the V4 as well as the digitalization of the Visegrád cooperation. This is the first ever Presidency, throughout which the majority of the meetings are held remotely. Despite the undoubtedly difficult economic and epidemic situation, the initiatives of the Polish Presidency shall be assessed positively.

At the beginning, it is worth to note that the biggest challenge ahead of the Presidency is to maintain a common position on the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF, the centerpiece of Next Generation EU fund). Hence, in the first months of the Presidency, the Visegrád Group focused primarily on the shape of the EU budget in the next financial perspective (2021-2027) and the fight against the effects of the coronavirus pandemic.

Furthermore, Poland wants to concentrate on the issues of water management and the fight against drought. This is a problem that has recently also affected the Czech Republic, which has experienced the most severe drought in almost 500 years. In the context of V4 foreign policy, support for transformation and modernization in the countries of the Eastern Partnership and the Western Balkans has been announced.

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In the area of security policy, the Polish Presidency intends to continue deepening cooperation with the United States, among others, within the V4-USA format. Additionally, the Visegrád Group will maintain support for the partnership within NATO and its enlargement, precisely in terms of stabilizing the situation of the partners in the East and the Balkans. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland Zbigniew Rau points out that upholding frequent contacts and close cooperation with the USA is a vital task for Polish diplomacy. It is worth recalling that the American administration actively supports the Three Seas Initiative, whose members include all V4 countries. For instance, during the last summit in Tallinn, the United States decided to financially support the Three Seas Investment Fund.

A videoconference of the V4 Deputy Ministers of Internal Affairs took place at the end of July. Consequently, a common position on helping migrants was established. The Ministers agreed on: supporting them in countries of origin and transit, backing FRONTEX to protect the external borders of the European Union and helping EU Member States which are under constant migratory pressure. Moreover, it was highlighted that the V4 countries consistently deny the idea of obligatory relocation of migrants.

At the beginning of September, a meeting of the Ministers of Finance of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary was held, during which a joint declaration on the continuation of economic cooperation was adopted. The meeting concerned, among others, the decision to further combat the economic effects of COVID-19. The Ministers agreed that the area of collaboration should include, in particular, tax matters in e-commerce. This is because the digital market is a key sector, given the current situation. Furthermore, the debate concerned: the fight against tax fraud, global minimum tax, the new EU own resources system and climate neutrality.

The Visegrád Group did not remain indifferent to the crisis in Belarus. During the September summit of Prime Ministers of V4 in Lublin, Belarus was the main topic on the agenda. The Heads of Government called on the Belarusian authorities to free political prisoners and stop violating human rights. They also condemned the torture and brutal treatment of protesters. In addition, they proposed an economic package for Belarusians, covering the IT, infrastructure, energy as well as small and medium-sized enterprise sectors. Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki announced the initiative of the Visegrád Group to introduce visa-free travel for Belarusians. It is worth noting that a few weeks earlier, the Visegrád Group supported Poland’s initiative to develop a geostrategic plan on the EU forum, including economic, military and human rights aspects. In terms of V4’s efforts to counteract the effects of COVID-19, Prime Minister Andrej Babiš informed about the Group’s plans to create a joint initiative with Austria to coordinate the fight against the pandemic.

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After several years, at a time of economic crisis, the Visegrád Group returned to the idea of creating a Central European airline. Such a company would be more stable, stronger and could easier to react to market problems in a given country. The initiative is strongly supported by Prime Minister Babiš, while LOT Polish Airlines would receive more than half of the shares in this venture. The initiative is still under consideration, but the president of Prague Airport, Vaclav Rehor, said he had already started negotiations with LOT Polish Airlines to expand its operations in Prague and Budapest. The joint airlines of the Visegrád Group would fill the gap in the region, as neither Slovakia nor Hungary have a national carrier while the privatized Czech airline is under restructuring plan.

In order to facilitate the flow of information and experiences on counteracting the coronavirus among the countries of the Bloc, the V4 Center for COVID-19 Information Exchange was established. The institution operates on the basis of recurrent videoconferences, during which representatives of the Visegrád countries will meet regularly.

