The technology advancements of the last decade have transformed the competition between the US and China into a dispute concerning the control over global Internet infrastructure. As the geopolitics surrounding the 5G rollout intensify, technologically developing Eastern Europe has become a centre of the conflict. The Sino-American struggle over 5G networks in the region places Eastern European countries in a difficult position both in terms of geopolitical loyalties and technological and economic development.

Geopolitics of the 21^st Century: The 5G Race

The traditional understanding of geopolitical competition defined by the control over natural resources and territories has been blurring as the significance of technologies like 5G increases.[1] The fifth-generation technology, popularly known as 5G, represents the upgrading of mobile, telecom and internet infrastructure from the existing 4G.[2] This upgrade promises to deliver highly responsive networks and faster wireless services[3] that could reinvent the business world by improving cost effectiveness and increasing productivity.[4] Yet this advancement involves a range of challenges since 5G networks will be considerably more complex than current networks due to their increased density.[5]

On a geopolitical level by becoming 5G providers states may interfere in client state’s data traffic thereby gaining control over its unencrypted content.[6] Consequently, as the determining critical information infrastructure of the next decade, the 5G rollout has been embedded in a range of controversies[7] as states compete to gain dominance over the construction of said networks.[8]

• Read also: Artificial Intelligence on the Battlefield

These conflicts have mainly emerged from the Chinese multinational technology company Huawei and the head of the previous 4G rollout: the US government. China’s notoriety for industrial espionage[9] has led to concerns regarding Huawei’s potential ties to the Chinese intelligence services.[10] According to US authorities, Huawei, which translates into “China with achievements” in Mandarin[11], is legally obliged to execute intelligence work for the Chinese government.[12] This accusation was reinforced by the fact that the founder of the company, Ren Zhengfrei, was found to be a former engineer for the People’s Liberation Army and a member of the communist party.[13]  Huawei’s involvement in the 5G rollout is therefore believed to carry significant security implications such as the risk of the Chinese government tracking critics, gathering intelligence and stealing intellectual property.[14]

The US government, which has been the leading voice in the anti-Huawei movement, has already banned the company from its domestic market.[15] The governments of Japan, Australia, New Zealand[16], and Sweden[17] have followed its example. Nonetheless, as Huawei tries to penetrate the European market the US’ anti-Huawei campaign follows.[18] As a consequence Europe, Eastern Europe specifically, has become a centre of the Sino-American digital conflict.

Eastern Europe: Huawei vs. the US 

The lack of a common 5G deployment within the European Union[19] has led to the contracting of different 5G providers across member states as well as to substantial gaps in the 5G infrastructure development between Western and Eastern Europe.[20] According to the 5G Readiness Index, the latter has fallen substantially behind. [21] As a consequence, Eastern Europe has become both the centre of Huawei’s expansion efforts and the focus of the US’ 5G security initiative “clean network”[22] aimed to secure the networks from “untrusted vendors”[23]. Eastern Europe thus finds itself divided between the US and China.

Supporters of the American anti-Huawei movement include states like Poland and Romania which view the US as a primary security provider.[24] Romania has adopted the harshest position towards the Chinese 5G provider.[25] In a joint statement in 2019, Romania and the US stated their mistrust towards Huawei based on an alleged case of espionage.[26] Despite the tech company’s denial of this accusation, Romanian President Klaus Iohannis proceeded to introduce a bill to effectively ban Huawei from taking part in 5G development in the country.[27] Romania has not been the only Eastern European state to take legal action against the company. Poland has operated along similar lines after two secret service agents and an ex-employee of Huawei were arrested over espionage charges in January 2019.[28]

• Read also: 35 years after Chernobyl: Eastern Europe’s Nuclear Energy Landscape

However, regardless of the US’ conviction, there have been several critical voices questioning the US’ representation of Huawei as a security threat. Firstly, it must be noted that Huawei is not a state-owned but a private company[29]. Secondly, as indicated by Qing Wang, professor of Innovation at the University of Warwick, affiliations to the People’s Liberation Army are common among people from the Chinese countryside like Zhengfrei since they represent a means to escape poverty.[30] Likewise, to date, there has been no public indication that demonstrates technical vulnerabilities within Huawei networks.[31]  As a consequence, Eastern European states like Hungary have not shared Romania’s and Poland’s mistrust towards Huawei. In fact, the Orbán government recently announced the opening of the Huawei Research and Development Center in Budapest.[32]

Viewing these conflicting positions countries like Serbia find themselves in a ‘though spot’ with respect to the decision of either joining the US’ clean network initiative or entering a contract with Huawei.[33] Although the division in Eastern European countries’ stances towards Huawei can be interpreted through the lens of geopolitical loyalties, the economic implications of 5G must not be disregarded.[34] In effect, consideration for the economic implications of 5G is necessary to fully capture the security dilemma posed by the 5G race.

The Digital Security Dilemma

As stated before, the evidence in support and opposition to Huawei’s connection to the Chinese government have led to differing security assessments. A report by NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) provides clarity. It has found that despite the lack of public evidence to support the claim of technological vulnerabilities within Huawei equipment, “it is fundamentally impossible to rule out potential technology flaws that can be exploited in the future”.[35] Huawei’s 5G networks can thus not be disregarded as a potential security threat. On the surface, it may thus appear “evident” which position Eastern European countries must assume in regard to Huawei.

However, one must not forget the beforementioned technological advancement and economic benefits of 5G networks[36] which would bring reliable connectivity, infrastructure, and new services to the countries.[37] Additionally, despite Washington’s support in the implementation of anti-Huawei bills, the US government effectively fails to offer a competitive alternative.[38] Although banning Huawei may mean minimizing cybersecurity risks, it also comes at a great economic cost to the region, one that some countries like Hungary are unwilling to take. Huawei published that, based on Oxford Economics predictions, banning the company from the 5G rollout could raise the cost for countries by 8-30% in a decade.[39]

The 5G race has not only placed Eastern European countries in a difficult position regarding their geopolitical loyalties but has also prompted the dilemma of whether the increasing security risks involved in technological development are justified for the sake of economic growth.

As technology defines the future, Internet infrastructure providers have moved from being a mere technological choice to becomeing a substantial security concern. The conflict between the Chinese technology company Huawei and the US government over the 5G rollout in Eastern Europe makes evidence of this shift in geopolitics. Eastern Europe, aiming to catch up with its Western neighbours in the field of 5G infrastructure, has found itself divided between entering a contract with Huawei or joining the American clean network initiative. Although the US’ accusations cannot be argued to be completely grounded, the potential security risk posed by Huawei must not be disregarded. YNevertheless, cybersecurity represents only one dimension to Eastern European countries’ struggle to position themselves in respect to the dispute. The long-term economic benefits of 5G rollout and the accessibility of Huawei’s services have placed the countries in a security dilemma in which technological development and economic growth must be weight against national security.

Author: Aitana Garcia Domingo is a final year student of the faculty of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick in Coventry, England. She specializes in international security and European public policy. Her main areas of interest include: gender and conflict, modern history, human rights and international security. Given her specialization in European public policy, she is currently working as a public sector consulting intern for Everis Spain’s international organizations team. She is also a Policy Analysis Intern at Warsaw Institute.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

More information:
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The use of artificial intelligence (AI) in decision-making systems and conventional solutions of the military is no longer surprising. What is eye-opening, however, is the possibility of using it without human supervision. When Deep Blue computer won a chess game against world champion Garry Kasparov in New York City in 1997, most experts perceived this event as a sign that AI is catching up with human intelligence.

