Shortly before the U.S. presidential election in November 2020, back when Donald Trump was in power, Poland and the United States signed a strategic agreement to cooperate on the development of the former country's civil nuclear power program. Poland wanted to build six reactors 6-9 gigawatts (GW) of nuclear energy capacity, with those of 6 GW capacity being able to cater for some 80 percent of the country's demand for electricity. According to the plan, it will select adequate technology in 2021, followed by the preferred site selection in 2022. The construction of the first plants will now not start until 2026 and the first reactor will begin operation in 2033. Before that, Poland and the United States will work together on a report delivering a design for implementing Poland’s nuclear power program. The agreement provides it will be ready over the next 18 months.

• Read also: U.S. and Sweden in Cold War Era

U.S.-Poland cooperation consists in supporting relevant business entities and government-led activities. Beyond that, the agreement defines areas of cooperation as steps ranging from regulatory, research, and training, through developing supply chains, to raising public awareness. The deal marks a major milestone for the Polish authorities––for twenty years, the country has relied essentially on coal for most of its power.

Nonetheless, this agreement was not the first sign of Washington's energy cooperation with Central and Eastern European states. It started back in 2019 when the Partnership for Transatlantic Energy and Climate Cooperation (P-TECC) was initiated in Houston. The platform was created as a pathway for enhanced cooperation between the United States and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe on energy security and the transition to clean, carbon-neutral economies.

In early September this year, the U.S. Department of Energy and the Ministry of Climate and Environment of the Republic of Poland organized the third edition of the Partnership for Transatlantic Energy and Climate Cooperation Business Forum. In opening remarks, Polish Climate Minister Michał Kurtyka said the increase in the amount of renewables in the energy mix caused new challenges for energy security, including energy storage or efforts to handle the periods when there was not "enough sun or wind." Nuclear power seems a good answer, according to Piotr Naimski, the Polish government minister responsible for energy security and infrastructure. "It is essential for a new face of the Polish energy sector to construct the entire branch of nuclear energy, through nuclear power plants. It is safe and reliable and a nuclear plant does not produce carbon dioxide so it is friendly to the climate while addressing relevant EU energy strategies," the Polish official was quoted as saying.

U.S.-Poland energy cooperation is reflected in some activities of both state-run and private companies. As the P-TEEC forum was wrapping up, a few U.S. nuclear businesses were already in talks with some Polish companies. Furthermore, Polish private businesses are also making efforts to develop this branch of the energy industry.

• Read also: Nord Stream 2 Divides Europe

In early 2019, Polish chemical giant Synthos opened talks with GE Hitachi, a joint venture between U.S. conglomerate General Electrics and Japanese tech company Hitachi, on the construction of BWRX-300 small modular reactor (SMR). Their concept emerged some ten years ago in the United States to reduce the high cost of building large nuclear power plants. Both small and micro reactors are easy to build and cheaper than a typical nuclear power plant. In addition, they are less expensive to operate, possibly generating more modest energy costs in Poland. Importantly, small modular reactors can be built in factories while their modules can be assembled just like Lego bricks to produce more power.

Two companies––Synthos and ZE PAK––will construct a nuclear power plant in Poland, based on the BWRX-300 technology, the two businesses announced in late August. A 300 MW capacity reactor is estimated to cost some PLN 3.8 billion while it is planned to build between four to six units. The first reactor in Pątnów near Konin is expected to become operational in 2030, or a few years before the launch of the state-run power plant. Interestingly, the project earned support from Georgette Mosbacher, former U.S. ambassador to Poland and a Donald Trump appointee. In addition, Poland's state-controlled fuel and energy giant PKN Orlen has signed a cooperation agreement with Synthos on small nuclear projects. Both companies are to define areas of cooperation. Similarly, KGHM, the Polish copper giant, has inked a joint commitment with the companies NuScale Power, an  American leader amongst producers of small modular reactors technology, and with PBE Molecule, to develop SMR technology. The first nuclear reactor is scheduled to be operational by 2029. Importantly, small reactors are unable to take over large state-run power plants. Instead, they complement them while gradually pushing out some of the fossil fuel generations. Thus they will be a vital addition to the energy transition process and fill in the void left by phasing out coal-based units. While private businesses keep concluding new deals, work is underway to draft the report for the Polish government.

Poland's "nuclear pathway" is key in many domains. An example is efforts to cement ties with the United States that cooled down after Joe Biden came to power. For Poland, a clear advantage of the nuclear energy pivot is to become independent of Russian energy commodities. This is essential now as gas has become a political weapon in Europe, especially after the Nord Stream energy pipeline was constructed.

A diversified energy mix that relies upon nuclear and renewable energy should in the future reduce energy prices, now growing amid the buoyant demand, also because of the prioritized manufacturing of electric vehicles in Europe. This is of top importance as countries such as Germany and the Netherlands––once green energy pioneers––are now producing more electricity in their coal-fired plants as they struggle with power outages. This stems from some political decisions to phase out nuclear power plants while the energy demand is rocketing, renewable energy sources are unreliable and provide less energy in adverse weather conditions, and gas storages now can hold too few commodities. In consequence, CO2 certificates trade high, prompting eye-watering energy prices, especially once combined with more expensive coal. There are also reports of power cuts in China, where more than a hundred factories have shut down as prices hit record highs amid coal shortage, forcing the country to ask Russia for help. This shows how important the energy market is now.

In this context, U.S. and Polish steps seem to push these two countries towards mutual benefits. The United States will be offered gigantic contracts while Poland is paving its way towards energy independence, zero-sum emissions, reduced tensions with Brussels and cheaper energy, the last of them poised to cheer up the public. It remains to be seen whether the Polish government did it right. Yet, many signs are that it indeed did. What confirmed that these efforts were successful was when France asked Poland and other states to sign a letter defending nuclear energy.

Author: 

Jakub Łyjak graduated from law at the University of Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań and economics at the Poznań University of Economics. He also studied Business Administration (Betriebswirtschaftslehre) at the Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität in Münster. He gained professional experience in the field of law and non-governmental organizations, including Polish Entrepreneurship and Leadership Association and Center for American Studies.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

More information:
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The period after the end of World War II was a time when European countries had to rebuild damaged economies. Nonetheless, the Swedish economy was soaring as the country's authorities continued to trade with both sides for most of the war. A stable economic policy was followed since the early years of the twentieth century despite two world wars.

The nineteenth century brought a new meaning to neutrality in international relations. In addition to political neutrality, a state rooted in an economic or maritime policy planned well in advance that favored one of the sides, people expressed a desire to avoid wars. Neutrality emerged as a response to lengthy wars the world saw in the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth century, combined with spiritual renewal and social commitment, a behavior pattern that gave rise to religious peace movements, notably in the United States[1]. In Sweden, an increasingly liberal society took on an added importance. Two world wars voided peace efforts and the Cold War-era tension ensued. Sweden was a rare example of a country following and sticking to the policy of non-alignment. It was a tough challenge, though, especially in the face of the dynamic situation on the geopolitical chessboard. Sweden had to alter its already flexible foreign policy to attain its goals.

