Introduced on May 21, 2021, a ceasefire between Israel and the Palestinian militant group Hamas in the Gaza Strip brought an end to fresh tensions in the Israel-Palestine conflict, or the first major crisis in the Middle East since Joe Biden was sworn in. Since new strains on May 10, Hamas militants have fired hundreds of rockets towards Israel whose forces replied with a military tit-for-tat.

Flaring up the smoldering conflict

The fighting between Israel and Palestinian militants in Gaza began on May 10, 2021, after weeks of rising Israeli-Palestinian tension in East Jerusalem that culminated in clashes at a holy site revered by both Muslims and Jews. Hamas began firing rockets near the al-Aqsa Mosque after warning Israel to withdraw from the site, triggering retaliatory air strikes. Another reason for the flare-up was plans to evict Palestinian families from a contested settlement area in Jerusalem.

It was the worst violence in Gaza and Israel since 2014. The Israeli military says more than 4,300 rockets were fired towards its territory by militants and that it struck more than 1,000 militant targets in Gaza. Hamas said it targeted an air base in the south.

• Read also: US Announces $125 Million Aid Package for Ukraine, Condemns Russia

The Israeli army admitted having launched artillery towards Lebanon in response to rocket fire from the neighboring country that failed to hit the Jewish state. Lebanon is home to a couple of combat groups, one of which is Hezbollah that clashed with Israel back in 2006.

The death toll looks differently according to the two warring parties. 11 days of fighting left more than 250 people dead. At least 243 people were killed in Gaza, according to its health ministry. Israel has said it killed at least 225 militants during the fighting. In Israel 12 people, including two children, were killed, its medical service says. Hamas, the Palestinian armed movement in Gaza, has not given casualty figures for fighters.

It is a truce, but what is next?

The two opposing parties said that the ceasefire was just a temporary solution. Israeli state officials said the country's forces targeted only military facilities, making considerable efforts to prevent casualties by warning residents of incoming air raids. Interestingly, Benjamin Netanyahu has come under fire for bringing an end to the conflict too soon. The mayors of Sderot and Ashkelon––two of the Israeli towns hardest hit by rockets from Gaza––were among those to voice their disappointment, saying Hamas should have been eliminated.

The head of the Palestinian Mission to the United Kingdom, Husam Zomlot, has said the latest outbreak of fighting in May 2021 is part of a much bigger historical picture. "This is a confrontation that has lasted for 100 years, between Israel and the people of Palestine." It has primarily been based on negation, he said, adding the negation started with the 1917 Balfour Declaration that "promised our land to others without consulting us.” The British government would use its best endeavors to facilitate the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, the declaration reads[1].

International reactions to the conflict

The Israel-Palestine conflict sparked distinct comments worldwide. Some of them show who and how backed the two warring sides.

According to the U.S. leader, with the ceasefire deal, he saw a "real opportunity" to make progress. U.S. President Joe Biden said he has spoken to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, adding he would expect tensions to de-escalate significantly. The Israeli top official said he was "determined to continue this operation until its goal is achieved to restore peace and security to the citizens of Israel." In Washington, some House and Senate Democrats sought to put pressure on Israel while others showed their support for Israel after Hamas rocket strikes.

• Read also: Russian Espionage at the core of NATO: the “Biot case”

Russia's deputy foreign minister called on Israel to "immediately" stop all settlement activities in the Palestinian Territories and respect the "status quo of Jerusalem's sacred sites." A spokesperson for Chancellor Angela Merkel said Berlin "condemns these incessant rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip against Israeli cities in the strongest terms", yet adding "Israel has the right to self-defense against these attacks." Yet the Turkish president allegedly suggested to Putin that an international protection force to shield the Palestinians should be considered.

Israel's biggest ally

It is worth saying a word about the U.S.-Israeli special relationship. The United States was the first country to recognize Israel as a state in 1948, and the first to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in 2017. The two countries have special defense cooperation. The U.S.-Israel security partnership has been "a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy," according to the U.S. Department of State. In 2016 Washington signed a $38 billion worth of military deal with Israel over the next decade. As part of it, Israel receives $3.3 billion annually in foreign military financing[2].

Middle Eastern Gordian knot

A new chapter of the Israel-Palestine war that just ended is yet another episode of the most complex Gordian knots in geopolitics, or a difficult-to-resolve dispute. As earlier clashes between Israel and Hamas have shown, these two use similar reactions as in the past. Both Israel and Gaza-controlling Hamas claimed victory in the conflict that killed so many civilians.

BBC Middle East editor Jeremy Bowen wrote that as the truce was signed, Israeli military truck personnel began dismantling the Iron Dome missile defense system, a solution developed by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems. In his opinion, this may suggest Israel and Hamas will temporarily hold the ceasefire to declare victory. Unfortunately, nothing has changed for the Israel-Hamas relationship. As there is no long-lasting peace solution, a new war is just a matter of time[3].

Author's bio

Tomasz Kijewski – President and Executive Director, Warsaw Institute

Tomasz Kijewski graduated from international relations at the University of Lodz (scholarship at the Center for Transatlantic Studies in Maastricht, the Netherlands) and post-graduate studies at the National Defense University in Warsaw. Graduate of the national security study program (PASS) at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (Garmisch-Partenkirchen / Washington DC). He completed a course at the International Energy Agency in Paris and was an International Visiting Advisor on Energy in Calgary. For many years he served as a diplomat actively promoting Polish interests in North America. The areas of Tomasz’s expertise include hybrid warfare and asymmetric conflicts, counter-terrorism, and energy security. He is currently preparing his doctoral dissertation (PhD).