Wall-Defender is a computer game that only older readers or die-hard fans of retro games may remember. Created in 1983 for the Atari 2600 platform, the game allowed the player to take on the role of a fortress defense commander. An 8-bit processor, 128 bytes of RAM, and technical limitations related to graphics display left a lot of room for the player’s imagination [1]. Today’s computers, equipped with incomparably more powerful processors and graphics chips can do much more. A “Wall-Defender” in 2021 does not display a bunch of pixels simulating an enemy, leaving the battle with a virtual opponent to the player. The “Wall-Defender” in 2021 fights a real enemy in real-time.

• Read also: 35 years after Chernobyl: Eastern Europe’s Nuclear Energy Landscape

Operation Guardian of the Walls [2] began after unrest in Jerusalem led to rockets being fired from Gaza into Israeli cities. The first firing of 38 missiles occurred on April 23 and 24. Between May 10 and 18, more than 3,440 rockets were fired toward the cities of Sderot, Ashkelon, Ashdod, and Jerusalem. The Iron Dome defense system intercepted more than 90% of the rockets that were heading towards the inhabited areas. It was designed to detect as well as destroy rockets and 155 mm artillery shells. The Iron Dome is effective against missiles fired from up to 43 miles away. Using AI algorithms, the system analyzes whether a detected series of short-range rockets and missiles threatens the population or critical infrastructure of the country [3]. If the AI system identifies such a threat, it automatically sends a command to launch an interceptor missile that neutralizes the threat at high altitude or in an uninhabited safe area. The system is also operational in the US since 2021 – the US Army has recently activated two Iron Dome defense batteries at Fort Bliss, TX. They are planned to be used in military exercises later this year and become fully operational in 2023 [4].

Operation Guardian of the Walls was not only about using the existing defense system – during the conflict the Israeli army used numerous innovative solutions. Consequently, many experts [5] claim that the fight turned into the world’s first AI-led war. Israel planned its attacks on Gaza with the use of AI. Huge amounts of data collected from open-source intelligence (OSINT), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), and human intelligence (HUMINT) were analyzed in order to carry out the so-called precision attacks. On the basis of satellite images, information from sensors, radars, UAVs, and other sources, the Israeli army was able to obtain accurate 3D images of the Gaza Strip as well as identify the locations of rocket launchers installed by Hamas. Moreover, the AI identified the types of weapons at the enemy’s disposal and, on the basis of the acquired data, determined, in real-time, the safest routes for ground troops operating near the front line. “For the first time, artificial intelligence was a key component and power multiplier in fighting the enemy,” an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Intelligence Corps senior officer said in a commentary, a part of the Jerusalem Post article [6].

Additionally, this report highlighted the importance of the work of soldiers in Unit 8200, who authored the algorithms and code for advanced programs called “Alchemist,” “Gospel,” and “Depth of Wisdom,” which were developed and used during the combat. “Gospel” helped the IDF military intelligence division to improve intelligence recommendations and identify key targets, which were then passed on to the air force to carry out attacks. The Israeli military says that AI helped to shorten the duration of battles as well as increase the effectiveness and speed of detecting targets of the attacks thanks to the super-cognition technology (recognition carried out by AI). According to it “Israel had managed to achieve more in 50 hours of fighting than in the 50 days of the war in 2014.”

Indeed, the 2021 Israel-Palestine crisis can be called the first AI-led war, but it is worth noting that AI has long been present on the battlefield. UAVs, fire-control systems (FCSs), drone swarms; means of reconnaissance, data exchange, and aggregation – these and multiple other elements are effectively used not only on the training grounds, but also during actual clashes. The conflicts in Syria or Ukraine could serve as an example.

The use of AI in decision-making systems and conventional solutions of the military is no longer surprising. What is eye-opening, or rather intimidating, is the possibility of using it without human supervision. When Deep Blue computer won a chess game against world champion Garry Kasparov in New York City in 1997, most experts perceived this event as a sign that AI is catching up with human intelligence. Subsequent scientific analyses have played down the significance of this event, trying to prove that Kasparov lost because he played the game “uncharacteristically badly.” What is more, the intellectual value of chess as a game was questioned, arguing that the computer can plan it by using brute force algorithms (checking every possible solution). Another clash in 2020 showed that humans are no longer a worthy opponent for well-trained AI.

• Read also: Technology and democracy: A new challenge for European security?

In a simulated F-16 dogfight between an US Air Force pilot, a graduate of the F-16 instructor course at the Air Force Weapons School with over 2,000 hours of flight experience, and an AI developed by Heron Systems, the human pilot lost 5-0 in five different maneuver scenarios [7].

Everything indicates that AI will play an increasingly significant role during armed conflicts. There is no doubt about it. Therefore, the limitations that decision makers have to place on AI systems are extremely important. Their growing autonomy requires taking appropriate precautions and, above all, prudence from the designers and operators of such systems.

Author:

Wiktor Sędkowski – graduated in Teleinformatics at the Wrocław University of Science and Technology, specialized in cybersecurity field. He is an expert on cyber threats. CISSP, OSCP and MCTS certificates holder. Worked as an engineer and solution architect for leading IT companies.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

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[1] https://archive.org/details/Videogaming_and_Computer_Gaming_Illustrated_1983-09_Ion_International_US/page/n37

[2] https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2021-05-12/eskalacja-konfliktu-izraelsko-arabskiego

[3] https://analyticsindiamag.com/israels-iron-dome-puts-ai-at-the-forefront-of-modern-warfare/

[4] https://www.defensenews.com/land/2021/02/15/iron-dome-plans-being-finalized-as-us-army-begins-training-on-systems/

[5] https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/The-first-AI-conflict-Israel-s-Gaza-operation-gives-glimpse-of-future

[6] https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/gaza-news/guardian-of-the-walls-the-first-ai-war-669371

[7] https://www.airforcemag.com/artificial-intelligence-easily-beats-human-fighter-pilot-in-darpa-trial/

The year 2021 marks the 35^th anniversary of the disaster in the nuclear power plant (NPP) of Chernobyl. It is often described as the worst nuclear accident known to humanity[1], with its fatality rates reaching the five-digit numbers[2]. Despite being badly affected by the accident, Russia is now notorious for dominating the nuclear energy market in Eastern Europe. Three and a half decades after the fallout seems an opportune time to critically reflect on the current state of the nuclear energy landscape in Eastern Europe and Russia’s central role within it.

The Chernobyl Disaster: An Overview

The Chernobyl NPP disaster occurred on April the 26^th of 1986 due to the failure of a scientific experiment[3] that led to the release of radioactive materials into the environment[4]. This leak caused the contamination of approximately 400.000 square kilometers[5], with radiation circulating to this day[6]. Although the Eastern European countries of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus were among the most affected, prevailing wind patterns resulted in the long-range transport of radionuclides throughout Europe[7]. An estimated 5 million people were found to be contaminated with radionuclides in regions surrounding the Chernobyl NPP[8]. The damages’ total costs exceed the $200 billion mark[9]. The Chernobyl fallout also significantly impacted Eastern Europe’s natural ecosystem and agriculture, although the magnitude of the harm remains disputed[10].