NATO Tug of War

The period ending World War II was marked with political tension. It quickly became apparent that Europe would be torn into two conflicting blocs––the Soviet Union and its Communist client states and U.S.-led capitalist countries. The division was then sealed by the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance in 1949 and the Warsaw Pact in 1955. Significantly, countries of Scandinavia adopted a distinct foreign policy. The idea of cooperation in the Scandinavian defense bloc––born back in the nineteenth century––reemerged right after the war ended. At that time it was essential to defend these countries against possible Soviet aggression while forging military and political ties. Intense cooperation talks began in 1948, sped up by a Communist coup in Czechoslovakia. Nonetheless, the idea was ditched because of simmering tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union and distinct views on the alliance and its future goals[2].

In consequence, Norway, Iceland, and Denmark were among the founding states of NATO while Sweden continued to pursue the policy of non-alignment. Just a year before the military bloc was created, Finland signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union amid the situation in Europe and its location, becoming a de facto neutral state.

• Read also: Nord Stream 2 Divides Europe

The period after the end of World War II was a time when European countries had to rebuild damaged economies. Nonetheless, the Swedish economy was soaring as the country's authorities continued to trade with both sides for most of the war. A stable economic policy was followed since the early years of the twentieth century despite two world wars. Ravaged European economies unveiled a growing demand for Swedish raw materials, notably iron. Furthermore, a new post-war economic order was designed to foster both economic growth and peaceful interactions between states. It was established at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, where the United States was a top decision maker and guarantor. According to Jakob Tanner, "the two main institutional pillars of the new order were fixed exchange rates and – in the long term – free currency markets based on current account convertibility. In order to meet these two contradictory goals, the architects of the Bretton Woods System decided to introduce a gold-dollar standard[3]." The United States took most of the new system yet its stable position was to guarantee the development of all the countries involved. Sweden––just like other Western countries––agreed to follow it. This yet does not mean the new arrangements were unfavorable for Sweden––the country joined the system relatively quickly. Sweden also shared the benefits of the Marshall Plan.

• Read also: We’ll keep homes supplied if energy firms go bust

After 1945 the country was in a good economic situation and welcomed bright development prospects. In 1946 Per Albin Hansson, Sweden's long-standing prime minister, died unexpectedly. His efficient policy made Sweden retain its sovereignty during World War II and maintain economic growth. Sweden skilfully switched sides in the conflict––a somewhat ambiguous statement in face of its policy of neutrality and non-alignment––which sealed its friendly ties with other Western countries. An imminent U.S.-Soviet war was obvious by that time. The descending Iron Curtain––prophesied by Goebbels in a speech and then Churchill at the Fulton conference––slowly became apparent. Sweden was away from the boundary. However, its top threat was possible Soviet invasion. Soviet troops were in Finland a year before the end of the war, thus Finland was forced to sign a ceasefire deal and make some considerable concessions. Nonetheless, the country's skillful diplomats prevented it from becoming a Soviet satellite state. Having experienced German occupation and deprived of any assistance from Sweden, Denmark and Norway could not rely on a spirit of Scandinavian unity or joint military defense. The UK-occupied Iceland was not drawn into the Scandinavian defense bloc. A top victor of World War II, the United States devised a defense policy plan for Europe. Sweden was aware of Washington's influence and awaited tough talks. These fears were not unfounded––as Swedish foreign officials would soon find out.

Author:

Adrian Kolano

Editorial director of the European Foreign Affairs. Graduate of history at the University of Rzeszów and international relations at the University of Warsaw. Scholarship holder at the University of Lund. He is interested in current political affairs in Sweden as well as the security and history of the region.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

More information:
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Possibly by sending its gas through Ukraine, Russia could refrain from offering more generous support to pro-Kremlin rebel fighters while the Russian-German Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline could come as a threat to both energy and national security of many European states.

The first White House visit by Ukraine's head of state in over four years

The consequences of Nord Stream 2 may in the first place be negative for Ukraine, which Washington is already well aware of. After the meeting of the leaders of Ukraine and the United States, the White House promised further political support for Kyiv and a $60 million increase in military aid, bringing the total U.S. aid for this year alone to more than $400 million.

Ukraine yet said it expected more generous financial support to rebuild its fleet, buy Javelin anti-tank missile, and develop its air defense and missile systems, with exorbitant estimates of their total worth some $22 billion. Zelensky made it abundantly clear what he hoped to get out of his first official visit to the White House in four years (August 31), which was more U.S. equipment to aid in his country's fight against pro-Russian separatists.

• Read also: We’ll keep homes supplied if energy firms go bust

It is worth noting that at the meeting of the U.S. and Ukrainian leaders, which did not fully satisfy Kyiv with its outcomes, the Biden administration gave its blessing to Nord Stream 2 which is a threat to energy and national security across the region. In September 2021, a joint statement was released by the Warsaw Institute, backed by more than twenty European and U.S. NGOs, calling to halt the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline[1].

The U.S. as the largest provider of military aid to Ukraine

The United States is the biggest single supplier of military aid to the Kyiv government. Alexander Vershbow, a former U.S. ambassador to Moscow and now an analyst at the Atlantic Council think tank in Washington, claims this aid should be bigger as the Ukraine-Russia conflict continues in its eighth year, with well more than 13,000 dead. The Biden administration said the small size of the package was due to concerns about igniting the Russian-Ukrainian conflict more than that. Vershbov disagreed with that, saying U.S. surface-to-air missiles would ensure Russia refrains from using aircraft to support the separatists in eastern Ukraine[2].

The U.S.-based Heritage Foundation wrote in a report that it is in America's interest that Ukraine remains independent and sovereign, and that it maintains the ability to choose its own destiny without outside interference. President Biden should reaffirm the United States' advocacy for Ukraine's future NATO membership, supply more weapons to Ukraine, and maintain sanctions pressure on the $12 billion Nord Stream 2 pipeline project. According to the Heritage Foundation, President Biden should corroborate Washington's support for Ukraine's future NATO membership, supply more weapons to Ukraine with fewer restrictions, maintain sanctions pressure on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, and buttress Ukraine during this especially risky time[3].

Will Russia seize other Ukrainian regions?

As all eyes are now on Afghanistan, tensions simmer in eastern Ukraine as the country lost some of its territories as a result of the 2014 conflict. Shortly before the U.S. and Ukrainian presidents met, Ukraine said that shelling from rebel-held areas in the east had wounded at least six troops and disrupted railway service. Russia said two civilians had been wounded in shelling from the Ukrainian[4] side.

• Read also: US Evacuation from Afghanistan: Haste Makes Waste

Money is a big issue for Kyiv. Ukraine now makes some $1.5–2 billion for energy transit through its territory. National security is another key issue there. Gas flows through Ukraine prevent Russia from launching an all-out military intervention in the neighboring state, according to the CEO of Naftogaz, Ukraine's state-run energy company[5]. Nord Stream 2 comes as a threat to both the energy and national security of many European countries.