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

More information:
www.warsawinstitute.org/support/

A recently discovered case of Russian espionage in Italy revealed a major threat to the security of NATO. Italy-Russia relations have been under close observation of the international forum, with their motives questioned and investigated by security experts worldwide. Concerns have been raised about the possible repercussion of Rome's privileged economic and political partnership with the Kremlin in the European and NATO contexts. Because of the “Biot case” the security of NATO might be at stake.

On March 31, these concerns turned into reality through the "Biot Case”: an Italian Navy Captain has been discovered passing confidential information to the Russians. Media, as well as political elites in the EU and international context focused their attention on this espionage case. Although the content of the information Mr. Biot gave to the Russians remains unknown for security reasons, the implications and repercussions of this event are expected to be very strong both in the Italian national context and in the international arena. As the case is still very recent what will happen next remains to be seen, however, some projections on the implications at the policy level can be made.

• Read also: The Auschwitz Hero

Rome-Moscow relations date back to the Soviet Union era. For over 75 years, Russia and Italy have had “positive economic and political relations”[1] given their reciprocal ideological sympathies. Indeed, economically Russia is one of the most relevant Italian partners in sectors such as energy, banking, telecommunications, and real estate. Politically, the Italo-Russian cooperation is well known as both right-wing and left-wing Italian governments have demonstrated significant interest in carrying on relationships with the Kremlin[2]. The personal friendship between the Russian President Vladimir Putin and the former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi certainly contributed to the strengthening of political cooperation, however, subsequent governments have cultivated these privileged relations as well even after the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea[3]. Lately, the cultural partnership has been cultivated too, with the introduction of specific Italian-Russian student exchange programs and the increase of Russian-related study centers and cultural institutes.

However, the stability of these relations has been undermined recently by the exposed case of Russian espionage in Italy, known as the “Biot case”.

Walter Biot, an Italian Navy Captain, has been accused of selling confidential documents on NATO and Italian security systems for 5.000 euros to the Russians. The Captain is formally accused of the cession of 9.000 confidential and classified military documents and 47 “NATO Secret” dossiers[4]. If this accusation will commute into a direct condemnation for Biot, Rome-Moscow privileged relations will surely be under a lot of pressure at the National, European, and NATO levels. That Russian relations with Italy could turn Rome into the "Russian Trojan Horse in Europe" is something that has already identified in research, and the associated possibility of danger for NATO’s and European stability has been highly discussed over the past years by academics and policymakers[5]. To some extent, the recent Biot case has shown that European and NATO concerns on Moscow-Rome relations were founded and that the degree of Russian political, economic, and cultural influence in Italy is led by Russian geopolitical interests in the broader international context. What are the policy implications of that? Why could this episode cause major international repercussions?

• Read also: US and Turkey – Further Loosening of the Alliance?

At both the European and Transatlantic levels, the object of political debate has never been the economic benefits Italy or Russia could get by their relations. Instead, what policymakers and academics have been concerned about was what was moving in the shadow of that. The suspect of the espionage activity or that of Russian carrying out its geopolitical strategies against the West through "the use" of Italy has been fluttering for a while in the whole Western hemisphere. This sensation has also been reinforced during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, when Russia rashly stepped in to help Italy with a delivery of anti-COVID equipment whose composition, modalities, and media promotion smelled like a geopolitical move at the core of the EU and NATO[6].

The main problem, however, is that, while Russian tactics and strategies before or during the pandemic were only seen as moves aimed at capitalizing against the Western democratic system, this espionage case could quickly turn into a major diplomatic incident which could significantly harm Italian-Russian relations and Russian-Western relations in general. At the national level, Italy will have to confront major international pressure to demonstrate on which side the country is and to strongly condemn these actions. In the broader international context, NATO and Russian relations were already severely compromised after the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, and largely deteriorated due to the Kremlin’s detainment of Alexei Navalny. Surely, the “Biot case” will not heal any of that, rather the Russian attempt to undermine one of the Allies will only contribute to a worsening.

Another issue arises from this situation. Namely, if Biot has passed classified and confidential NATO documents, the security of Italy as well as that of the others 30 NATO members could be highly compromised. The possibility that information on NATO military exercises, strategies, national military details of the Members, as well as any other strategic detail has been revealed to Russia represents a major threat to NATO stability. On his side, however, Biot, who has not been interrogated yet, states he could not pass sensitive information as he did not have access to them. However, according to the Italian judge working on the case, Biot’s actions were not “isolated or sporadic”, but rather well-planned and organized, as a high number of photographs of these files have been found on several mobile phones used by Captain Biot to carry out his ‘duties’ for the Russians[7]. Nevertheless, everything is still under review by the Italian judiciary and no certain claim can be made until the investigation moves further.

Considered as the worst diplomatic incident since the Cold War era, the "Biot case" will certainly have significant policy repercussions for Italian-Russian relations as well as internationally.

The danger to which Italy, NATO, and its members could be exposed by this episode is of significant relevance. If sensitive material has been passed to the Russians, there is a need to understand which dossiers have been divulgated, as Russia might now be one step ahead, and NATO could be facing a new major security threat. Furthermore, this espionage case could lead not only to a worsening of the Russian-Italian relations, but also of those between Italy and the other NATO members. The path chosen by Russia and Italy, for now, is that of de-escalating the potential triggering force of this situation. However, when more details emerge, Italy will have to maintain tactful relations with Moscow and within the NATO context, as the stability of the current political scenario is already at stake.