Viewing the enormous human, environmental and economic cost of the disaster, one would expect a harshening of nuclear energy policies in the affected regions. However, the impact of the Chernobyl accident on energy policy has been conflicting[11]

• Read also: Joe Biden’s Approach: The Paris Agreement

Chernobyl: Lessons Learned and Unlearned

During the first decade after the disaster, its repercussions remained present in Soviet and later Russian decision-makers’ minds[12]. The first set of Russia’s new energy policies, released in 1995, envisioned the expansion of alternative sources of energy such as natural gas[13]. Yet this negative sentiment towards nuclear power did not last. In the following years, rising oil prices increased the international demand for natural gas, whereby Russia decided to raise its gas sale rate and cover the domestic market through nuclear power[14]. This shift in the Russian energy strategy is known as the ‘nuclear renaissance’.[15] Russia’s nuclear renaissance peaked in 2007 when the previous ministry for atomic energy was transformed into the state cooperation Rosatom[16].

Today Rosatom’s activities reach far beyond Russia, with the state cooperation controlling over 17% of global nuclear fuel production[17]. Nuclear goods export has become a key objective of Russian energy policy.[18] According to Rosatom’s website, 20 nuclear reactors are planned for export construction in Bangladesh, Belarus, China, Egypt, Finland, Hungary, India and Turkey. The state cooperation is also expected to pitch for a contract with Bulgaria[19]. The global popularity of Rosatom as a supplier can be traced back to its ‘all-inclusive’ package, which covers all stages of the power production[20]. This ability of the supplier to rapidly adapt to the market’s demands[21]  has been attributed to its unrestricted access to tax-based Russian state funds[22]. However, Rosatom’s growth and growing position as NPP constructor has raised safety concerns among Western observes[23]. The development of Russian energy policies post-Chernobyl shows that the lessons learned by the disaster were buried under Russia’s eagerness to exploit the nuclear energy market. The advancement of Rosatom’s activities, particularly in Eastern Europe, raises concerns regarding the future of alternative energy sources in the region.

Rosatom, Nuclear Governance Standards and Geopolitics

Over the past decades, Russia has been active in expanding its strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces[24]. The Federation of American Scientist estimates that Moscow disposed of approximately 4,315 nuclear warheads in January 2020, 36% of which are considered of offensive strategic deployment[25]. European NATO allies have continually expressed their concern about Russia’s nuclear modernization programs[26].

Amidst these tensions surrounding Russia’s nuclear weapon program, Rosatom has been accused of weakening nuclear governance standards to meet the Russian government’s growth ambition. The United States, among other Western countries, have been notably reluctant to believe that Rosatom follows the standards enforced by global nuclear governance frameworks[27]. This skepticism was specifically targeted towards the state cooperation’s disregard of EU policies on hybrid threat assessments[28]. Western countries’ distrust towards Rosatom’s activities also stems from the fact that many of its clients dispose of significant gaps of knowledge and capability concerning nuclear infrastructure and regulatory supervision[29]. These concerns were confirmed earlier this year when members of the European Parliament (MEP) demanded the suspension of the commercial launch of the Rosatom-constructed NPP in Astravets, Belarus[30]. The authorities of the only 23km distanced Lithuania had previously denounced that the grounds on which the NPP’s construction had been planned were unstable and that the risk of earthquakes had not been tested sufficiently to deem the site safe[31]. Similarly, Rebecca Harm, a former German MEP, stated that the Astravets NPP had not passed the EU’s stress test in 2018 and that the technical deficiencies revealed by the test could not possibly have been reversed since then[32]. Although Rosatom rejected these claims, MEPs proceeded to vote 642 to 29 in favour of stopping the NPP’s launch until further investigation[33].

Even though Astravets NPP’s case is indicative of the safety concerns regarding Rosatom’s rising nuclear activities, the scientific community remains divided on the likelihood of history repeating itself. The World Nuclear Association claims that evidence collected over the past six decades demonstrates that nuclear power plants constitute a safe means to generate energy both at present and in the future[34]. Such predictions, however, operate under the premise of compliance with international quality and safety standards[35]. As the association indicates, NPPs operate under the logic of ‘low probability but high-consequence risks’[36]. Given Rosatom’s rapid expansion, the probability of another nuclear accident is likely to increase if European nuclear energy policies continue to be disregarded. Experts warn of the danger and call for higher policy[37] enforcement and the need to hold the provider liable for potential accidents[38].

The growth of Rosatom’s activities poses not only a threat to international safety but is also a tool of geopolitics. Nuclear energy exports hold a strategic value to Russia since they can be employed as foreign policy tools[39]. Eastern European countries like Belarus and Hungary are becoming vulnerable to Russian influence as the state creates firstly energy dependency and secondly economic reliance through credit arrangements[40]. To illustrate the latter, the Astravet NPP was entirely financed by Russia[41]. Similarly, Hungary proceeded to violate European legal standards by awarding Rosatom the construction of two reactors without the completion of an open tender [42]. The European Union advises against dependence on Russian nuclear fuel supplies and instead recommends diversification[43] to avoid cases like Ukraine (subject to several gas supply cuts from Russia from 2006 onwards[44]). It appears that in the 35 years since Chernobyl, Rosatom has turned nuclear energy export into a geopolitical tool.

• Read also: Alone Against the Entire World

Conclusion

Three and a half decades after the Chernobyl accident, its human, economic and environmental cost remain undeniable. Even so, its effects on Russian energy policy have been conflicting. State-owned Rosatom has grown to dominate the nuclear energy market at the expense of Russian taxpayers and possibly international safety. Although the likelihood of a second nuclear disaster remains disputed, the NPP in Astravets and other upcoming projects raise concerns about Rosatom’s activities in Eastern Europe and their possible effect on EU nuclear policy compliance. Moreover, the increased state cooperation has exacerbated the risk of NPPs being employed as a foreign policy tool. In views of Russian energy policy, the risk of history repeating itself cannot be discarded.

Author: Aitana García Domingo

Aitana Garcia Domingo is a final year student of the faculty of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick in Coventry, England. She specializes in international security and European public policy. Her main areas of interest include: gender and conflict, modern history, human rights and international security. Given her specialization in European public policy, she is currently working as a public sector consulting intern for Everis Spain’s international organizations team. She is also a Policy Analysis Intern at Warsaw Institute.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

More information:
www.warsawinstitute.org/support/

General Stefan Rowecki, nom de guerre: Grot (Spearhead)

The 78^th anniversary of the arrest of General Stefan Grot-Rowecki was commemorated in Poland on June 30, 2021. The history of this soldier, a warrior for freedom and independence of Poland, was inextricably linked with the fight against the enemies of the Fatherland during World War II.

“I am the Home Army”

Stefan Grot-Rowecki, described by the Germans as “Third Reich’s public enemy number one,” was the chief architect of the Polish Underground State. He organized the ranks of the Home Army (Armia Krajowa, AK) and was its first commander. Moreover, he was the only one who could say “I am the Home Army.[1]”

On the initiative of Grot-Rowecki, the most important national conspiratorial organizations were united, which made it possible to create a uniform underground army. In 1941, upon the special order of General Sikorski, the Union of Armed Struggle (Związek Walki Zbrojnej, ZWZ) was recognized as part of the Polish Armed Forces. A year later, it was transformed into the renowned Home Army – Grot-Rowecki became its Commander-in-Chief. He was in charge of its Headquarters, (Komenda Główna) which included intelligence and communications units, the Bureau of Information and Propaganda, as well as the Directorate of Diversion. In total, the Home Army had up to 200,000 men (according to German intelligence).

• Read also: Joe Biden’s Approach: The Paris Agreement

Grot-Rowecki was well-respected by the Commander-in-Chief General Władysław Sikorski, but did not hesitate to argue with him. Stefan Grot-Rowecki had a strong character, which he proved by, among others, defending the Home Army against the accounts of officers sympathetic to the ideas of Marshal Piłsudski. He criticized, for instance, General Sikorski’s dismissal of the highest-ranking Polish commander of the time – General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, the former Chief of Staff of Józef Piłsudski’s 1^st Brigade and Rowecki’s superior from the time of the Polish Legions’ battles[2].