Undoubtedly, the current economic and health situation has put the Polish Presidency to a test. The active foreign policy of the Presidency – transatlantic, EU and V4+ has a great influence on the security of the region. What is more, collaboration in the framework of the Three Seas Initiative is actually a platform integrating cooperation within the EU, V4 and transatlantic policy. Relevant development of the digital policy framework will have a positive impact on the economies of the V4 countries where digitalization, automation and robotization are becoming increasingly important. A significant challenge not only for the Presidency but the entire Visegrád Group is to develop a common position on policy towards Russi and maintain sanctions on the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. Poland is especially against it, arguing that it is primarily a political project that will undermine the energy security of the region. This position is shared by the United States, which has extended sanctions against those involved in the development of the scheme. On the other hand, Hungary, which has been strongly associated with the Russian energy sector for years, does not oppose the project. The Czech Republic and Slovakia have changed their position over time. Initially, both countries supported the Polish standpoint. However, due to the potential economic benefits from the development of transmission networks, the Czech Republic and Slovakia changed their stance. Despite the aforementioned discrepancies, the V4 countries are able to speak with one voice on issues concerning Russia, as was the case with the joint statement condemning the Alexey Navalny poisoning.

Author: Maciej Tyburski

A graduate of Diplomacy and a student of Eastern Studies with a specialization in China and Russia. He gained his professional experience in the NGOs and public sector. His areas of interest include the politics of the Visegrad Group countries, the Three Seas Initiative, geopolitics and foreign languages.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

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North Macedonia, which is aspiring to join the European Union (EU), had to face the challenges of complicated relations with its neighbors, especially Greece and Bulgaria. These countries have difficulty in recognizing the statehood or ethnicity of their neighbor in the north and west respectively. Athens had a dispute with Skopje over the name of the country, which Greece believed to be related to a Hellenistic heritage. The Prespa agreement between Athens and Skopje, signed in 2017, regulated this issue by creating a compromise name “North Macedonia” for the country so far officially called “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (FYROM). This settlement posed a challenge to both Macedonian and Greek politicians, as they met with strong opposition from many groups in their societies, whilst the conditionality of adopting this agreement was directly linked to the start of EU accession negotiations by Skopje.

However, the issues of the historical identity of North Macedonia were also raised by Bulgaria, which has been a member of the European Union since 2007. Sofia makes the formal beginning of accession negotiations with North Macedonia conditional on fulfilling the Treaty of Friendship with Bulgaria by Skopje. According to the Bulgarian authorities, there is an unresolved historical dispute between the two countries regarding the Macedonian language, which, according to the Bulgarian side, is a dialect of the Bulgarian language. Furthermore, an important dispute between Bulgaria and North Macedonia is the status of the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria, which, according to Sofia, is an integral part of the Bulgarian people.

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In the historical context, the actions of the government in Sofia towards North Macedonia can be considered on two levels. The first one concerns the international sphere and Bulgaria’s activities in the context of North Macedonia’s integration with NATO and the European Union. After the declaration of independence by (at that time still) the Republic of Macedonia, Bulgaria had no objections to the name of the new state. As a result of the complicated situation, caused by internal conflicts with the Albanian minority, Sofia feared political instability on the territory of its western neighbor. Consequently, it supported the government in Skopje. However, as a result of Athens’ veto on North Macedonia’s integration into NATO at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, Sofia changed its strategy towards the government in Skopje. According to the new foreign policy guidelines, Sofia revoked its unconditional support for the project of North Macedonia’s integration with NATO and the European Union. This was due to fears of political tensions with Athens within NATO and the EU. However, this political situation enabled Sofia to enforce its claims against the government in Skopje regarding historical policy.

The second level of this conflict concerns the domestic conditions in both countries. In North Macedonia, the settlement with Greece on the issue of the official name of the state met with disagreement from the opposition circles against the left-wing government, especially the VMRO-DPMNE party, representing anti-Greek and anti-Bulgarian attitudes towards attempts to communicate with the neighbors. This party was criticized for referring to the legacy of Alexander the Great as an element of building the national identity of North Macedonia as well as for attributing Bulgarian heroes such as Todor Aleksandrov and Ivan Mihailov Gavrilov to Macedonian historical heritage.