Author: Ludovica Balducci

Ludovica graduated MA International Relations from the University of Groningen, the Netherlands, where she specialised in International Security. She is a research and analysis assistant at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy. Ludovica gained professional experience at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, United Nations International Crime and Justice Research Institute, and International Relations Institute in Prague. Her research focuses on EU Security and Defence policies, hybrid warfare and modern security threats, EU-NATO relations, and EU external relations. Ludovica is currently a Policy Analysis Intern at Warsaw Institute. 

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

More information:
www.warsawinstitute.org/support/

On the 120th anniversary of Witold Pilecki's birth, it is vital to recall one of the most outstanding soldiers of the Polish armed underground resistance movement during World War II.

Witold Pilecki was born on May 13, 1901, to a Polish family whose traditions shaped his upbringing––his father Józef fought in the January Uprising of 1863, as did Hipolit and Hieronim, two brothers of his mother, Ludwika née Osiecińska. Witold's vision of the world and his strong attachment to the idea of an independent Poland were built upon stories about the Uprising, Mikhail Muravyov, known under his moniker "Hangman," Vilna, or confiscated property after the Uprising. Witold's father was Julian, a forest inspector in the Russian town of Olonets, Karelia, where the young Pilecki was born.

The young Witold got his first experience in underground resistance organizations while attending illegal Polish self-education clubs and then the clandestine Polish scout units.

• Read also: Pulaski, Kosciuszko and the Memory of the Sons of Liberty

In the spring of 1918 he took part in what might have been his first combat operation––along with his friends Witold broke into a Russian military warehouse in Orel, seizing uniforms and other pieces of equipment. In Vilna Witold enrolled the Joachim Lelewel Gymnasium, he also joined the underground Polish Scouting and Guiding Association (ZHP) and the Polish Military Organization. In December 1918 Pilecki fought in the battle to reclaim Vilna from Germany, and then in other battles against the Bolsheviks and Ukrainians. He also fought in the battle to seize back Brest on the Bug from the German hands where he showed both commitment and incredible bravery.

In the early 1930s Pilecki met Maria Ostrowska, a primary school teacher in the nearby Krupa village, who soon became his wife. They got married on April 7, 1931, and started a family in 1932 when their son Andrzej was born while a year later their daughter Zofia came into the world. At the same time Pilecki was active in the local community: he was the chairman of a dairy, headed a volunteer fire brigade, and founded a farmer's association. He was also a farmer––in September 1926, Pilecki became the owner of his family's ancestral estate, Sukurcze, with over 100 hectares of land, a manor, a court yard, and farm buildings. He put all his efforts into repairing as well as modernizing his neighborhood.

In 1939 he fought in the battle of Wolbórz and Chełm. He never laid down his arms and founded the Secret Polish Army resistance, coining its name, and then becoming its chief of staff and the chief inspector. Pilecki volunteered to allow himself to be captured by the occupying Germans to infiltrate the Auschwitz concentration camp to gather intelligence detailing German atrocities at the camp and establish an underground resistance movement. On 19 September 1940 he deliberately went out during a Warsaw street roundup in Żoliborz and was caught by the Germans. He had a false identity card in the name of Tomasz Serafiński. Pilecki was then sent to Auschwitz and was assigned inmate number 4859. Inside the camp Pilecki organized an underground Military Organization (Związek Organizacji Wojskowej, ZOW). Also while there, he helped other inmates, asking for better working conditions, extra portions of soup for the exhausted, food allotments, or asking to allow them to work indoors. He made efforts to hand information through the former inmates to the headquarters of the Home Army in Warsaw––and through it to London. He told everything he witnessed about the destructive labor, inhuman suffering, minimal food rations, and offered some analyses of the possibility to start an uprising in the camp. Witold Pilecki left Auschwitz on the night of April 26, 1943, after a 947-day stay in the camp, and made his way back to the headquarters of the Home Army in Warsaw to submit his report about his time in Auschwitz. In Warsaw he was active in the Home Army, drafting up a report on the military underground organization inside the camp. Following his time in Auschwitz, Pilecki fought in the Warsaw Uprising of the summer of 1944, volunteering for service with Chrobry II Battalion (Warszawianka Company). Pilecki was taken prisoner after the Uprising and spent the rest of the war in captivity, first in the town of Lansdorf in Silesia and then in a prisoner of war camp in Murnau. The camp was liberated by General George Patton's 3rd Army on April 29, 1945. He made his way to Italy where he became an officer of the Polish Second Corps led by General Władysław Anders.

• Read also: The Union of Poles in Belarus – the Main Enemy of the Regime

Witold Pilecki then returned to Warsaw under an assumed name of Roman Jezierski on December 8, 1945 to begin gathering intelligence on the situation in the country––including crimes of the Ministry of Public Security––that he then handed to the Polish Second Corps. He was arrested on May 8, 1947, and thrown in a Mokotów jail. He fought off allegations of espionage or of staging an attack against officers of the Ministry of Public Security. In prison he was tortured: his nails were torn off, his legs were crushed, his testicles were crushed, he was stuffed on a leg of a chair. His Auschwitz reports were not included in the case file; it is worth adding that Pilecki's testimony is both a deeply moving and shocking read.

A show trial was organized and held on March 3, 1948. Pilecki pleaded not guilty. During the trial, the prosecutor did not allow for the questioning of his witnesses nor did he permit them to the witness stand, anyone who could defend Pilecki.