The most wanted Pole

During the occupation, there was a special unit dedicated to hunting down the leaders of the Polish Underground State. The Germans placed Grot-Rowecki at the top of their list of most wanted Poles. It is said that a huge illuminated portrait of him was hanging at the headquarters of the German security authorities, located on the Szucha Avenue in Warsaw.

The Gestapo arrested General Grot-Rowecki on June 30, 1943, but the story of the arrest, which shows the challenges of wartime, is significant. Grot-Rowecki was handed over to the Germans by the agents of Gestapo, the Secret State Police of the Third Reich, operating within the Home Army. Those traitors were: Blanka Kaczorowska, Ludwik Kalkstein, and Eugeniusz Świerczewski. The latter was later killed by the Home Army’s counterintelligence.

Grot-Rowecki was taken to the Gestapo headquarters in Szucha Avenue in Warsaw and later sent to Berlin. There he repeatedly rejected the German proposal of cooperation.

The degree of occupants’ fear of General Grot-Rowecki is highlighted by the fact that upon hearing about the outbreak of the Warsaw Uprising on August 1, 1944, one of the main leaders of Nazi Germany, Heinrich Himmler, ordered the immediate extermination of Grot-Rowecki, who was imprisoned in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp.

Vindication and the paradox of history

During the Stalinist period in Poland (1945-1956), the official assessment of Grot-Rowecki’s activity was negative. On the basis of unfounded accusations, the state authorities claimed that the Home Army command collaborated with the Germans. Grot-Rowecki was likewise put in an unfavorable light. It was not until the following years that attempts were made to objectively evaluate his achievements. The first biography of Grot-Rowecki was published only in 1959.

The Polish assault rifle (5.56 mm caliber) was named Grot in honor of the General. At the beginning of 2021, this Polish, modern export product was a victim of a media attack, conducted by the Onet.pl web portal. According to the opinion of the command of the Territorial Defense Forces and a number of independent experts, such criticism was unjustified.

The New European Order

Due to a series of arrests of top commanders and leaders of the Polish resistance movement, some historians suggest that the detention of Grot-Rowecki (June 30, 1943) was a result of a broader intelligence operation against the Polish Underground State. During the same period (June 9, 1943), the Gestapo arrested the commander of the National Armed Forces (Narodowe Siły Zbrojne, NSZ), Colonel Ignacy Oziewicz. On July 4, 1943, General Władysław Sikorski died (along with the Commander-in-Chief’s Chief of Staff and his only daughter) in mysterious circumstances in a plane crash in Gibraltar – his Liberator II AL523 aircraft fell into the sea 16 seconds after take-off. Sikorski died while returning from an inspection of Polish forces in the Middle East, where, as some researchers indicate, he might have obtained documents of great importance (about the Katyń massacre). Prior to that trip, two members of the government asked Sikorski by letter not to fly to the Middle East.

Within two months, the Polish Army lost three top commanders who could not imagine laying down their arms after the end of the war if Polish interests were not properly protected. These figures were not always crystalline, but their steadfast and patriotic attitude clearly showed that they did not abandon the fight for a free Poland. It is hard to resist the impression that they did not want to lay down their arms literally and figuratively (the arms of political fight), because they had Poland in their hearts. Its fate was to be decided a little over 1.5 years later at the Yalta Conference. A new geopolitical shape of Europe was being sacrificially constructed, with the involvement of the victorious superpowers – the USSR, Great Britain, and the USA, on the “ruins of the post-war history.”

Author’s bio

Tomasz Kijewski – President, Warsaw Institute

Fellow at the Maastricht Center for Transatlantic Studies and the Marshall Center (Garmisch-Partenkirchen/Washington D.C.), among others. While performing diplomatic duties for a number of years, he was actively promoting a positive image of Poland and the Polish community in North America. He completed a course at the International Energy Agency (IEA) in Paris and an internship dedicated to the oil and gas sector in Calgary (Canada). He is preparing a doctoral thesis in the field of national security.

• Read also: Phishing – Cyber Extortion Aimed at Politicians

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

More information:
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Joe Biden’s first decision after moving into the White House was reversing president Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. This might have signalled a new break in the importance of climate policy—but did it really? In order to convince the world to trust his newfound focus on climate policy, president Biden will have to act on his promises with bold decision in the near future.

In his address to the US Congress on 28th April 2021, Joe Biden signified the integral role climate policy is to play during his administration. “For too long, we have failed to use the most important word when it comes to meeting the climate crisis. Jobs. Jobs. For me, when I think about climate change, I think jobs” he commented. This ambitious move towards a transformation of the energy and transport sector goes in tandem with Mr. Biden’s achievements during the first one hundred days in office: as his first act as President, he re-entered the United States into the Paris Agreement, a 2016-signed initiative aiming to reduce the rise of carbon emissions to below 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels.

• Read also: Phishing – Cyber Extortion Aimed at Politicians

Donald Trump’s administration, characterized by climate scepticism and a lack of reform towards more sustainable practices, saw a withdrawal of the country from the Accord in 2017, arguing that it had a detrimental effect on the development of the American economy. Mr. Biden’s address suggests that, while he shares Mr. Trump’s wish to create workplaces and expand the economy, he wishes to do so through a transit towards more sustainable energy sources, and the creation of more environmentally-friendly means of transportation. This is evident in his infrastructure proposal, totalling to $2 trillion, unveiled in March.

This unprecedented emphasis on the struggle against climate change might foreshadow the emergence of the United States as the leaders of an international cooperation to reach the goals laid out in the Paris Agreement. With the upcoming COP26 event in Glasgow, taking place between 1^st and 12^th November 2021, the topic of Nationally Declared Commitments (or NDCs for short), comes up again in the international debate, and many supporters of the reform look towards Biden as the leading figure of the talks.

This hope is amplified by the ambiguous success of the Agreement today; while all Parties continue to issue NDCs for every stage of reform planned in the Accord, some states are very intermittent in their adherence to the aims: this concerns countries such as China, United States, and Australia. This is especially worrying considering the fact that the first two states contributed towards more than 45% of the world’s total CO2 emissions in 2018. President Xi Jinping has always been reluctant to make pledges regarding China’s NDCs. However, in light of Mr. Biden’s reformed stance, he accepted the president’s invitation to the Leaders’ Summit on Climate Change on April 22, where he stressed the importance of harmonious cooperation and international struggle for green development. These words, addressed to 38 other leaders of countries party to the Paris Agreement, may signal a thaw in international commitment to the aims set out in the Accord.

This seemingly optimistic outlook, triggered by Biden’s reformatory stance, does not, however, go without criticism. At her congressional hearing in April, Greta Thunberg, a climate activist and the creator of the Youth Climate Strike, was very sceptical towards Mr. Biden’s climate ambitions. “I don’t believe for a second that you can actually do this” she commented. “How long do you honestly believe that people in power like you will get away with it? How long do you think you can continue to ignore the climate crisis, the global aspect of equity and historic emissions, without being accountable?”

• Read also: Consumer Patriotism as an Economic Opportunity

Similar voices of scepticism arose from within the Congress. Although many Representatives assess the plan as a step in the right direction and applaud its focus on the introduction of more sustainable measures, some groups bemoan the scale of the plan’s expenditure, most notably from the progressive faction of the Democratic Party. “The size of it is disappointing. It's not enough” – commented  Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Representative for New York’s 14th Congressional District. Varshini Prakash, the executive director of the Sunrise Movement, also found the plan’s expenditure to be far too little to initiate meaningful change.