In Bulgaria, on the other hand, the dispute with North Macedonia, especially in recent months, is aimed at some kind of consolidation towards the unpopular government of Boyko Borisov, who will seek re-election in early 2021. The resignation of the government in Sofia from its continued course of conditionality before the December intergovernmental conference, which begins negotiations with North Macedonia, can be seen by the opposition as a betrayal of Bulgaria’s interests and used against the government in the election campaign.

The international dimension

North Macedonia, a NATO member since 2020, is an important element of international security in the Western Balkans. From the Euro-Atlantic perspective, North Macedonia is located in the vital region of the Black Sea and the Adriatic Sea, which is the subject of energy investments, therefore a political instability in this country is a threat to security in Central and Eastern Europe and, more broadly, the eastern flank of NATO. The slowdown in European integration in the Western Balkans will increase the activity of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China in a region which, due to its strategic location between Western Europe and the widely understood Middle East, may lead to a renewal of the ethnic conflicts of the 1990s. Although Bulgaria was not militarily involved in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the current increase in nationalism among the political elites in Skopje and Sofia may lead to a future loss of NATO’s regional influence in case of tensions between its members.

It seems that the only way to stabilize the situation in the region is to integrate the countries of the Western Balkans into the European Union. Croatia, which was the first country in the Western Balkans to join the EU, also encountered some difficulties in relations with its neighbors (Italy and Slovenia), which likewise enforced the disputed issues with Zagreb, threatening to use the veto power in the accession negotiations. It can therefore be assumed that the conflict between Bulgaria and North Macedonia persists only in the context of European integration of North Macedonia.

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Any imbalance between the peoples in the Western Balkans is dangerous for the stability of the region. Taking into account the complex ethnic issues in North Macedonia, which is inhabited by a large Albanian community (about 25% of the total population of two million people in North Macedonia), a conflict may arise. It would be related to the escalation of the dispute between North Macedonia and Bulgaria and the growth of chauvinistic attitudes. In the recent history of North Macedonia, there have already been conflicts between the Albanian and Macedonian communities in the context of the war in Kosovo. The increase in nationalistic attitudes among the Macedonian community may also lead to some conflicts with the Albanians living in the country.

In conclusion, the increased tensions between Bulgaria and North Macedonia and the possibility of a veto on the opening of formal negotiations between Skopje and the EU may lead North Macedonia to “fall out” of the European integration process. The actions taken so far by this country in dialogue with Greece as well as the first veto of France and the Netherlands at the beginning of negotiations with the European Union, have led to the discouragement of the North Macedonian society from European integration. It can be assumed that blocking the accession negotiations by Bulgaria during the December conference will lead to the collapse of the whole process of European integration whilst Skopje might consider alternative alliances with China, Russia or Turkey. Such a solution would pose a threat to constructing regional alliances within NATO. An example of such processes may be a change in Turkey’s international policy, which gave up European integration and instead built alliances, for instance with Russia, questioning the solidarity of this country with NATO structures.

Author: Jakub Lachert

Jakub Lachert is a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Political Sciences and International Studies at the University of Warsaw. His research interests include: European Union neighborhood policy, including, in particular, Eastern policy, Eastern Partnership, Western Balkans in the process of integration with the EU.

Solutions based on artificial intelligence (AI) have been supporting all branches of industry for many years and have been secretly accompanying us in the most banal everyday activities. Supercomputers with enormous computing power and entire data centers clustered in public and private clouds solve thousands of complex mathematical problems and operations every day. So why didn’t they predict the current pandemic? Why didn’t they help us stop it?

They did predict it.

Works on the use of algorithms, based on artificial intelligence, has been predicting the possibility of a pandemic for many years, whilst models developed by researchers have been used effectively in the fight against infectious diseases, thus limiting their development. An example of such activity are the achievements of AIME company (Artificial Intelligence and Medical Epidemiology), which since 2012 has been conducting research on the possibilities of using AI to predict the course of infectious disease epidemics. In 2017, the models, trained on a huge amount of data, reached 86% effectiveness in predicting the locations where the Zika and dengue virus outbreaks occurred within the following three months.