As Russia is bracing for the rapid completion of its Nord Stream 2, not only does Russia refuse to extend the existing transit deal with Ukraine, but it also fails to meet its commitments by 2024. Warsaw Institute experts said U.S. and German pledges to do their utmost to continue Russian flows via Ukraine are rather meaningless[6].

Even though completing Nord Stream 2 is a foregone conclusion for many abroad, it is vital for politicians to oppose the project after it is made operational. Those that are right in this case are countries like Poland that are merit solidarity with their NATO and EU allies. Defending national and energy security is among top priorities for societies aspiring to freedom and sovereignty alongside efforts to shield civil liberties. What should guide them there is tenacity, efficiency, and hope to attain positive goals.

author:

Tomasz Kijewski – President of the Warsaw Institute.

Scholarship holder at the Center for Transatlantic Studies in Maastricht, the Netherlands, and the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (Garmisch-Partenkirchen/Washington DC). For many years he served as a diplomat actively promoting Polish interests in North America. He completed a course at the International Energy Agency (IEA) in Paris and was an International Visiting Advisor on Energy in Calgary. He is currently preparing his doctoral dissertation on national security.

In an interview with the BBC, Steve Rosenberg, the network’s Moscow correspondent, quoted a senior Russian official, who claimed that ‘in many ways, the relationship between the East and the West right now is worse than during the Cold War’. Indeed, signs of mutual US-CEE hostility are present since the Obama era, as the White House reacted coldly to Russian annexation of Crimea, the destabilized rule of Ukraine and the imbalance of democratic institutions in Poland and Hungary. With Xi Jingping and Vladimir Putin as constantly growing competitors, will Biden uphold the delicate balance between continuing the legacy of Donald Trump’s foreign policy and keeping a firm stand against the expansion of Russian and Chinese spheres of interest?

Upon Donald Trump’s election in 2016, and in the wake of his presidency, the Central-East Europe region was clearly divided into two distinct groups: the first, such as the Czech Republic or Germany, approached the new president with skepticism, and bemoaned his lenient approach towards Vladimir Putin, as well as the tightening of relations with Great Britain, which at that time struggled to leave the European Union with the Conservative Party at the helm. The other group, including the likes of Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia, saw Mr. Trump’s reign as an opportunity to create a powerful ally, helping them in their relative isolationism from the EU.

• Read also: 90 Years of the Polish Cipher Bureau

This isolationism is highly influenced in these countries’ tendencies to tread towards autocratic measures: Viktor Orban, the Prime Minister of Hungary, famously passed a law allowing him to rule by decree indefinitely in March 2020. These measures, leading the NGO Freedom House to list Hungary as the first country in the EU to not be fully democratic, have been echoed in Poland, where the government’s intervention in the freedom of media, judiciary and the country’s Supreme Court have been bemoaned by the international forum. Mr. Trump turned a blind eye to these infringements, reaffirming his will to cooperate with the countries to destabilize the influence of US greatest competitors—China and Russia—in the region.

However, upon the beginning of Biden’s presidency in January 2021, these countries found themselves in an uncomfortable position of wishing to remain in alliance with the US led by a president who does not share their rather conservative values. Before the inauguration of Biden in Washington DC, many media outlets questioned what his approach towards the CEE would manifest. His fierce stance against Russian influence—both domestic and foreign—was, for some, a prophecy of increased American influence in the region: a task made simpler by Donald Trump’s amicable relations with Hungary and Poland.

It now seems that ideological differences overcame a pragmatic wish of cooperation. Biden has often been seen at odds with the Polish governing party’s reforms, regarding the media and the establishment of the so-called „LGBT-free zones“ in some Polish municipalities, which led to a cooling of relations between the two countries. Budapest’s approach towards the new presidency was not very different. Mr. Orban has always supported Donald Trump; he was one of the first EU leaders to congratulate Trump on his election in 2016 and hosted him during an official visit in March 2019, where both men exchanged compliments. Hungarian Prime Minister also had a fierce mutual disdain towards the Democratic Party, calling them ‘moral imperialists’. In return, he has been called a practitioner of ‘illiberal democracy’; a bone of contention present since 2010 and the clashes between Mr. Orban and the Obama administration, in which Biden served as Vice-President.

• Read also: Law Enforcement Versus Cybercrime

During that administration, the D.C.-Budapest relationship seemed to have died down—and it is likely that President Biden may use the same approach towards ‘illiberally democratic’ CEE states. Aside from the indirect criticism of the rule of Poland’s governing party and the cooling of relations with Mr. Orban, an example of such an approach could be Slovakia, whose democratic index has fallen, according to the NGO Sustainable Governance Indicators. Though unofficial information sprung up around April 2021 about a possible visit of the US President to Bratislava, as of July 2021, no such visit has been officially announced, meaning Mr. Biden probably will not visit a CEE capital in 2021.

One may ask – if Mr. Biden does not plan to claim influence over the CEE area, what is the alternative? There are currently two other powers who might fill the void after Mr. Trump’s departure—Russia and China—but both these alternatives seem short-lived. President Xi undertook several initiatives to strengthen Chinese influence, mainly through the 17+1 initiative created by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs back in 2012. Though an ambitious endeavor, it has been criticized for its ineffectiveness, as it served mostly for CEE states to gain a better negotiating position against China than vice versa.

Russian dominance in the region does not seem likely either, partly because of most countries‘ troublesome history with USSR and its successor, but mostly because of Vladimir Putin’s ambitions in the region, as well as in the international field. A perfect example of such an attempt at creating reliance is the infamous Nord Stream 2, which is perceived by some to be a geopolitical tactic to make Europe dependent on Gazprom’s supplies. Both Poland and Hungary have voiced concerns over the building of the line, and Ukraine, being omitted in the scheme, understandably opposes it as well. It is worth mentioning that both Germany and the US, sensing an opportunity to establish better relations, waived sanctions on the architechts of the scheme, much to the CEE’s dismay.

So, what does the future hold for Mr. Biden and his relation with Mr. Orban, Mr. Duda, Miss Čaputová and others in the region? It seems that the new president is not interested in practicing the same techniques of foreign policy as his predecessor; rather, he focuses mostly on the West and an improvement in relations with Germany and France. And although one may expect another superpower to fill in the void of influence, based on current ambitions and failures of Russia and China, it seems unlikely that any of them will get closer to Europe’s east. Their future may be twofold; they will either aim to integrate closer with the European Union, reforming their judiciary systems to comply with the European community’s guidelines, or they will be left without a major ally, unable to steadfastly push their agenda on the international front. Whatever the case may be, Joe Biden does not see the CEE as a battlefield with Russia or China, nor does he see it as a potential ally; only the future may show if he will regard it as a friend or a foe.

author:

Kacper Nowak
Former student at Dulwich College, begins studying Human, Social and Political Studies at Cambridge University in October 2021. Passionate about politics and international relations, particularly those pertaining to economics and sustainability. Kacper is currently a Policy Analysis Intern at the Warsaw Institute.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

More information:
www.warsawinstitute.org/support/

August 30, 2021, when the last US Air Force aircraft took off from Kabul airport, marked the end of the nearly two-decade-long US intervention in Afghanistan.