The criticism of the Paris Agreement, both during its inception in 2016 and in the course of its development, echoes the grievances towards Biden’s plan. Though it revolutionized the area of international cooperation against climate change with its legally binding targets, NDCs of the biggest polluters were set at levels which fail to meet the general aim of the Agreement. Unambitious NDCs is exactly what severely limits the impact of the Accord, and makes climate activists, such as the aforementioned Greta Thunberg, sceptical of the scheme. A similarly controversial approach, seen in other efforts of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC for short), such as in the 1997-signed Kyoto Protocol, could be attributed to a lack of steadfast leadership among the signatories.

The US’s role as the leader of international cooperation on climate change has always been connected to domestic politics; the Kyoto Protocol was signed by the Democratic Bill Clinton, but his successor, George Bush, did not ratify the decision, limiting its impact. Similarly, ambitious prospects connected to the signing of the Paris Agreement by the Obama administrations were quickly confounded by Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the Accord in the subsequent year. However, never before has climate reform been so high on presidential agenda, and no other president before has underlined the importance of a movement towards a more sustainable future in such a pronounced way.

Therefore, will Joe Biden assume a leading role among nations party to the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC? His invitation of representatives of 40 countries to the Leaders’ Summit on Climate Change, and his efforts to re-enter the United States into the Accord may suggest that Mr. Biden’s international influence may put pressure on the biggest polluters of the world to undertake more ambitious NDCs and enter other international schemes, aimed at reducing the world’s carbon footprint. Realizing that reforming the United States’ economy is necessary in order to exert this pressure, Mr. Biden’s plan is the country’s biggest expenditure towards sustainable infrastructure in history.

Mr. Biden’s address to the Congress symbolizes the efforts he undertook towards a fight with climate change in the first one hundred days of his presidency. He has made ambitious plans and bold claims of combining sustainability with a higher amount of Americans in the workforce. But voices of criticism from more reformatory factions mean that in order to convince the Congress, and the entire world, of the importance of struggle against climate change, he will have to act on these plans in the near future.

author:

Kacper Nowak
Former student at Dulwich College, begins studying Human, Social and Political Studies at Cambridge University in October 2021. Passionate about politics and international relations, particularly those pertaining to economics and sustainability. Kacper is currently a Policy Analysis Intern at the Warsaw Institute.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

More information:
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In 1971, almost two decades before the World Wide Web, Ray Tomlinson sent a message to himself on the ARPANET saying “something like QWERTYUIOP.” It is considered to be the first ever email. Internet mail and its functionality have evolved considerably over half a century, but its core principle has remained unchanged.

Email is meant to allow for asynchronous message exchange over the Internet. Asynchronous communication means that a message can be used at any moment following its creation, no simultaneous interaction between the recipient and the sender is required. A lot of people expected that the rapid growth of an entire branch of communication technology, the advent of chat rooms, social media, online instant messaging, and business communication platforms, such as Microsoft Teams and Slack, would contribute to the demise of email. No such thing has happened. Nowadays, email is still the main communication tool and without an email address we would not be able to sign up for the vast majority of services that were supposed to herald the decline of Internet mail.

• Read also: Consumer Patriotism as an Economic Opportunity

The ubiquity of this service, the asynchronism (which we use to store message history), and the users’ disregard for basic Internet safety rules, make email the main target of cybercriminals’ attacks. Phishing, which involves sending emails that look deceptively like the real ones to recipients, is targeted at us all. According to the FBI, phishing was the most common type of cyberattack in 2020. The number of phishing incidents has nearly doubled from 114,702 in 2019 to 241,324 in 2020. Five years ago (in 2016), the number of such incidents was more than 11 times lower.

Most phishing emails contain malicious links directing to copies of popular websites that look similarly to them. These sites, prepared by criminals, usually try to steal user’s access data (login and password) or run malicious scripts exploiting vulnerabilities in user’s software. Often, the phishing message is accompanied by attachments that launch malicious code, if opened by the victim. ESET’s report on threats in 2020[1] states that the most common attachments are executable files (.exe), macros, MS Office documents, and PDF files.

The second common type of an attack is a direct hack of a mailbox, conducted with the use of a known password or a brute-force method. Practically every day there is a data leak from a larger or a smaller web portal. Frequently, the data contains passwords or their hashes. While in the case of a complex password, guessing it on the basis of the hash is time-consuming, simple passwords consisting of less than 12 characters can now be cracked within a few hours. Unfortunately, users often use even shorter passwords, which could be hacked on a home computer in a dozen or so minutes. The scale of the problem is well presented by an analysis of Alice Henshaw[2]. In 2019, using the Hashcat tool and the AWS infrastructure (rented for $18), 80% of the passwords, originating from a leak containing over 14 million hashes, were cracked within 20 hours.

If the attacker does not have the user’s password, there is always another possibility – an arduous task of forcibly hacking the mailbox through an automated process of attempting to log into it, using the most common passwords.

• Read also: Technology and democracy: A new challenge for European security?

Security problems with webmail services affect everyone. Public figures are even more vulnerable, for obvious reasons. Over a decade ago, hackers broke into[3] the Belgian Prime Minister’s mailbox. Having gained access to his private emails, they forwarded many of them to the local newspaper.

In 2015, the private email account of the former head of the CIA, John Brennan, was hacked. The cybercriminal responsible for the attack gained access to government documents stored as email attachments on Brennan’s personal account because the Agency’s head sent them from his work email[4]. Screenshots of some of the documents were made public on Twitter, including Brennan’s contact list and phone records of the former CIA Deputy Director Avril Haines.

A successful phishing attack also led to the well-known email data leak. Hillary Clinton’s campaign manager, John Podesta, unknowingly clicked on a malicious link in an email that looked like a message generated by Google. The senders were not from Google, but a group of phishing hackers whom the US government later linked to Russia[5]. Deceived by the cybercriminals and his own advisor, Podesta not only clicked on the malicious link, but also entered the correct login credentials on the website prepared by the cybercriminals. This allowed the hackers to gain access to his email account. Soon after, thousands of Podesta’s emails began to appear on WikiLeaks, ultimately affecting the US presidential election.

In late May 2021, Microsoft informed about a new phishing campaign, targeting government agencies, think tanks, and consultants associated with NGOs, the majority of which operated in the United States. Microsoft attributed this activity to the Russian-based group, responsible for the SolarWinds attack[6]. This activity coincides with an attack carried out against public officials in Poland. At the end of June 2021, a spokesperson for the Minister-Coordinator of Special Services said that:

“The Internal Security Agency (ABW) and the Military Counterintelligence Service (SKW) determined that the list of targets of a sociotechnical attack, carried out by the UNC1151 group, included at least 4,350 email addresses belonging to Polish citizens or appearing in Polish email services. The Polish Special Services possess information that the aggressors are connected to the activities of Russian special services. (…) The list also includes an email address used by Minister Michał Dworczyk. The services responsible for cyber security analyzed several messages sent to the Minister’s address that could have been used for phishing – their content and design was aimed at obtaining login credentials. We also noted several logins from abroad to the email account used by Minister Dworczyk.”

The same group is responsible for hacking the accounts of German politicians[7]. The actions of the UNC1151 group are part of the “Ghostwriter” campaign. Its aim is to destabilize moods and the political situation in Central European countries. As a result of the attack, the documents and correspondence from Minister Dworczyk’s private account were made public on the Telegram platform.