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Bill Gates TED Talk in 2015 is known primarily among people who consider the COVID-19 a global conspiracy. In fact, it is impossible not to notice similarities between the course of the current epidemic and the hypothetical super-virus pandemic described by Gates in his speech. He did not come up with this scenario on his own. On the basis of historical data and algorithms based on them, the AI generated a model predicting almost identical scenario as the one we are dealing with today.

They did help.

In the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic, Dario Gil, the Director of IBM Research, reached out to the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) through his White House contacts with a concise question: “How can we help?” Many parties offered their assistance. The US Department of Energy (DOE), which owns most of the world’s most powerful supercomputers, NASA, academic computer networks, Amazon Web Services, AMD, BP, the D. E. Shaw group, Dell, Google, HP, Microsoft, Nvidia and Intel = they all wanted to help. An association aiming at bringing together massive computing resources was established. Currently, 43 members of the COVID-19 HPC Consortium (High Performance Computing) provide scientists with over 600 petaflops (50,000 GPUs and 68,000,000 virtual processors) of computational power. This is not the only such initiative. The F@h (Folding@Home) project, which has been supporting scientists in developing new drugs by using computer simulations carried out on voluntarily shared resources since 2000, has also started to fight the pandemic. Every owner of a computer, smartphone and even a game console, after installing a special application, can make the device’s computing resources available to scientists. During the current pandemic, F@h has gained in popularity, and thanks to the involvement of thousands of people, a total computing power amounted to 2.43 exaflops (2.43×10¹⁸) in the first half of 2020. For the sake of illustration, this is roughly as much as the computing power of 480 million processors used in office computers.

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Many of the problems associated with the current epidemic have been solved using artificial intelligence. The developed models of virus spread allowed to predict where new hotspots may appear. Simulations based on the acquired data allowed the governments of many countries to take effective countermeasures, limiting the spread of the virus. Implemented solutions helped to track COVID-19 carriers and effectively predict the new outbreaks. Forecasting models have identified and continue to recognize the most vulnerable regions, people and countries, effectively predicting the forthcoming number of infections in any location in the world. This allows the health services to take appropriate preventive measures in advance.

In many countries, the burden on health professionals has been partly relieved by the artificial intelligence, which has taken over some of the doctors’ duties. The process of identifying potential COVID-19 carriers has already been improved. Furthermore, algorithms which diagnose the disease with extraordinary effectiveness on the basis of chest X-rays have been developed. The technologies used in, among others, the aforementioned F@h initiative, assisted in identifying drugs that help to treat patients with COVID-19. For example, clinical trials of Relaxifen would not have started without the Exscalate4CoV (E4C) project, a consortium of European companies and institutions, including the International Institute of Molecular and Cell Biology in Warsaw (IIMCB). Without the help of computers and artificial intelligence the process of searching for drugs would have been significantly prolonged. The procedures related to creating and testing the vaccine would also take years, instead of months. The help of AI brought us the last phase of vaccine testing within a year after the pandemic outbreak.

Artificial intelligence not only predicted the current crisis, but also proved to be helpful in treating COVID-19 patients and continuously monitoring their health. AI facilitates drug research by analyzing huge data sets, which exceed human capabilities. The ultimate victory over the virus will only be possible through the human-AI cooperation.

Author: Wiktor Sędkowski

Wiktor Sędkowski graduated in Teleinformatics at the Wrocław University of Science and Technology, specialized in cybersecurity field. He is an expert on cyber threats. CISSP, OSCP and MCTS certificates holder. Worked as an engineer and solution architect for leading IT companies.

The situation in the United States, the most powerful global superpower, is necessarily of interest to practically all countries in the world. On November 7 this year it was announced that Joe Biden won the presidential election and will become the 46^th leader of the United States. At the same time, Donald Trump declared that he would go to court to confirm the integrity of the electoral process. Although in the United States the electoral madness and internal turmoil associated with the presidential election is likely to continue in the coming months, it is worth to consider what may be the future course of American policy towards Europe, especially in terms of the countries in its central and eastern part, including Poland.