The mission in Afghanistan was one of the major issues that Joe Biden had to deal with after becoming the US President. His predecessor, Donald Trump, had previously negotiated a deal with the Taliban, an Afghan fundamentalist Islamic group, in which they pledged to cut ties with terrorist organizations, particularly al-Qaeda, and guaranteed no support for attacks against the US and its allies. They also assured about the effort to reach an agreement with the US backed democratic government. In return, America presented a timetable for the withdrawal of the US and NATO troops, which would eventually lead to a departure from the country. Above all, Trump wanted to maintain peace while ending the “endless” war. Such a resolution of the Afghan issue was to benefit both the United States and its allies, spending billions to maintain military bases on another continent, as well as the Taliban, who would thus gain wider international recognition and greater influence over the country’s future fate. Moreover, Trump hoped that this move would bring him victory in the then upcoming presidential election, which did not happen.

• Read also: Law Enforcement Versus Cybercrime

After Biden’s presidential victory, experts predicted that the Democrat would want to cancel the decisions of his predecessor, because a chaotic withdrawal of US troops could contribute to destabilizing the situation in the region. It is worth recalling that the US mission in Afghanistan began in October 2001, shortly after the 9/11 attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C. This was due to the assistance that the Taliban, in power at the time, were giving to terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda, responsible for these tragic attacks. One of the “successes” of the American intervention was the overthrow of the Taliban rule and the killing of al-Qaeda leaders. Contrary to expectations, however, Biden assessed that the objectives of the military intervention in Afghanistan had been achieved. Moreover, in his opinion, the prolonged military presence no longer guaranteed peace in the region.

As a result, on April 14, 2021, Joe Biden announced the end of the intervention and the withdrawal of all, i.e., about 3,500, troops stationed in Afghanistan, setting the deadline as September 11, 2021, the 20^th anniversary of the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City. These sudden decisions forced similar actions to be undertaken by the NATO countries participating in the mission. As a result, thousands of servicemen, diplomats, and their families had to leave the country in a short period of time. The evacuation did not end until late August, but the Taliban took military action as soon as the Americans left their bases. Although a long civil war or even a partition of the country was expected, the situation clarified in about a week. Back in July, the US president argued that the Afghan army was as well-equipped as any other army in the world, allowing the US-backed government to maintain its authority. However, reality has shown otherwise. The isolated government forces failed to fight against the Taliban, in effect surrendering city after city and eventually the entire country.

The return of the Taliban, an Islamic fundamentalist organization, indicates the collapse of democracy and the return of the regime based on sharia, associated with the loss of civil rights, especially the women’s rights (as could be observed during the recent protests in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan). Moreover, this situation raises concerns about the potential increase in the number of terrorist attacks in the world. Especially since the Americans left military equipment worth, according to experts, about 85 billion dollars, when abandoning their military bases. It is an equivalent of nearly four times the annual budget of the Polish Ministry of Defense. Consequently, a huge number of weapons, aircraft, helicopters, off-road vehicles, and drones were acquired by the Taliban. While some of the equipment would not be used by them since they are not familiar with the American technology, there are legitimate concerns that some of the seized weapons could be sold on the black market.

• Read also: 90 Years of the Polish Cipher Bureau

These fears seem to be confirmed by a military parade, which recently took place in Kandahar, Afghanistan’s second largest city, where the Taliban originated. The new “acquisitions,” such as HMMWVs and UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, were presented during the cavalcade.

Joe Biden summed up the end of the intervention in Afghanistan by stating that “the era of great American military interventions aimed at building states and democracies is over.” At the same time, he pointed out that the United States is now facing challenges on multiple fronts, such as Russia or China, and cannot afford to be stuck in Afghanistan for years to come. Moreover, he pointed out that the trillions of dollars spent on this mission could be better allocated and support the country’s growth. The president also announced that the US will continue to fight terrorism, however, without waging a ground war. Besides, the US will take care of human rights not through military interventions, but through diplomacy, pressure, and building international coalitions.

The rapid evacuation of troops from Afghanistan was assessed, already under Trump, as a potential cause of a civil war, a humanitarian crisis, and a new wave of refugees. Hence, the decisions taken by Joe Biden were negatively evaluated by both US allies and Americans. Recent polls in the US have shown that the military intervention in Afghanistan was, according to most American citizens, their country’s failure. This also influences the support of the incumbent president. According to the polls, before the decisions related to the evacuation were made, Biden had a 60% approval rating. In August this rating dropped to 46%. It seems that this sudden and chaotic exit from Afghanistan wasted 20 years of American presence in that country, and its outcome will be similar to the state of affairs in 2001. The sense of failure was complemented by the bombings in Kabul, which occurred during the evacuation at the airport, and which led to the death of more than 80 people, including 13 US soldiers. The so-called Islamic State claimed responsibility for the bombings.

To sum up, the events discussed above will certainly affect the perception of the US in the international arena. It can also be concluded that the new president does not do well in diplomacy, as his actions towards Russia have shown. The Nord Stream 2 could serve as an example here. In this case, the Biden administration changed its mind several times, first promising to “use all the tools” to prevent the Russians from completing the project, to later (after few months) give the green light for its continuation. All this could contribute to the loss of the superpower status by the United States, the one that it had at the beginning of the Afghan war.

Author: 
Jakub Łyjak graduated from law at the University of Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań and economics at the Poznań University of Economics. He also studied Business Administration (Betriebswirtschaftslehre) at the Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität in Münster. He gained professional experience in the field of law and non-governmental organizations, including Polish Entrepreneurship and Leadership Association and Center for American Studies.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

More information:
www.warsawinstitute.org/support/

Due to the intense activity of cyber criminals, authorities in many countries have long been looking for legal and technological solutions to effectively combat computer crime. The successful prosecution of cyber criminals faces numerous difficulties that have to be overcome in order to find and punish the perpetrators.

Various crimes occur every now and then both in the real and online word. The most common type of cybercrime is fraud. It is evolving at a very fast pace as well as becoming more and more complex. Apart from that, there are other crimes and offenses, such as impersonation, unauthorized acquisition of information, computer eavesdropping, thwarting the acquisition of information, thwarting access to computer data, computer sabotage, spreading malicious software, cracking, and many others. In the United States, the FBI leads the national effort to counter cybercrimes, including cyberterrorism, espionage, computer hacking, and major cyber fraud. The FBI continuously adapts to meet the challenges posed by online criminals. Consequently, special officers have been trained and delegated to each of its 56 field offices. Additionally, a Cyber Action Team (CAT) has been established – it could be relocated anywhere across the country within hours in order to respond to major incidents.

• Read also: Illegal Migration: A New Weapon?