In all of the examples above, apart from the obvious mistake of using private email accounts for work purposes, we have to deal with several other basic types of negligence. We all need to remember that we are responsible for the security of our own correspondence and the one that is entrusted to us. Even the best security protections, offered by service providers, will not defend us from an attack of the criminals if we do not use them. Therefore, how to protect an email account? Let us check whether our passwords are not leaked – we can do it by using the haveibeenpwned.com website. Let us change your passwords to strong ones, preferably with at least 16 characters. We should not use the same password in every case, and, if it is possible, let us remember to enable two-factor authentication.

author: Wiktor Sędkowski 

Wiktor Sędkowski graduated in Teleinformatics at the Wrocław University of Science and Technology, specialized in cybersecurity field. He is an expert on cyber threats. CISSP, OSCP and MCTS certificates holder. Worked as an engineer and solution architect for leading IT companies.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

More information:
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Has the COVID-19 pandemic affected shopping attitudes? In the case of individual consumer choices of Polish citizens, we are beginning to see significant changes in trends. Consequently, retail chains are altering their marketing and sales policies on the domestic market. How can this impact the economy? Can consumer patriotism be relevant to everyday life?

According to the latest research conducted by ARC Rynek i Opinia, consumer patriotism is now especially visible in the case of food products – as many as 70% of Poles prefer to choose domestic products. Local brands are associated with high quality and freshness, while Polish food is regarded as healthy, safe and ecological. Increasingly enough, more and more frequently the local origin of products has an impact on other areas of consumer choices, such as clothing, footwear and cosmetics, where we also value the high quality of domestic manufacturers. The activities of retail chains (more often than not foreign), which dominate our retail market, are also noteworthy. For years we participated in the policy of promoting trends of availability of all products, which aimed at unification of food in grocery stores across the European Union. The consumer’s choice was based on two criteria – price and recognition of the product’s brand.

• Read also: Energy Attacks on Diplomats

The present and the results outlined in the first part of the article are not a coincidence nor a statistical error. They are also a consequence of experiences and reflections resulting from the pandemic. As a society, we now pay more attention to matters associated with health and immunity – the quality of the food we buy has an impact on them. As entrepreneurs and employees, we think more often about economic solidarity in the face of the difficulties associated with trade in the wake of the epidemic, while as urban and rural dwellers, we are experiencing tremendous traffic congestion as well as increasing environmental pollution. Can choosing a homegrown product have an impact on dimensions such as the economy, health and environment? At this point it is worth quoting the statement of Marcin Wroński, Deputy Director General of the National Support Center for Agriculture (KOWR), for Polskie Radio 24, who during last year’s Vision for Development Forum in Gdynia said that “too few consumers take into account the fact that by buying a product from Poland we give Polish farmers and companies funds for investments, and the state budget money for various investments. For employees of this sector such an attitude gives a prospect of stable employment. What is more, the money spent on purchasing Polish products will go back to the consumers in the form of investments in hospitals, roads, schools and railroad lines.” These words of the KOWR representative correspond with the statement of Rafał Zgorzelski, PhD, during the conference on the domestic products’ promotion strategies entitled “POLISH PRODUCT – responsibility in difficult times”: “by buying Polish products, we have a personal impact on the development of the Polish economy and we consciously shape our future. Economic patriotism and conscious consumer choices is an everyday, practical patriotism. These are our everyday choices.”

In terms of the economic aspect of this issue, it turns out that in the case of products and services meeting the two criteria of “Polishness,” i.e., being manufactured in Poland by companies with Polish capital, every PLN 1 spent on such a product returns as much as PLN 0.79 to the national economy. In the case of products made by foreign companies but manufactured in Poland this amount is PLN 0.76. On the other hand, in the case of fully foreign products that are only sold in Poland, each PLN 1 spent on their purchase will return only PLN 0.25 to the Polish economy. Bearing in mind the statements of the experts mentioned above, it is also worth referring to the actions on a national scale, which are also of great importance in terms of building mechanisms of economic patriotism in the country. According to the surveys by the Polish Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, the National Support Center for Agriculture and the Agency for Restructuring and Modernization of Agriculture, already 61.3% of surveyed urban and rural residents pay attention to the certification of food products, including the POLISH PRODUCT logo, promoted by large retail chains, which is already recognized by about 81% of us. The aim of introducing this logo was to facilitate recognition of products manufactured domestically and made from local resources, so that the consumer could make a conscious choice. This has a significant impact on the national economy. The freshness and quality of local food also advocates for its purchase. The domestic origin of products also means shorter supply chains and thus a reduction of carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere, during long shipment of goods imported from abroad. It is worth noting the involvement of entities in the promotion of the POLISH PRODUCT logo, such as the companies of the PKP Group, which prepared an extensive shipment offer for domestic food producers in order to reduce emissions. Polish State Railways actively participate in promotional campaigns, among others, by displaying advertisements of the #KupujŚwiadomie (shop consciously) and #ProduktPolski (Polish product) advertising spots at railway stations and aboard trains.

• Read also: Technology and democracy: A new challenge for European security?

Does consumer and economic patriotism make sense? In fact, instead of answering this question, it is better to ask why are we focusing on this issue so late and why only a few years ago statements about capital, which supposedly had no nationality, appeared in the media more often? As the example of highly developed European countries shows, the long-established tradition of choosing local products by the inhabitants of Germany, France, Italy or Austria, had a huge impact on the overall economic development and strong position of these countries on the economic arena of Europe and the world. What will be vital in the new, post-pandemic reality, is the foundation of the economy, i.e., what we will build on a new reality, while consumer patriotism should be part of this foundation for rebuilding the economy and developing the society.

Author: Artur Krzeszowiak

Artur Krzeszowiak is a communication strategy specialist in the executive agency of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development as well as a member of the PZPN committee for the development of women's football in Poland. He studied Public Administration at the University of Economics in Krakow, graduated from Film & Television Production Management London Film Academy, project coordinator as part of the "Kupuj Świadomie – Produkt Polski" campaign.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

More information:
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A number of American diplomats, primarily those based in Cuba and China, showed specific clinical symptoms between 2016 and 2018. Those affected by the previously unknown condition reported: sudden pain, pressure, and vibrations in the head, loud noise that seemed to come from a specific direction, and pain in one or both ears that accompanied it. Some of them also complained about tinnitus, vision problems, lack of concentration, and dizziness.

As of December 2018, 26 employees at US facilities have reported health problems that began to be known as the Havana Syndrome [1]. The same set of symptoms were reported by Canadian diplomats in 2017. Already then, the US Department of State had asked scientific centers for an independent analysis. Multiple causes were investigated, including various bacterial and viral infections as well as exposure to harsh environmental conditions. At first, the theory of a directed-energy weapon (DEW), using powerful radio waves, microwaves, or particle beams instead of munition, did not have many supporters. Nevertheless, the investigating committee included it as one of the hypotheses, indicating an unknown source of pulsed radio frequencies as a possible cause.

The use of radio wave energy on the battlefield is, in spite of appearances, not a new solution. Usually, this type of weapon is used to destabilize the functioning of electronic devices. Disrupting communication systems was common during World War II and the Cold War. In 1948, the Soviet Union began jamming Western radio broadcasts, the main targets of which included the BBC External Broadcasting Services, Voice of America, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (a US government-funded radio station, established in 1949 as a result of a merger of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty). Jamming stations worked in the USSR until January 1, 1988, being particularly active during martial law introduced in the Polish People’s Republic (PRL), or the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. To this day, this technology is used by the Iranian intelligence services. Specialized military units can also jam signals of other systems, for instance, GPS or GSM/LTE networks. Recently, such situations were reported in eastern Ukraine and during the protests following the Belarusian presidential election.