On May 15, 1948, Pilecki was sentenced to death, deprived of public and civil rights, while his property was forfeited to the state treasury. The final bid for clemency sent to communist officials by Pilecki's attorney, family, and friends was eventually turned down and the sentence was upheld.

Witold Pilecki––veteran of the two world wars, and the Polish-Soviet War, awarded with Poland's highest honors, Auschwitz volunteers, founder of an underground resistance organization in the camp, Warsaw Uprising veteran, prisoner of war camp in Lansdorf and Murnau, Home Army officer, Polish Second Corps officer in Italy, one of the most venerated figures of World War II and in general––was shot in the back of the head by communists on May 25, 1948, at 9:30 pm.

author: Rafał Zgorzelski, PhD

A historian, publicist and manager. PhD in humanities in the field of history – a graduate of the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń. He gained professional experience in the regulated sectors. His research interests focus on modern political thought and contemporary geopolitical systems. Promoter of economic patriotism.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

More information:
www.warsawinstitute.org/support/

The recent recognition of the 1915 massacre of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire as a genocide by the American President, was strongly opposed by the authorities in Ankara. In recent years, Turkey has been gradually distancing itself politically from the West, however, it remains the second military power and an important member of NATO. In the “post-Erdoğan” era, Turkey should be able to engage in the alliances of the Western world, anew, with a clean slate. Where are bilateral relationships among Ankara, Washington and other North Atlantic Alliance members headed?

Biden’s statement a “grave mistake?”

The declaration made by the US President in April 2021, which recognized the 1915 massacre of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire as a genocide, has sparked outrage among the authorities in Ankara. The Turkish government recognizes the deaths of around one million Armenians during World War I as a result of warfare, rather than a deliberate ethnic cleansing of this Christian ethnic group. In response to Biden’s statement, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs strongly emphasized that he does not agree with the US position. He added that President Biden’s words cannot change history or rewrite it. Moreover, he considered the statement of the American head of state a “grave mistake” that “undermines mutual trust and friendship.” The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned US Ambassador David Satterfield and informed him that Washington’s latest move “caused a wound that was difficult to repair.”

In turn, the American media note that Erdoğan is an authoritarian Islamist, in power since 2003. His difficult relationship with the US and the 2017 incident when 15 of Erdoğan’s bodyguards used force against pro-Kurdish and pro-Armenian protesters (US citizens) are often recalled. This event took place near the White House after a meeting with President Trump. Charges against 11 of them were dropped in 2018, but the US Congress halted arms sales to Turkey after the attack.

Polemics overshadowed by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

The diplomatic conflict between Washington and Ankara occurred amid continuing Azeri-Armenian tensions in a region nearby Turkey. The Turkish side has warned the United States that it might have to further restrict traffic at border crossings with Armenia. In November 2020, Armenia was forced to cede control of a significant part of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan. Turkish officials said that the Turkish-Armenian border might not be reopened after the war if Biden recognizes the 1915 events as a genocide. It is worth recalling that last year Turkey supported Azerbaijan, Armenia’s adversary, in the war over the control of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which since 1991 had been a territory de facto dependent on the Armenians. Both the Turks and the Russians, who engaged in the de-escalation of the dispute and thus strengthened their control in the region, forcing out other players (the US and the EU members, among others), emerged victorious from this conflict. In this light, it is not surprising that Armenia’s Foreign Ministry was content with Biden’s words and stressed that “the message of the US President continues this strong American tradition of standing by truth and justice.”

Uneasy friendship between the allies

The exclusion of Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program by the Trump administration, caused by the need to protect US national security, was one of many clear messages to Ankara that Washington has lost trust in it. And how did this happen?

It is now five years since the controversial coup that attempted to overthrow the Turkish President. Hundreds were killed and the subsequent repression affected thousands. In 2016, a failed coup attempt, carried out by a group of Turkish military officers, took place. The coup, as assessed by the Turkish government, was organized by the progressive Gülen movement, which (in Islamic terms) stands in opposition to the conservative Erdoğan and advocates a departure from Islamic traditions in many ways. Gülen, who lives in Pennsylvania since 1999, has denied any involvement in the attempted coup.

• Read also: Pulaski, Kosciuszko and the Memory of the Sons of Liberty

Then, the Turkish Prime Minister called his political opponent a leader of a terrorist organization, who also resides in the United States. He even indirectly suggested US involvement or support for Gülen and the putschists. According to him, the US authorities should rethink the principles of cooperation with Turkey – Washington’s strategic ally in the region and worldwide.

In 2016, Turkey made a formal request for Gülen’s extradition. According to the media, the Turkish government has likewise attempted to exert pressure on a number of foreign governments to close schools and medical facilities associated with the Gülen movement, for instance, in Germany, where this institution has around 70,000 active members, but also in Albania, Pakistan, Somalia, Indonesia, Nigeria and Kenya, among others.

Since the coup, Erdoğan has consolidated control over the country, most notably over the armed forces and the mass media. Some observers have put forward a theory that the putsch was a provocation of the Turkish authorities aimed at gaining an excuse for neutralizing political opponents in the army, judiciary, media and the parliament. “A gift from God to purge the traitors in the army,” words attributed to Erdoğan concerning the coup, as well as the low activity of the rebellious army units, were expected to support this reasoning.

Turkey without Erdoğan?

The United States and Turkey are allies in NATO, but Biden’s acknowledgement of the Armenian genocide is yet another factor that worsens relations between these two countries (following, for instance, the purchase of a Russian air defense system by Ankara and the matter of US support for Kurdish rebels in Syria).