The topic that has dominated the public debate in Poland and abroad in recent weeks has undoubtedly been the United States presidential election. It turned out to be one of the closest, fiercest, but also the most significant election in the history of this nearly 250-year-old democracy. What does Joe Biden’s victory mean for Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries? What projects initiated by Trump have a chance to be continued by the new American administration?

The first term of President Donald Trump was not bad for Poland, for instance, it officially joined the US Visa Waiver Program. The Three Seas Initiative (3SI), which unites 12 Central European EU member states, was launched in 2016, during the Trump’s presidency, thanks to considerable support from the US. The Americans have announced that they will support Initiative’s energy investments with up to $1 billion. In this case, Joe Biden may continue the policy of his predecessor, which would be beneficial for Poland and the region. According to Michael Carpenter, Biden’s foreign policy advisor, the Three Seas Initiative is seen as a potential counterweight to the Chinese “One Belt, One Road” project. The 3SI is expected to support, among others, regional development of natural gas connections and LNG import capacity. It is crucial for Poland that the USA continues building the energy sector of the Three Seas Initiative.

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Donald Trump was also clearly in favor of increasing the energy independence of the US by developing oil and gas resources (including those from the so-called oil shale deposits). This clearly translated into greater US activity in terms of energy exports, especially LNG, which is particularly vital for reducing the dependence of many countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Furthermore, Trump announced support for the construction of a nuclear power plant in Poland. On the other hand, Biden was in favor of limiting oil and gas production in the USA. Trade of liquefied natural gas, i.e. LNG, is a significant aspect of the US energy partnership with Poland. In his election campaign Trump used the example of the successful American shale revolution, thanks to which the USA is slowly becoming an oil and gas exporter. Thanks to the US, progress is being made in the energy security of Poland and other CEE countries in the field of natural gas. In 2019, American LNG accounted for about 5.5% of Poland’s gas sources, while in 2017 it was nonexistent. Thus, the trend is dynamically growing. Liquefied natural gas, ordered by PGNiG (Polish Oil Mining and Gas Extraction), will be transported from the USA to Poland by two new LNG tankers. It is also worth mentioning that the global giant Shell has just opened its first LNG center in Poland, which is also the first one in the CEE.

While the withdrawal of American soldiers from Europe, based mainly in Germany, should be unequivocally assessed negatively, the expansion of the US military presence in Poland and the region should be considered an element strengthening our security in the long term. Many opponents of this policy (and of Trump) have forgotten that in the last years of Obama's presidency, when Joe Biden was the Vice President, the United States sent military personnel to Poland, which has since exceeded 4,000 people and is likely to be significantly increased, as announced by the US ambassador to Poland. It is the largest US military contingent on the eastern flank of NATO and the fourth biggest one in Europe after Germany (about 37,500), Italy (12,000) and Great Britain (8,300).

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Planned purchases of modern equipment from the USA (e.g. F-35) should be a valuable investment in our security. Should we save on it? History shows us that we should not. The question is what will Biden do, although it seems that he will not undo the decisions of his predecessor concerning such a strategic area of US foreign policy as security.

It is worth emphasizing that regardless who sits in the Oval Office, Europe has and will have a strategic importance for Washington. Despite the “Asian pivot,” the United States is aware that it is currently unable to compete with China without European support. The common, Euro-Atlantic security zone, despite the doubts periodically raised by some politicians, is of strategic importance not only for the US, but above all for European countries. Europe needs stability.

So does Poland, which has recently been rapidly catching up with the historical backlog and is becoming a leader in the CEE and globally (e.g. participation of our experts in G20 working groups). Moreover, Warsaw is building its position within the EU as well as is a source of invaluable realism and the voice of reason on key issues (e.g. responsible migration policy, social relations), which unfortunately is quite rare in the international debate.

Therefore, the election in the USA, no matter how exciting they may be, should be assessed carefully as well as in terms of Polish and regional interests. From the point of view of the Polish diaspora this may be complicated, but it should also not overshadow the essence of our true long-term relationship with the USA to our compatriots in America. Our relations and interests with the USA – economic ones, above all – are so extensive that we should approach the domestic disputes with due attention, but in particular with calm and optimism.