• Read also: Technology and democracy: A new challenge for European security?

Directed energy can also be used as a direct weapon. The most common solutions based on this technology include directional radio frequency jammers [3] and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) emitters. They are used to neutralize unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and electronic equipment. Radio waves at certain frequencies cut off the remotely controlled vehicle from the operator’s and GPS signal, in fact disabling it. On the other hand, EMPs are able to destroy target’s electronics remotely. This type of technology has long been available to many armies worldwide. A report of the US Department of Defense by Vincent Pry [4] indicates China’s ability to conduct an EMP attack on the United States. According to it, China currently has the technical capabilities (a network of satellites, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and EMP weapons) to “shut down the US power grid, permanently deactivate critical means of communication, and even prevent US carrier strike groups from responding to an attack.”

Moreover, the directed-energy weapon could be used against humans. Long Range Acoustic Devices (LRADs) use very loud sound and cause an unpleasant, painful sensation among its recipients. They can be successfully used by the law enforcement agencies, for example, against crowds. In 2011, the Polish police force purchased six LRADs. In Poland, however, there is no legal basis for the use of this type of weapon. For this reason, the use of high frequency blast was banned and the Supreme Audit Office (NIK) issued a critical report on the purchase [6]. Another commonly used technology is the Active Denial System (ADS), developed by the US in 2001. This weapon fires a beam of 94 GHz waves (wavelength of 3 mm) [7], which penetrate through clothing and cause rapid heating of the skin surface. As a result, the exposed person feels that its entire body surface is burning. The energy of the wave, 3 mm in length, is largely absorbed by the skin, so internal organs are not directly exposed to the ADS. However, it is not hard to imagine modifying such a device. The alteration of the signal’s amplitude and wavelength is not a complicated process. The effect, however, could be catastrophic to the health of a victim exposed to such a weapon.

• Read also: Cybercrime: Further Data Leaks

This topic has resurfaced in the media because the incidents reported by the American diplomatic personnel did not end in 2018. Since then, the number of people affected by the Havana Syndrome reached 50, and the most recent report (dated December 2020) outlines incidents that occurred in Cuba, China, Russia, and several other countries [9]. The attacks have prompted the Pentagon to launch an investigation. Numerous experts suggest that Russia is responsible for these attacks. Russian research into this technology began in the second half of the 20^th century, when the former Soviet Union decided to pursue an “irregular warfare.” Microwave pulse weapon, which uses electromagnetic radiation to damage targets, was and is the ideal gray zone weapon because it is very difficult to attribute responsibility for its use to anyone. This type of weapon does not leave any marks on the bullet or even a bullet itself, as is the case with conventional weapons. Consequently, attribution can be very difficult. Finding the party responsible for the attack is even more difficult not only due to the long list of countries that are hostile to US, but also the fact that these symptoms could be caused by something entirely different. Such was the case with a Marine in Syria, allegedly affected by the directed-energy weapon. A thorough investigation of the Pentagon and analysis of medical records revealed that all symptoms were a result of food poisoning.

author: Wiktor Sędkowski 

Wiktor Sędkowski graduated in Teleinformatics at the Wrocław University of Science and Technology, specialized in cybersecurity field. He is an expert on cyber threats. CISSP, OSCP and MCTS certificates holder. Worked as an engineer and solution architect for leading IT companies.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

More information:
www.warsawinstitute.org/support/

[1] Nelson, R. (2020). Havana syndrome might be the result of energy pulses. The Lancet, 396(10267), 1954.

[2] Risso, L. (2013). Radio wars: Broadcasting in the cold war. Cold War History, 13(2), 145-152.

[3] Pärlin, K., Alam, M. M., & Le Moullec, Y. (2018, May). Jamming of UAV remote control systems using software defined radio. In 2018 International Conference on Military Communications and Information Systems (ICMCIS) (pp. 1-6). IEEE.

[4] Pry, P. V. (2020). China: EMP Threat: The People’s Republic of China Military Doctrine, Plans, and Capabilities for Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack. EMP Task Force on National and Homeland Security.

[5] https://panoptykon.org/wiadomosc/najwyzsza-izba-kontroli-bezzasadny-zakup-lrad-przez-policje, retrieved: June 2021

[6] https://www.nik.gov.pl/plik/id,4405,vp,5626.pdf, retrieved: June 2021

[7] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Active_Denial_System, retrieved: June 2021

[8] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=80kDn4vit_w, retrieved: June 2021

[9] https://www.politico.com/news/2021/04/22/pentagon-russia-attacks-us-troops-484150, retrieved: June 2021

[10] https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/05/business/economy/havana-syndrome-microwave-attack.html, retrieved: June 2021

Technology permeates every aspect of our daily lives. However, its increased presence has posed a significant challenge to our liberties. Western democracies need to re-adapt in order to concretely regulate tech and prevent potential new forms of interferences for its institutions. Especially in Europe have democratic states felt the need to develop new normative approaches and regulations to provide a framework regulating Big Tech companies and preventing them from abusing their power.

Is technology a friend or a foe for the European Union? The question arises in many international meetings and summits as a consequence of the technological progress and the consequential emergence of new possible threats to democracy and citizens. China, as well as other authoritarian regimes, provides a significant example of how technology has been instrumentalized by the regime to implement surveillance over their population and over private data[1]. An interesting recent example of this attitude is reflected in the use of tracking apps, mass surveillance tools, drones and CCTV cameras during the COVID-19 pandemic to monitor people and the spread of the pandemic[2]. During the first wave of the pandemic, the Chinese government installed CCTV cameras to monitor people’s 14-days quarantine, required people to share their personal data (such as ID number, residential address, place of work, etc.) in order to get a QR code attesting their health status, and used drones to tell people to wear face masks. This high level of state surveillance has further compromised the already fragile issue of human rights in China, with advocates like Wang Quazhang raising concerns over the possibility of the normalization of such surveillance practices even after the pandemic[3]. The Western hemisphere and the EU cannot allow this to happen and must therefore regulate the use of technology and the policies of Big Tech companies collecting and using private citizens’ data in their territories in order to preserve the liberties of their citizens.

• Read also: Cybercrime: Further Data Leaks

It goes without saying that technology has greatly changed the way we live: Big Tech companies are present in most aspects of our day-to-day lives. Because of this, however, they have had ambiguous implications for democratic principles and human security. Continuous data collection and data sharing, app’s tracking, use of online cookies, the use of CCTV cameras and other surveillance tools are posing a significant challenge to people whose physical and online activities are being constantly monitored by both governments and tech firms. In the United Kingdom, for instance, surveillance powers have gained presence during the pandemic through the installation of a large number of CCTV cameras and stricter control of the information shared online[4]. The increased state surveillance and governments recurring to Big Tech Firm developing tracking strategies and apps during the pandemic has pushed the debate for a re-design of how technologies and their use should be regulated in a way that does not compromise individuals’ basic freedoms. In this sense, it is very important that governments and institutions act in very mindful ways considering the new challenges and threats posed by technology and its misuse at the individual- and society-level. One of the main challenges in this regard is to make Big Tech firms comply with democratic values and standards in the respect of fundamental rights and the rule of law in the way in which they use, elaborate, and collect personal data, how they ensure freedom of expression and at the same time control their contents. This is particularly salient in the European context, as these are considered as fundamental pillars of the Union itself. From here, the governance question arises. How is the EU performing in regulating Big Tech company?