As far as Turkey’s relations within NATO are concerned, Daniel Kochis, an expert from the influential Heritage Foundation, noted in a special interview for the Warsaw Institute on April 26, 2021, that this is a highly complex subject, especially in the light of recent events. It is impossible to abandon cooperation with Turkey due to its military power and influence in the region. The American analyst added that Erdoğan’s authoritarian government is a problem since it does not meet democratic standards, in comparison to other members of the Alliance.

• Read also: Deception and misleading – Russian Disinformation in Africa

Biden and Erdoğan planned to meet face-to-face during the upcoming NATO summit in Belgium on June 14, 2021, the White House said in a statement. It is unclear whether that meeting would take place. Naturally, the relations between the two leaders are strained. Recently, Biden called Turkey’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention “a disheartening step backward for the international movement to end violence against women globally.”

As some American experts point out, Erdoğan would not lead Turkey forever. According to them, in the post-Erdoğan era, this country should be allowed to reengage in Western alliances, rather than being forced into a closer political-military partnership with Moscow, as is currently the case.

Author: 

Tomasz Kijewski – President and Executive Director, Warsaw Institute

Fellow at the Maastricht Center for Transatlantic Studies and the Marshall Center (Garmisch-Partenkirchen/Washington D.C.), among others. While performing diplomatic duties for a number of years, he was actively promoting a positive image of Poland and the Polish community in North America. He completed a course at the International Energy Agency (IEA) in Paris and an internship dedicated to the oil and gas sector in Calgary (Canada). He is preparing a doctoral thesis in the field of national security.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

More information:
www.warsawinstitute.org/support/

Casimir Pulaski Day was celebrated in Illinois on March 1, 2021. This legal holiday was established on June 20, 1977 to commemorate Casimir Pulaski, a hero of the American Revolutionary War. This day is a symbol and a tribute of the American people to all the Poles who took part in the American War of Independence. What do we know about the involvement of Polish volunteers in the Revolutionary War and are those events remembered in light of ongoing sociocultural changes, more than 240 years after Pulaski’s death?

• Read also: US Announces $125 Million Aid Package for Ukraine, Condemns Russia

The early days

One of the first or even the first group of Poles to come to North America were Polish craftsmen from the Jamestown Settlement. They arrived on American soil as early as 1608. This means that they have done it 12 years before the Pilgrim Fathers who fled from England to Massachusetts aboard the renowned ship – Mayflower. Interestingly enough, in 1619 the Poles were denied the right to vote. As a result, they organized the first (documented) strike in the colonies of North America. Consequently, our countrymen were granted full voting rights. Over the years, more and more inhabitants of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth came to the American colonies, integrating with the previous settlers to a various extent.

Speaking of the Polish people of the American Revolutionary War, we usually refer to Tadeusz Kosciuszko and Kazimierz Pulaski, mainly because little more is said about the others. The Continental Army composed of colonists and immigrants, the latter of which could be divided into two groups. One of them was the colonial emigration. It included generations of Poles who settled in the former English colonies over the centuries. However, during the American War of Independence their descendants served mainly in militia units or local armies and considered themselves American rather than Polish citizens. Nevertheless, respect for their ancestor’s homeland is evidenced by the fact that many of them kept Polish-sounding surnames or that some places received Polish names, such as county and town of Pulaski, located in the state of Virginia.

The second group of immigrants included Polish officers and privates who could not serve in the Polish army due to its pathetically small size as well as the Bar Confederates who were fleeing persecution and avoiding imprisonment. Among them were the heroes of the American army mentioned above, but also other figures who deserve to be remembered for the blood they shed in the fight for freedom. Maurice Benyovszky, known from Slowacki’s poem, is certainly one of them. As a member of the Bar Confederation, he was sentenced to exile in Kamchatka, from where he escaped and made his way to France. After numerous adventures, including the establishment of a colony in Madagascar or being a civil servant in Austria, he eventually set off across the Atlantic. However, it was not an easy task and before Benyovszky got there he was imprisoned several times by the English. When he finally arrived to the war-torn New World, he set off to find his Polish countryman, companion in Confederate war, and then already a brigadier general in the Continental Army – Casimir Pulaski. Benyovszky found him in Savannah, where the general died shortly afterwards as a result of wounds received in the battle. Maurice Benyovszky tried to establish a legion, similar to the one of Pulaski, yet the circumstances (the approaching end of the war) were unfavorable. We know that he left America and died in Madagascar in 1786. It is worth noting that Benyovszky was a Hungarian citizen, but he considered Poland to be his homeland – he moved there as well as shed blood and suffered exile for its cause.

There were more people like Benyovszky, but perhaps their stories were not as intriguing. Mieczyslaw Haiman, the pioneer historian of Polish Americans, lists 14 Polish officers who served in the Continental Army. Among them are surnames such as Zielinski, Kowacz, Kotkowski, Kraszewski, Terlecki, and a sonorous, though perhaps not very Polish-sounding name – De Bitzen. Six of them gave their lives for freedom.

Remembrance

The Polish community in the United States is the largest Polish diaspora in the world. It is estimated that over nine million Poles and Polish Americans live in America. Their presence is clearly evident, especially where Polish communities are the largest, i.e., in Chicago, Denver or New York. When wandering through these cities, we can encounter numerous traces of Polishness. Among them, perhaps the most recognizable are the Polish churches and monuments, which commemorate historical events or Polish statesmen. The remembrance of Poles’ contribution to the widely understood development of the United States is also lasting. Successive US presidential candidates are trying to win the votes of Polish Americans which proves the strength of this minority.