Moreover, the FBI has the support of cybersecurity specialists working in embassies around the world and collaborates with international institutions that fight against cybercrime. The Agency’s resources also include Cyber Watch (CyWatch), a 24/7 command center for intrusion prevention and response operation. CyWatch processes threat reports coming in from across the country, assesses them for action, and engages the appropriate units (other intelligence and law enforcement agencies) in the field for immediate action. To coordinate all actors, the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF) was established in 2008. It comprises more than 30 partnering agencies, including law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and Department of Defense entities that work together to ensure cybersecurity.

For a long time, Poland has been developing units operating in the field of cybersecurity, both civilian and military ones. The Central Office for Combating Cybercrime, which performs tasks related to the creation of conditions for the effective detection of perpetrators of crimes, committed with the use of modern information and communication technologies, has been operating under the auspices of the National Police Headquarters for many years. What is more, the Department for Combating Cybercrime was established within the Central Investigation Bureau of Police a few years ago. Within the Polish Research and Academic Computer Network (NASK), there is a team called CERT Polska, which is responsible for, to date successfully, monitoring Internet threats and incidents at the national level. Military cybersecurity establishments include, among others, the National Cybersecurity Center, the Cybersecurity Operations Center, the Military Counterintelligence Service, and the Cybersecurity Training Center of Excellence. As it could be noticed, the number and diversity of these institutions is quite large. Therefore, at the end of July 2021, it was announced that the Central Office for Combating Cybercrime will be established. It is expected to commence its operation on January 1, 2022, and reach full readiness in 2025. Since competencies useful in tracking down online criminals are valued, the Office will have a separate pay scale, different from that of other units of the police.

Cyber policemen are to receive a fixed allowance increasing their salary by an additional 70–130%, which should translate into final earnings close to those of IT specialists in the regular market. Detailed plans are not known, but since institutions dealing with cybercrime have existed before (and were severely underfunded), it seems natural that some of the current employees will be transferred to the new Office. This will allow to step up efforts and adopt a model similar to that implemented in the United States. The competences of the new unit are expected to be very broad. In the draft law, published by the Ministry of the Interior and Administration, it is specified that the new Office will create software to break, for instance, passwords or encrypted communication. The new police unit will have the ability to break, also remotely, any security measure, e.g., to a cloud drive. This could be invaluable, for example, in the fight against crimes related to pedophilia.

• Read also: 90 Years of the Polish Cipher Bureau

Undoubtedly, the establishment of the Central Office for Combating Cybercrime and securing funds for ensuring network security, is a step in the right direction. We have been observing an increase in cybercriminal activity for some time now. Surely, it will become even more frequent and its consequences will be more serious with the development of the Internet and the services dependent on it.

Author:

Wiktor Sędkowski graduated in Teleinformatics at the Wrocław University of Science and Technology, specialized in cybersecurity field. He is an expert on cyber threats. CISSP, OSCP and MCTS certificates holder. Worked as an engineer and solution architect for leading IT companies.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

More information:
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In mid-1931 the Polish Cipher Bureau was formed by the merger of two units dealing with counterintelligence and cryptology – the Radio-Intelligence Office (Referat Radiowywiadu) and the Polish-Cryptography Office (Referat Szyfrów Własnych). The Bureau dealt with both cryptography, i.e. the production and supervision over the correct use of ciphers, as well as cryptology – studying of ciphers and codes, mainly for the purpose of breaking them. From the very beginning, the Bureau's staff worked in four units: (1) own ciphers, (2) eastern radio intelligence, (3) Russian ciphers, and (4) dealing with German radio intelligence and ciphers.

A very modern solution, applied during the establishment of the Cipher Bureau, was to hire mathematicians to work at the key posts. This idea, then innovative in Europe, had been earlier implemented in the United States. One of the first people employed in the Signal Intelligence Service (SIS), founded in the USA in 1930 for the purposes identical to those of the Polish Cipher Bureau, were mathematicians. It is worth mentioning that the American National Security Agency (NSA) was established in November 1952 on the basis of Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), which had replaced the SIS. Frank B. Rowlett – a mathematics teacher from southern Virginia, was pioneer in the SIS. Later, in April 1930, Abraham Sinkov and Solomon Kullback, math teachers from New York City, had also joined this organization. In Poland, where a similar solution was applied, the Cipher Bureau hired mathematicians of the Poznań University who, on the recommendation of Professor Zdzisław Krygowski, had earlier took part in a cryptology course, prepared for the most talented students of mathematics by the Cipher Bureau. The core team included Marian Rejewski, Jerzy Różycki, and Henryk Zygalski who were given the task of breaking the German cipher device – the Enigma machine. The effects of collaboration between American and Polish teams were noticeable almost instantly.

• Read also: Pegasus Affair: Who Was Wiretapped in the Middle East?

Within a few years, in the US, Rowlett and his co-workers broke the Japanese cryptographic machine 91-shiki ōbun injiki, used for encrypting diplomatic communication. In Poland, a year after the launch of the Cipher Bureau, Marian Rejewski used the group theory to break the Enigma. Numerous historians consider this event as groundbreaking, while experts in the field refer to it as “a remarkable event in the field of cryptanalysis, one of the greatest in the history of this domain.” Years after the end of World War II, one of the theorems, which Rejewski formulated and proved while attempting to break the cipher, was described by Irving Good, a British mathematician who worked as a cryptologist at Bletchley Park along with Alan Turing, as “the theorem that won World War II.”

Rejewski's great achievement did not mean that the work on Enigma has ended. Although the team managed to break the cipher and even reconstruct the machine, the cryptanalysts still had to solve the problem of decrypting secret messages within a decent time frame. In order to do this, the decryption process had to be automated. Rejewski's team a created a cryptological “Bomb,” a machine whose name came from a sound it was making during an automatic search for a correct arrangement of movable cipher cylinders, which allowed to find a decryption key. This challenge became even more significant when the Germans improved Enigma, which increased the complexity of the cipher, by adding two additional cylinders in 1938. Despite the enhancements made by the Germans, the Poles were able to break German messages without any major issues. The measure of the Cipher Bureau's efficiency were its statistics and at the beginning of 1938 those looked impressive. During one of the training sessions, the Cipher Bureau broke 75% of German cryptograms – no other cryptologic service in the world had such achievements.

Throughout that time (1932–1938), Polish intelligence was passing on German military messages, deciphered by the employees of the Polish Cipher Bureau, to its allies (the French and the British). However, it was not until 1939 that Poland decided to share with them the method that allowed the Bureau to obtain secret information. For this purpose, in spring 1939 a meeting of Polish, English, and French cryptologic services was held in Pyry, Poland. Apart from a copy of the Polish deciphering machine (“the Bomb”), the Polish services handed over to their allies the full documentation of mathematical assumptions and algorithms, related to the Enigma's ciphers, as well as the instruction manual for the Polish machine. This took place on July 25, 1939, just before the outbreak of World War II.

• Read also: Illegal Migration: A New Weapon?