About the author

Tomasz Kijewski – Executive Director, Warsaw Institute

Scholarship holder at the Maastricht Center for Transatlantic Studies and George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (Garmisch-Partenkirchen/Washington, D.C.). Currently prepares his doctoral dissertation. As a diplomat at the Embassy of Poland in Canada he actively promoted a positive image of Poland and the Polish community in North America for over five years.

Russia’s 2007 cyber-attacks on Estonia did not cause any long-term harm. What they did, however, is they helped NATO realise the vulnerabilities of a country’s digital presence. As a direct consequence, NATO’s Centre of Excellence was founded to provide cyber-attack prevention and devise a specially dedicated military protocol applicable to the most modern type of warfare.

In the morning of 27 April 2007, Estonia’s digital services were down. It was the first massed attack in the world directed at an entire nation and not just a single institution. Amongst the entities affected were government bodies, police, banks, emergency centre, Internet service providers, online media, and enterprises. The attacks, though not sophisticated in their nature, were conducted at a significant scale – especially for Estonia, whose public services are to a large extent digitalised. For a total of 22 days, the attackers were flooding the country’s cyberspace through continuous sending of requests and spam messages.

Despite the simplicity of those actions, their volume was so large that the hosts of targeted services were incapable of handling them, thus disrupting the entire digital systems. Estonian intelligence agency quickly identified that the attacks were coming from the territory of Russia, which country rejected its neighbour’s formal request for investigation assistance. It was discovered, however, that users of Russian forums published calls for contribution in the attacks with simplified instructions on how it can be done. Additionally, some of the malicious queries contained indications of political motivations and the attackers’ Russian language background.

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After three weeks of attacks disrupting Estonia’s digital services, the warfare was countered with no long-term harm to the country’s servers and systems. It was time for the world to learn its lesson. Firstly, the West realised the vulnerabilities of a state’s cyber presence. From a theft of a society’s sensitive data, to interfering the entire country’s utility services such as electricity, safety, defence, financial services, and communication; a hostile nation could gain a tremendous military advantage remotely, without the victim even realising. Indeed, it was the first time in its history that NATO had received a request for assistance in cyber defence. At that time, cyber warfare was vastly unregulated; there were no international laws let alone specialistic protocols providing a scheme of defence. Nevertheless, the international military alliance had already been defending itself from digital threats on daily basis.

Even at the time Estonia was undergoing the crisis, the organisation was experiencing the same type of attack from the same source as the Baltic state. Not fully prepared for providing external help, NATO coordinated the member nations to collaborate on the resources available for helping Estonia. It was then unquestionable that a procedural improvement was needed and that in the coming years there would be more of such requests. Thus, NATO assessed its internal defence strategies and appropriate infrastructure, followed by a report issued to all allied defence ministers.

The report further evolved into cyber defence policy which then led to the creation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) and its establishment in Tallin. In fact, Estonia advocated its erection prior to its association to NATO, in 2003. The institution is now responsible for improving the interoperability of cyber defence within the member states and their systems, enhancing training, education, and spreading awareness of the issue, providing cyber defence support for experimentation, analysing the legal aspects of digital security, and contributing to the making of NATO’s security policy.

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In 2009, CCDCOE provided an international forum for experts, scholars and practitioners, to study how international law, especially humanitarian and jus ad bellum which describes the criteria under which entering a war is permissible, apply to the digital sphere. They later composed a manual describing how those laws should be interpreted in the context of cyber warfare. It was the first endeavour that used a comprehensive, analytical approach to the issue and clarified, at least to some extent, the legal matters surrounding it. Once published, the paper enjoyed vast coverage in popular media and sparked further professional study of cybersecurity.

Russia’s 2007 cyber-attacks on Estonia had only one long-term effect – prompting NATO to systematise its procedures and protocols regarding cyber safety assistance and to allocate more resources to extensive research and experimentation in this area. By doing so, Russia did nothing but pointed a crack in the West’s wall and suggested its renovation.