Nevertheless, recent events related to the eruption of public outrage in the United States allow to draw some disturbing conclusions. Although the vast majority of the protests have been peaceful, the destruction and violence that has occurred during some of them could be frightening.

• Read also: The Union of Poles in Belarus – the Main Enemy of the Regime

It is alarming that the reason for the protest often falls victim to the demonstrators. Arson and vandalism do not serve the cause, i.e., the fight for noble values, especially when they are committed completely thoughtlessly. An example of such actions is the destruction of what one could be unfamiliar with. During one of such protests in Washington, D.C., the Tadeusz Kosciuszko monument was vandalized. When asked about this “incident,” random passersby, supporting the movement mentioned above, had no idea who Kosciuszko was. Moreover, they did not know what he had done for the American cause and African Americans.

This memorial was a completely misguided target of that anger. Kosciuszko spent the funds received from the Congress on the liberation and education of enslaved Africans. He spent part of his fortune on buying land for the freed slaves so that they could earn their own living as free citizens. His testament, whose executor was Jefferson, strongly supported abolitionism. In turn, when Native Americans learned that Kosciuszko had stood up for their rights, Chief Little Turtle of the Miamis personally expressed his gratitude for this act. During the insurrection in the country on the Vistula River, the Polish general defended the rights of Jews and freed peasants.

Kosciuszko was a man ahead of his time, a man for whom all lives did matter. Therefore, we should bear that in mind and preserve remembrance, especially when it is desecrated.

Author: Adrian Kolano, graduate of history at the University of Rzeszów, international relations at the University of Warsaw and former scholarship student at University of Lund. His research interests include geopolitics, security and international relations. The main region of interest is Scandinavia, particularly Sweden.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

More information:
www.warsawinstitute.org/support/

Bibliography:

Haiman, M. (1931). Polacy w Walce o Niepodległość Ameryki: Szkice Historyczne. Chicago, IL: Polska Katolicka Spółka Wydawnicza.

Haiman, M. (1927). Z Przeszłości Polskiej w Ameryce: Szkice Historyczne. Buffalo, NY: Telegram.

Since 2014, the United States has allocated over $2 billion in security assistance to Ukraine. In the context of globally strained relations with Russia, the Biden administration continues to support the authorities in Kyiv to advance its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

Why did Biden provide Ukraine with $125 million?

In March 2021, the US approved the first military aid package to Ukraine under President Biden's administration, Pentagon officials announced. The $125 million support is funded through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI). The plan includes training, satellite imagery support and armed Mark VI patrol boats, among others. To date, the United States has committed a total of eight of these boats manufactured by the US-based company SAFE Boats International.

The remaining $150 million USAI funds, granted by the US Congress, will be allocated when the US Department of Defense (DoD), in agreement with the US Department of State, confirms that Ukraine has made sufficient progress on crucial defense reforms. The DoD has encouraged Ukraine to continue reforms that strengthen civilian control of the military, promote greater transparency and accountability in terms of the arms industry as well as procurement. The modernization of the defense sector in other key areas, consistent with NATO principles and standards, remains vital in this regard.

President Biden makes a promise to punish Russia

In a statement published on the 7^th anniversary of the 2014 invasion of Crimea, President Biden promised to hold Russia accountable for its aggression. “The United States continues to stand with Ukraine and its allies and partners (…). On this somber anniversary, we reaffirm a simple truth: Crimea is Ukraine,” he said. Biden added that the US will never recognize the alleged annexation of the peninsula.

Biden had his first phone call with President Vladimir Putin back in January 2021. He used the conversation to put pressure on the Russian leader in terms of the arrest of opposition leader Navalny and the hack of US government agencies, which Russia is suspected of conducting.

• Read also: The Union of Poles in Belarus – the Main Enemy of the Regime

The matter of armament and the overall nature of US military aid to Ukraine has been a sensitive issue since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. The Obama administration has been hesitant to send weapons, despite pressure from members of Congress. Later, the Trump administration agreed to sell Javelin anti-tank missiles and launch units to Kyiv.

Nuclear weapons in Crimea and fights in Donbass

Hybrid warfare against Ukraine, including disinformation and cyberattacks, is a key element of “The White Paper,” a more than 70-page report published by the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine (FISU) in February 2021. According to the provided information, Russia has deployed more than 30,000 troops in annexed Crimea and is even creating the conditions to deploy nuclear weapons in occupied Crimea.

On the other hand, the situation in Donbass, the front line, has been deteriorating in recent weeks. On March 26, 2021, four Ukrainian soldiers died and two were wounded in an attack of the pro-Russian rebels. The shelling was carried out with 82 mm caliber mortars, the use of which is prohibited by the Minsk agreements, as well as automatic grenade launchers and heavy machine guns. This was the worst incident since the beginning of the ceasefire, which came into force in late July 2020. Thus, this truce exists only on paper. A further escalation of hostilities in Donbas should be expected in the near future.

• Read also: Deception and misleading – Russian Disinformation in Africa

The Minsk II agreement negotiated by the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France, signed in February 2015, left the Donbas territorially divided. Ukrainian authorities in Kyiv control the western part of Donbas, while separatist entities dominate the eastern part, including major cities such as Donetsk and Luhansk. The war has brought destruction and division. Around 14,000 people have died in Donbas alone. More than 2 million have fled the region.