After the outbreak of war, the Cipher Bureau was relocated to France, where Polish cryptanalysts continued to break German ciphers. After the German invasion and the fall of France, they had to be evacuated from its territory. Jerzy Różycki died in an accident of a French passenger ship on January 9, 1942. Rejewski and Zygalski made their way to Spain, although with great difficulties, where they were robbed and later arrested. After being freed, they travelled through Portugal and Gibraltar to Great Britain. There, they were enlisted in the Polish Armed Forces as privates and posted to a Polish Army facility in Boxmoor, where they were tasked with breaking German SS cipher codes. Polish mathematicians who laid the foundations for the decryption of the German Enigma were not sent to a center in Bletchley Park (Great Britain), established in 1940. Consequently, they found themselves on the sidelines of the developments in cryptology. However, American cryptologists did end up there. In 1942, five months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Solomon Kullback was sent to Great Britain where at Bletchley Park he worked with the British on breaking German cipher messages. The Enigma decryption became an exclusively British and American domain. Polish mathematicians were excluded from further contributions to this field while at Bletchley Park “very few even knew about the Polish contribution.”

After the war, Kullback and Rowlett returned to the United States, where they worked together again. Frank B. Rowlett became the chief of cryptanalysis at the newly formed NSA. Kullback accepted a position at the NSA as head of the data processing automation department, where he supervised 60 engineers working on innovative tasks. Henryk Zygalski decided not to return to Soviet-occupied Poland after the war, he remained in Great Britain and taught mathematics in a provincial school. In 1977 he received an honorary doctorate of the Polish University in Exile and died in 1978. Marian Rejewski returned to Poland where he started to work for a cable manufacturing company in Bydgoszcz. Between 1949 and 1958 Rejewski was persecuted and repeatedly investigated by the Polish Office of Public Security. He died of a heart attack on February 13, 1980, at the age of 74. He was interred with military honors at the Powązki Military Cemetery in Warsaw.

Breaking the ciphers of the German Enigma and deciphering German messages had a decisive influence on the course of the war. Historians estimate that if the Allies had not learned many German plans in advance, the war would have lasted three years longer. Millions of human lives were saved as a result of the work of cryptologists and analysts of the Polish Cipher Bureau, American SIS, and British GCCS.

Author:

Wiktor Sędkowski graduated in Teleinformatics at the Wrocław University of Science and Technology, specialized in cybersecurity field. He is an expert on cyber threats. CISSP, OSCP and MCTS certificates holder. Worked as an engineer and solution architect for leading IT companies.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

More information:
www.warsawinstitute.org/support/

The case of Pegasus, an Israeli software that allows various intelligence services in its possession worldwide to infect and take control over almost any device, returned again in mid-July 2021. According to the latest reports, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have used it extremely often, both to monitor their own citizens (particularly those critical of their own governments) as well as politicians of other countries, especially from Egypt and Iraq.

Pegasus is a spyware developed by NSO Group, a company established by former Israeli intelligence officers. It is not precisely known when it was founded, however, experts indicate that it was created in 2013 or afterwards. It is used to track, eavesdrop on, and take control of various devices (mainly cell phones), among others. The Israeli authorities classify this software as a weapon, which means that its export must be approved by the government. A number of countries have purchased this technology, officially for the purpose of fighting crime and terrorism. In 2019, it was suspected that Poland, specifically the Central Anticorruption Bureau (CBA), had acquired it as well. However, the recent years, have been full of controversies and reports that Pegasus was also used by the governments of certain countries to spy on multiple “inconvenient” politicians, activists, journalists, or businesspeople. Especially states that are known for a rather “flexible” approach to human rights and democracy.

• Read also: Illegal Migration: A New Weapon?

The first such case was uncovered in 2016 – then the general public became aware of this technology. In the following years, several more leaks occurred, the latest of which was publicized this July by The Pegasus Project – an international investigative journalism initiative led by the Paris-based NGO Forbidden Stories and Amnesty International, in collaboration with more than 80 journalists representing 17 news organizations in 10 countries. One of them, Daraj, focuses on the cases of Pegasus use in the Middle East, specifically by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The disclosed information shed a light not only on how the governments of these countries fight domestic opposition, but also on the balance of power and international politics in the region.

The services of NSO Group have “enjoyed” great and long-standing popularity with the Saudi Arabian and Emirati governments, which are among the major users of Pegasus, according to reports. The 2016 case, which made Pegasus widely known, was in fact a failed attempt to install it on a phone of Ahmed Mansoor, an Emirati human rights activist, who in 2018 was sentenced to 10 years in prison for “spreading false information, instigating religious conflicts, and defaming the state” on social media. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia was allegedly using the software to spy on Jamal Khashoggi, a journalist who criticized Riyadh and was murdered inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018. Allegedly, Pegasus was used to spy on him and his family – both before and after his death. Other people supposedly targeted by the software included: Haya bint Hussein (former wife of the Emir of Dubai), Latifa Al Maktoum (daughter of the Emir of Dubai who tried to flee to India in 2018), Alaa al-Siddiq (Emirati human rights activist), and Loujain Alhathloul (Saudi women’s rights activist).

As Daraj reports, Saudi Arabian authorities were apparently using Pegasus not only domestically, against various dissidents, but also to spy on politicians, often high-ranking, of other countries (including its allies). Such was the case of Egypt, where, according to the journalist’s investigation, the software was used for surveillance of Sameh Shoukry, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and one of the most important figures of the post-revolutionary Egyptian regime. Other high-profile politicians whose numbers have been identified as Pegasus victims include: Mostafa Madbouly (Prime Minister), Mohamed Maait (Minister of Finance), Mohamed Hossam Abdel-Rahim (Minister of Justice until December 2019), Yasser Elkady (Minister of Communications and Information Technology until June 2018), and Ahmad Hafiz (Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). According to the reports of Daraj, Saudi Arabia was behind the wiretaps and the individuals listed above were said to have fallen victim to the software between March and August 2019. This was a particularly intense period in Egypt’s foreign and domestic politics – several strategic laws were either debated or passed, such as the exploration and extraction of minerals from black sand deposits, the new $11.2 billion sovereign wealth fund, and constitutional amendments. Moreover, significant international meetings took place at the time: Shoukry’s talks with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo (March 26, 2019); the Arab League summit in Tunisia (March 31, 2019), on the sidelines of which (March 29, 2019) the Foreign Ministers of Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq discussed the security situation in the region (President Al-Sisi, King Abdullah II, and then-Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi had also met five days earlier); Shoukry’s visit to Palestine, which included talks with President Abbas (May 24, 2019), and to Baghdad (August 4, 2019), where he yet again met with his Jordanian and Iraqi counterparts; Egyptian-Greek talks on the division of territorial waters in the Mediterranean Sea that were directed against Turkey (August 7, 2019); as well as further talks with Pompeo (August 19, 2019). All this suggests that while Saudi Arabia has remained Egypt’s key ally in the region since President Al-Sisi came to power in 2014, Riyadh is still distrustful of Cairo, especially in terms of its foreign policy, which Saudi Arabia would like to control. This may have to do with the fact that although Egypt’s position has declined sharply in recent years, particularly due to economic reasons, it continues to militarily surpass other Arab countries and seeks to rebuild its historical role of the leader.