While the U.S. model of governance is mainly unbalanced on neoliberal economic deregulation with market laws that often prevail over the need to protect privacy, the EU is developing its own framework of regulation that prioritize its citizens’ rights over market laws[5]. In this sense, last December the EU based its approach on dialogue with companies and strict data policies with which Big Firms have to comply. Also in December the European Commission announced new regulations that are meant to “force tech companies to change their practices” and will come in the form of two laws: the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act[6]. A significant aspect of these regulations is that they will be largely citizen-rights driven as they will be aiming to 1) put into place restrictions on the governance of Big Tech’s use of customer data; 2) keep users safe online by protecting their freedom of expression, and 3) hold tech companies accountable for their deeds[7]. The laws, however, still have to go under a long review process in order to pass and enter into force.

• Read also: The First Major Middle East Crisis Under Joe Biden

The step made by the EU towards a stricter regulation of Big Tech companies represents a big step that could have significant resonance at the global level. The EU could assume a leading role in the regulation of Big Tech companies and their activity, promoting an approach that prioritizes the rights of citizens but does not disregard those of the companies. This is of significant importance considering the values the EU embraces and promotes across and outside its region. Accountability, safety, and transparency are the values the EU has put at the core of these laws with the aim of, using Margrethe Vestager words, putting “some order in the chaos”[8]. The core function of the Acts will be that of mitigating the risks of illegal content spreading and of manipulation of content through a risk assessment approach carried out by the companies themselves. In addition, the Act establishes the right for European regulators “to demand information from tech companies about how both their moderation teams and their algorithms work at scale” and, through the threat of fines, companies will be forced to follow these new institutional practices[9]. As previously mentioned, these laws still have to go through a careful and multi-step review process, however, if they are approved and enter into force, they could revolutionize the way in which Big Tech firms operate within a democratic system, and the impact of these Acts could have a significant echo beyond the European Union.

The approval of the Acts would represent a major step undertaken at the European level towards the regulation of the use of technology and Big Tech firms’ operations. The approval of the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act will allow the EU to gain a leading position in this field. In particular, the hope is that other democracies, such as the US and the UK, that are currently developing policies whose main concern is to regulate digital markets[10], will follow the EU path and develop regulations aimed at protecting their citizens and their rights in the same manner. As a consequence, the creation of comprehensive regulations that cover a large spectrum of aspects could conduct the whole Western hemisphere towards the creation of harmonized policies in a way that reduces the risks associated with both surveillance technologies and Big Tech firms’ operations within their territories. However, this will hardly happen in realities like China where the government makes a large use of Big Tech Firm and surveillance tools to exercise control over the population with almost inexistent regard for human rights.

Author: Ludovica Balducci 

Ludovica graduated MA International Relations from the University of  Groningen, the Netherlands, where she specialised in International Security. She is a research and analysis assistant at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy. Ludovica gained professional experience at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, United Nations International Crime and Justice Research Institute, and International Relations Institute in Prague. Her research focuses on EU Security and Defence policies, hybrid warfare and modern security threats, EU-NATO relations, and EU external relations. Ludovica is currently a Policy Analysis Intern at Warsaw Institute.  

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

More information:
www.warsawinstitute.org/support/

Two major databases have been leaked in the past weeks. The first one concerned Facebook users' information, the second one contained data of LinkedIn users. These leaks share not only the date and method of disclosure (both sets of data were originally uploaded on RaidForums, a hacker forum), but also the fact that they included a considerable number of records.

Leaked data, which can be accessed free of charge, comprises 533 million Facebook users from 106 countries. Among them are over 2.5 million Poles, 11 million Britons, 30 million Americans and 7 million Australians. Importantly, this is not a new data leak. Facebook has patched the vulnerability which allowed to obtain that data a long time ago, indicating that it likely dates back to late 2019. Since 2020, the database was available to anyone who was willing to pay for a copy of the entire collection. Now, although slightly modified, it is available for free. What does it include? Not private messages, nor passwords or their hashes. Instead, we can find names and surnames, phone numbers, email addresses, genders, occupations and the place of residence of 533 million Facebook users. The leak occurred due to a bug in the contacts import feature. Most likely, attackers generated billions of fictitious profiles that sequentially generated phone numbers. When attempting to import fabricated contacts, the Facebook application interface returned data (included in the database that was made public) if the phone number was valid. All leaked records were uploaded to a database at the HaveIbeenPwned website, thanks to which we can easily verify whether our data has been stolen.

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Less than a week after the first leak was announced, news broke about another one. A file containing 2 million LinkedIn profiles appeared on the same forum where Facebook user data was shared. At the same time, the seller who wrote the post assured possession of 500 million other accounts and offered to share them with anyone willing to pay a four-figure sum. LinkedIn reported that the stolen data did not contain any private information about users. The data set extracted from the sample available free of charge confirms this position – it included: email addresses, phone numbers, genders, job titles and other data that is publicly available online, on users' profiles. The data did not comprise any sensitive information, passwords or credit card numbers. It only included information that was publicly available on LinkedIn profiles, hence it could be concluded that, most likely, it had been obtained through web scraping. This technique allows certain software to automatically extract data available from other software or websites. Presumably, the hackers simply “scraped” publicly available data with a computer program that they created to mechanically gather information.

Therefore, did nothing wrong happen if both data sets did not contain any information that could be considered confidential? It is worth remembering that being in possession of one’s email address could be enough for a competent cybercriminal to cause substantial damage. For this reason, many national Computer Incident Response Teams (CIRTs) have issued relevant announcements, reminding [6] of the most common types of attacks, related to the leak of such data. These include, but are not limited to: impersonation of a user in order to send malicious links (requests to transfer money or generate one-time passwords, e.g., the BLIK code), or using obtained user data to take over other accounts, for instance, resetting passwords by answering secret questions on the basis of personal information collected from publicly available sources.

Attacks conducted on the basis of the data leaked in the Internet occurred shortly afterwards. Multiple phishing campaigns were observed in Poland already after a week. Scammers sent SMS messages to phone numbers, obtained from leaked data, hoping that an inattentive recipient of a text would click on a link included in it. The messages contained false information such as notification about an awaiting package or a necessity to pay an overdue invoice or an electricity bill. Obviously, the link was a scam invented only to extort money. Every day a number of people fell for the exemplarily fabricated payment panels, from which we supposedly can log into our bank account or make an online payment. Fraudsters intercept data required to access banking services and victims lose their savings in this way. Last year, CERT.PL (Computer Emergency Response Team) blocked 32,000 domains used for offences such as the ones described above.

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Similar practices took place in the USA where a number of messages, in which fraudsters impersonated banks  by sending a link that was supposed to be a new bank statement with an alleged overdraft, have been circulating lately. Another common type of attack involves impersonating popular online stores, such as Walmart or Amazon. The procedure is similar in both cases – a link leads to a fake website which looks just like the page of a real bank or a payment gateway. When logging in, the victim provides its access data to the scammers.

Consequently, how to defend against thieves? First of all, by being more vigilant when it comes to providing personal information on the Internet. Cybercriminals can use it to carry out spear phishing and, accordingly, for fraudulent and other corrupt practices. Before clicking on any link, let us verify the domain, or, if still in doubt, check its credibility by using a search engine.

Author: Wiktor Sędkowski  

Wiktor Sędkowski graduated in Teleinformatics at the Wrocław University of Science and Technology, specialized in cybersecurity field. He is an expert on cyber threats. CISSP, OSCP and MCTS certificates holder. Worked as an engineer and solution architect for leading IT companies. 

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