Russia, Ukraine and the rest of the world

Biden's harsh words about the Kremlin's policy and the $125 million package for Ukraine indicate Washington's offensive approach against Russia. This is also different from the strategy of former American presidents, who usually avoided open confrontation with the Kremlin. Already during the election campaign, Biden labelled Russia as an “enemy” and “the biggest threat” to US security and alliances.

On the other hand, the government in Kyiv is continuously calling foreign countries for further support and seeking allies to improve its international position, which has been damaged by the loss of Crimea (a contemporary example of using hybrid warfare tactics). The United States, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine periodically emphasizes, can do more to end the war in Donbas and Russia's occupation of Crimea.

Ukraine's long-term trajectory toward integration into Western structures is clear, but short-term prospects in this matter remain less certain. According to California-based Brian Mefford, Director of Wooden Horse Strategies, a consulting firm located in Kyiv, at the strategic level Russia's goals in Ukraine will remain unchanged and include the prevention of its European and Euro-Atlantic development. The geopolitical dimension of Ukraine's security, and, more broadly, security of the whole continent, is certainly connected with developments in the world, including Central and Eastern Europe. Much will depend on the dynamics of public protests in Belarus and the Russian Federation.

Author’s Bio

Tomasz Kijewski – President and Executive Director, Warsaw Institute

Fellow at the Maastricht Center for Transatlantic Studies and the Marshall Center (Garmisch-Partenkirchen/Washington D.C.), among others. While performing diplomatic duties for a number of years, he was actively promoting a positive image of Poland and the Polish community in North America. He completed a course at the International Energy Agency (IEA) in Paris and an internship dedicated to the oil and gas sector in Calgary (Canada). He is preparing a doctoral thesis on national security.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

More information:
www.warsawinstitute.org/support/

Since the beginning of its existence (1990), the Union of Poles in Belarus (UPB) was the key independent center which gathered people with Polish roots and those who spoke Polish. In Belarus, Poles constitute around 4% of the whole population and the UPB has 30,000 members, thus being one of the largest non-governmental organizations in this country. Its activities included educating children in Polish, publishing magazines in this language (for instance, Głos znad Niemna) as well as maintaining extensive contacts with Poland in cultural and social dimensions. Since Alexander Lukashenko came to power in 1994, some political pressure was put on the authorities of the UPB, which was accused of opposition activities. In the 2000s, the state administration accused the UPB of a lack of transparency – the statutory documents were prepared in Polish but were not translated into Belarusian. The government was also threatening that it would illegalize the Union.

• Read also: Deception and misleading – Russian Disinformation in Africa

In March 2005, following Tadeusz Kruczkowski’s term as president of the UPB, Andżelika Borys was elected the new leader of the organization at the 6^th Congress of the Union. However, this outcome of the election was not recognized by the Lukashenko administration. New election was held in August and its winner was Józef Łucznik, a candidate supported by Lukashenko. Nevertheless, the elected pro-government candidate was not accepted by the Polish activists. Since then, there are two independent organizations of Poles in Belarus. All former assets of the UPB, such as 16 Polish Houses, were taken away from the part of the Union led by Andżelika Borys, simultaneously depriving it of any subsidies from the state. At the same time, the UPB, independent from the Belarusian authorities, ceased to be a partner in talks for the Lukashenko regime and the propaganda began to treat it as a force that is hostile towards the state. In interviews, Alexander Lukashenko emphasized that “there are many Poles in Belarus, but they are my Poles.” Such narration was required to limit external influence in the context of building relations with national minorities in Belarus.

The Polish side officially supports the UPB, headed by Andżelika Borys. Since 2008, this institution is responsible for issuing the Card of the Pole, a document which confirms Polish nationality. The Card is not recognized by the Belarusian administration, but it may facilitate trips to Poland or the legalization of a stay in the homeland to the Belarusian citizens with Polish roots.

The situation of the Polish minority in Belarus following the 2020 presidential election

The magnitude of opposition and determination of the Belarusian society following the disputed presidential election in August 2020, came as a surprise to the regime of President Lukashenko. The previous major post-election protests in December 2010 were suppressed by the regime within a day. However, as a result of the changes in Belarusian society, the citizens’ opposition has not been crushed by the brutal repression of the security apparatus over several months.

Hence, the administration of President Lukashenko tried to build a narrative based on threats to Belarusian independence coming from neighboring countries, mainly Poland and Lithuania, but also Ukraine. In one of his speeches following the victory in August 2020, which was not recognized in the West, Lukashenko claimed that in Grodno (a city in western Belarus where Polish diaspora accounts for about 25% of the population) Polish flags were displayed during post-election protests. Such innuendos were aimed at making Belarusians believe that only a strong leadership of the incumbent president can maintain the integrity of the country and that Poles are a subversive element of the Belarusian statehood.

Regime’s actions aimed at repressing the Polish population at various levels have intensified in recent weeks. On March 11, the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs ordered the Polish consul in Brest to leave the country within 48 hours following his participation in a ceremony related to the National Remembrance Day of the “Cursed Soldiers.” This event was cyclical and the Belarusian side did not respond to it in any way before. The arrest of Andżelika Borys, the UPB president, for organizing an “illegal mass event” was yet another action against the Polish population in Belarus. The authorities considered Grodzieńskie Kaziuki (Saint Casimir’s Fair in Grodno), a traditional annual fair as one. Moreover, the prosecutor’s office has launched an investigation against the president of the UPB for inciting hatred on the grounds of religion and nationality, for which she could be sentenced to between 6 and 12 years in prison. The reason for this decision was the organization of multiple illegal mass events involving minors that “glorified criminal formations conducting hostile anti-Soviet activities during and after the Great Patriotic War.” It should be reminded that the authorities in Minsk consider the “Cursed Soldiers” as such. Additionally, the detainees included Andrzej Poczobut, an activist of UPB in Grodno region and a journalist of Gazeta Wyborcza, who was arrested by the police on Thursday, March 25.