• Read also: Artificial Intelligence on the Battlefield

Another Arab country whose top politicians fell victim to Pegasus was Iraq. Its intelligence services had long suspected that the country was under mass surveillance, but rather that of the United States or Iran, which have long engaged in the struggle for influence over the Euphrates River. However, the journalist’s investigation into the Israeli software revealed that the UAE and Saudi Arabia were in fact spying on Iraqi politicians and that the UAE was far more active in this regard. Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi was said to be one of those whose phones were infected with Pegasus, when he was the director of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service. What is more, the list of affected people included: the former Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi, President Barham Salih, and the Speaker of the Council of Representatives of Iraq Muhammad al-Halbusi. Journalists, military officials, activists, and even Muslim clergy, including Ali al-Sistani, one of the most influential individuals in the country, may have also been wiretapped, apart from the politicians. Iraqi Kurdistan authorities, including Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, have been among them too. Another large group reportedly targeted by Pegasus comprised individuals associated with Iran (including Iranian diplomats in Iraq) and Shiite militias loyal to it. The latter encompassed Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, Deputy Chairman of the Popular Mobilization Forces (al-Ḥashd ash-Shaʿbī, PMF), who was killed in a US drone strike in early 2020 along with Iranian General Qasem Soleimani. As the Puls Lewantu website notes, this shows that although formally the Saudi Arabian and Emirati authorities show no interest in the situation in Iraq and have taken little action to combat Iranian influence in the country to date, thanks to Pegasus they were well aware of what was happening there, both among the political elite and commanders of pro-Iranian militias.

Interestingly enough, the wiretaps published to date have revealed that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have not used Pegasus to monitor their main regional adversary – Iran (apart from the diplomats operating in Iraq). According to Daraj, this might be connected to the position of Israel, whose authorities must authorize the use of NSO Group technology by other countries, and which wishes to have exclusive rights to eavesdrop on that state. Either way, the Pegasus row confirms that Saudi Arabia and the UAE were already cooperating closely with Israel long before the latter officially established diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv in August 2020. Both countries firmly deny any use of the technology, while NSO Group assures that their software was used for surveillance of citizens who could be “inconvenient” to either regime. Nonetheless, the results of the journalist’s investigation would impact relations of Saudi Arabia and the UAE with their Arab partners. Moreover, the Pegasus affair once again shows how technology, which has become an indispensable part of our lives, can also be used as a tool for mass surveillance and espionage. Certainly, it would be naive to think that such practices started along with Pegasus, however, such information always raise legitimate concerns about the degree of state’s interference in our privacy. Especially when we hear that this technology is used against people who criticize certain governments or are the heads of other, sovereign states. Similarly, the Pegasus case shows that countries considered undemocratic, in whose case one might have doubts about the use of these tools, do not have to develop such software themselves – they can obtain it elsewhere.

author: Maciej Śmigiel

A graduate of the Arabic and Islamic Studies at the University of Warsaw, where he was granted scholarships to Egypt and Morocco. Currently a PhD candidate at the Doctoral School of Humanities (cultural and religious studies). He gained his professional experience as a trainee at the Counter-Terrorism Center in Internal Security Agency, Embassy of Poland in Cairo and National Security Agency.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

More information:
www.warsawinstitute.org/support/

After Donald Trump ordered to build his famous wall, illegal traffic dropped by roughly 90 percent between 2019 and 2020 in Yuma, Arizona. It is not an isolated example of ad-hoc measures to counter modern border threats to state security. A slew of EU and NATO countries, including Lithuania, Estonia, and Hungary, followed suit.

Now thousands of migrants are flocking to tiny Lithuania.

Lithuania's parliament––a NATO and EU nation––has voted in August 2021 to build a fence on the most vulnerable section of its border. It will run for 550 kilometers (340 miles) to protect Lithuania––a country with a population of just over 2 million––against an influx of migrants seeking to enter it from Belarus as the latter is conflicted with the West.

Over 4,000 migrants have already entered Lithuania illegally from Belarus this year[1]. Without this physical barrier, it is impossible to protect borders, according to authorities in Vilnius. Lithuania aims to build a 4m (13ft) metal fence on the border with Belarus. It is expected to cost about $178 million. The European Union said it would not finance the fence, a project to boost the bloc's security. It has offered help in the form of border guards and supplies instead.

• Read also: Artificial Intelligence on the Battlefield

Iraqi and Afghan migrants on the Baltic Sea?

Lithuania blamed the regime of President Alexander Lukashenko for this sudden uptick in illegal cross-border migration. Relations between Belarus and Lithuania deteriorated further in June 2021 after Belarus forced a Ryanair flight heading to Lithuania to divert to Minsk and arrested a Belarusian opposition journalist on board. Since security forces in Belarus unleashed a bloody crackdown on people protesting against the rigged election in 2020, authorities in Minsk are clashing with opposition figures. Earlier, presidential challenger Svetlana Tikhanovskaya had found shelter in Lithuania; the woman led protests to overthrow the regime of Alexander Lukashenko, also known as color revolutions that the Kremlin sees as the top threat. Shortly after, there was an unexpected upturn in illegal cross-border migration from Belarus to Lithuania, Poland, and Latvia. Many come from distant non-EU countries in the Middle East. Lithuania blamed Belarus for offering migrants flights to allow them not to cross other state borders to reach the Baltic Sea region.

In power since 1994, Lukashenko accused Lithuania of deliberately provoking his government into a reaction at the border. The Belarusian president says the migrants Lithuania turns away will not be allowed back into Belarus. Furthermore, Latvia declared a state of emergency at its Belarus border, authorizing the border guards to use physical force to return migrants to the country from which they came[2].

"Migration wars": a new form of threat to the West

As for security, there is a question whether Lithuania could become a new Greece that had seen an influx of migrants as the first EU nation. Offering flights to migrants from the Middle East is another example only to Hungary that also mainland countries could witness irregular migration on their territory. According to some experts, a surge of migrants could be a form of hybrid warfare and a plan to attack EU and NATO states. This had already featured the 2015 migration crisis when EU officials said an influx of migrants was part of a hybrid warfare campaign, staged by EU neighboring countries to force some concessions.

• Read also: Eastern Europe, Huawei and 5GEastern Europe, Huawei and 5G

Dr. Jacek Raubo was right to note that what is now taking place on the Lithuania-Belarus border should be a warning sign to Poland and other NATO states amid migration pressure[3]. The situation involves urgent measures to boost the number of personnel, training schemes, coordination both nation and worldwide, and resilience of state security services, also those responsible for border security. A mass exodus of migrants into the United States––notably since Joe Biden has taken office––is a vivid example that responsible and nation-oriented policy must not underestimate this risk. This also refers to defense spending in general. According to Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, the first Polish minister for European affairs and now a member of the European Parliament, Poland and other NATO countries in peril should increase their defense expenditure to 4–5 percent of their gross domestic product, or the level that is accurate for frontline states. It seems a good and urgent idea to oblige citizens of Poland and other NATO countries to serve through universal military training––even short and cursory.

Hybrid warfare is composed of three stages. First, efforts are made to destabilize the country by fueling invented internal disputes and social tensions and then to damage the economy, infrastructure, and reputation worldwide. The last step consists of replacing democratically elected authorities with a puppet political group that pursues the interests of the aggressor––either consciously or not[4]. Migration pressure falls into the first two categories.

Hybrid activities, where disinformation serves a pivotal role, are a key part of the threats above. We should be aware of that while browsing through stories and catching inaccurate or fake news in both domestic and foreign policy debates in the United States, Europe, or elsewhere in the world. This is often disinformation that has nothing to do with the facts, albeit once it is attractively served, it captures the attention of media outlets and websites that disseminate the content thoughtlessly because emotion-based stories sell well while resembling a catchy novelty. So "by their fruit you will recognize them," as a common-sense slogan goes.

Author's bio

Tomasz Kijewski – President of the Warsaw Institute.

Scholarship holder at the Center for Transatlantic Studies in Maastricht, the Netherlands, and the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (Garmisch-Partenkirchen/Washington DC). For many years he served as a diplomat actively promoting Polish interests in North America. He completed a course at the International Energy Agency (IEA) in Paris and was an International Visiting Advisor on Energy in Calgary. He is currently writing his doctoral dissertation on national security.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

More information:
www.warsawinstitute.org/support/

“The strategic independence of Europe is our new common project for this century”: with these words European Council President Charles Michel remarked the EU vital objective driving the Recovery Plan[1]. The European Commission has underlined several times how strategic autonomy should encompass a variety of sectors, ranging from economy to security. With the election of Joe Biden in the United States the pillar of security and defense, fundamental to European strategic autonomy has received growing attention. The US President – a convinced transatlantist, has renewed and reinforced his commitment towards NATO and fulfilled his wish of a stronger and more independent Europe capable of standing next to the US in the face of Chinese and Russian security threats[2].

The attention on EU strategic autonomy has increased along with recent profound shifts in the international system, in particular, those concerning the rise of China and the often-aggressive foreign policy carried out by Russia. These developments have rendered evident how the US “no longer represents the world’s undisputed hegemon” [1]. Since its creation, the EU has developed and grown following principles of the international liberal order based on US-driven practices, organizations, and laws[2]. However, the changes in the global stage and the past four years of Trump Administration have shaken the EU. The political and economic union reached the conclusion that it could not rely on the US as it had done in the past and should therefore develop its own strategic autonomy. This is not to say that US-EU relations are at stake. Rather, in the current multilateral global order, the EU achieving strategic autonomy could reinforce and help redesigning Transatlantic relations. On the other hand, it is also true that the relationship between the EU and the US in the defence sphere is slightly asymmetrical as the EU strongly depends on US[3].

• Read also: Eastern Europe, Huawei and 5GEastern Europe, Huawei and 5G

Soon, the EU should aim to strengthen solidarity and deliver new tangible assets and capabilities to be able to face a wide range of threats. For this purpose, it is essential for EU Member States to define European common goals and understand what kind of capabilities will be needed to face current and future security threats[4]. Undoubtedly, fragmentation within EU Member States’ defence strategies, investments, and capabilities represent one of the main weaknesses of the EU that would significantly benefit from a more integrated and cohesive approach towards security and defence policy. To face this, EU Members have called for a comprehensive approach to security enhancing more efficient cooperation, resourceful and technological capacities, and joint information sharing, intelligence and risk assessment in the New Strategic Agenda (2019-2024)[5].

If the EU wants to achieve strategic autonomy and diminish its level of reliance on the US, and achieve further integration, addressing these issues must become a top priority. Thus, further discussion at the EU level on security and defence should be focused on budgets, strategic priorities, capabilities, and policy developments with particular focus on cyber security and on the creation of a common understanding in relation to Russia, China, and other EU neighbours[6]. In the cyber realm, considering the EU weaknesses in terms of network and information security, and of EU laws’ gaps[7], bilateral cooperation and consultations with the US could be particularly helpful for the EU to strengthen its response towards this kind of threats following the path of a more experiences ally.

The past four years with the US under the Trump Administration, during which he repeatedly showed a “selective engagement” in world affairs and EU security when American “direct interests were not at stake”, have proven to the EU that it cannot rely on the US as it had done in the past[8]. Hence, in an age characterized by multipolarity, the idea of a strategically independent EU has regained popularity as it would both reinforce transatlantic ties, and foster responsibility and autonomy for the EU across surrounding regions and transnationally. On the US side, with the advent of the Biden administration, the approach towards EU security and defence has radically changed with the US President sustaining and welcoming growing investments in the EU military capabilities in order for the US and EU to share the defence burden more equally[9]. Washington’s purpose is to support its European allies in capacity building and to increase inter-European training exercises within the context of NATO to reinforce the existing strategic partnership[10]. In this regard, one of the main commitments of the EU should be increasing its military spending. Even during previous US Administrations, American Presidents have been frustrated by the EU Members States’ reluctance to meet the US demands on this matter. A first crucial step to achieve autonomy would be meeting the investment and budget requirements as that would constitute an essential pre-condition to achieve autonomy and be able to gain more responsibilities – particularly in terms of handling security threats across its own geographic area. Of course, this, as mentioned above, requires EU Members to revise their internal policies in terms of defence and military capabilities – as they are responsible for investments in the military area at the national level. Such revisions would help harmonize national security policies at the EU level first, and subsequently develop cohesive supranational policies on this matter.

• Read also: Artificial Intelligence on the Battlefield

The shift in the US approach towards EU strategic autonomy under the Biden Administration can be a crucial factor in shaping, encouraging and supporting the European strategic autonomy project. In fact, the next four years represent an unprecedent opportunity for the EU to renew transatlantic relations, modernize, and shape them according to the current international developments. Not only for the EU, but for the whole Western hemisphere, a renewed EU-US partnership could be of vital importance in regulating geopolitics with China and Russia. A vital feature of this partnership has been highlighted by President Emmanuel Macron who stated that European “strategic defence autonomy can be … a very solid component” of transatlantic relations[11]. President Biden seems to be on the same page. During his visit to the EU he underlined his commitment to this project and to the Alliance several times, stressing how it is fundamental for both EU and US to stand stronger together and to reinforce their partnership not only in the security defence sphere, but also in relation to climate, public health, and technology, which threats must be addressed collectively than individually[12].

author: Ludovica Balducci 

Ludovica graduated MA International Relations from the University of  Groningen, the Netherlands, where she specialised in International Security. She is a research and analysis assistant at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy. Ludovica gained professional experience at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, United Nations International Crime and Justice Research Institute, and International Relations Institute in Prague. Her research focuses on EU Security and Defence policies, hybrid warfare and modern security threats, EU-NATO relations, and EU external relations. Ludovica is currently a Policy Analysis Intern at Warsaw Institute.  

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

More information:
www.warsawinstitute.org/support/