• Read also: The Accession of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to NATO

The repressions against the Polish population in Belarus coincided with the Belarusian Freedom Day, which is not recognized by the Lukashenko regime. The event commemorates the proclamation of the Belarusian People’s Republic in 1918 – the first Belarusian state in modern history. This unofficial holiday is an opportunity for the opposition to show its unity, which, symbolically, refers to traditions that are distinct from the Lukashenko regime, based on Soviet symbolism.

Summary

It could be assumed that the actions of the Belarusian regime intend to intimidate the society and likewise present the Polish population as a threat to the integrity of the state. Lukashenko’s anti-Polish campaign is ineffective in the case of the Belarusian youth that use, for instance, social media and independent information channels. However, such operation could have an effect on the recipients of the regime’s propaganda. On March 24, a series of demonstrations of Lukashenko’s supporters took place in front of the Polish embassy in Minsk and consulate in Grodno. They condemned the actions of the Republic of Poland towards Belarus. Similar protests were also held at diplomatic posts of Lithuania, Ukraine and the United States. Such events are expected to make the Belarusian society believe that the Western countries are responsible for the domestic social unrest.

Taking into account the international context of the Belarusian regime’s repressions against Poland and Lithuania, these actions may be treated as an element of strategic rivalry between NATO and Russia (along with Belarus). The United States supports the countries of the Alliance’s eastern flank, such as Poland and Lithuania, which are located at the strategic section of the border with the Kaliningrad Oblast (an exclave of the Russian Federation situated on the coast of the Baltic Sea) and Belarus. Indirectly, the Lukashenko regime’s repression also targets the United States, a major NATO power. Minsk’s propaganda often portrays Poland as a representative of American interests in Eastern Europe and as a threat to the alliance between Belarus and Russia.

Author: Jakub Lachert is a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Political Sciences and International Studies at the University of Warsaw. His research interests include: European Union neighborhood policy, including, in particular, Eastern policy, Eastern Partnership, Western Balkans in the process of integration with the EU.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

More information:
www.warsawinstitute.org/support/

Introduction

In the October of 2019 Facebook have removed a dozen of authentically looking fake profiles, which have worked together in a coordinated way to gain influence and carry out a disinformation campaign in Africa – all the fake profiles could be connected to Russia. The profiles could be connected to a well-known oligarch, Yevgeny Prigozhin, who is a very close ally of President Vladimir Putin. Prigozhin is also the head of the de facto working, but de jure non-existent private military company (PMC), the Wagner Group, which is a common guest of the conflicts in the African continent. All the deactivated profiles concentrated on African countries. Their activity gives a unique opportunity to investigate the so-called gray zone of the Russian disinformation campaign in Africa.

Confusing terminology

In the recent years, a lot of concepts formulated around the words connected to disinformation (e.g. fake news, information warfare, etc.). It’s no surprise: the terminology is chaotic. The definitions usually cross over each other, and the expressions are used – must of the time falsely – as simple synonyms. We can confidently say that there is no absolute terminus technicus we could use for all the actions Russia has carried out in the field of media through hybrid warfare since 2014.

• Read also: The Accession of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to NATO

Our main term is the ‘disinformation’. The European Committee (EC) uses an own definition for the term. According to that the disinformation is a ‘verifiably false or misleading information created, presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public’.[1] One of the main tools for disinformation are the so called ‘fake news’. The aim of creating fake news is to catch attention and reach even reliable media sources’ feed with deception.

We can confidently say that Russia uses ‘disinformation’, since this expression stands the closest to name all the minor instruments together. This proves that the Kremlin uses a complex set of narratives, systematic and coordinated attacks at the same time with a less professional and more interest-enforcing intention. The fact that the modern state of Russia decided to restart this old KGB-strategy is not that surprising in the context, that its political system is still ruled by people, who used to work as assets to the intelligence (even the President of Russia is a member of them).[2]

A few years ago, the Gerasimov Doctrine straightforwardly decided to pick disinformation to be one of their official tools. Moscow realized that with the spreading of fake news they can become sympathetic in the eyes of entire societies, which might motivate the leader of the disinformed countries to tighten their relations with the Russian Federation.[3] Russia realized that social media platforms such as Facebook can easily manipulate through media consumption the worldview of their users. The algorithms of these sites create such ‘Filter Bubbles’ and ‘Echo Chambers’ which make it possible for the distributors to reach more relevant social-economic resources and by that aim the audience more precisely – this is what we call the ‘micro-marketing’.[4]

Russia in Africa – again

In the last decade Russia has ‘rediscovered’ Africa. Moscow’s priority in the continent is to strengthen its position and undermine the influence of the US and Europe – and finally take over the geopolitical supremacy. With the reelection of President Vladimir Putin in 2012, Russia has stepped into a new era, where the aggressive foreign policy, the maintenance of the image of a world power and the preservation and expansion of zone of influence have become priority again. Russia is not interested only in its ‘Near Abroad’, but in various new regions, too.[5] Moscow lined up a great variation of tools which all helped to achieve its goal, such as the building of military bases, the actions of irregular forces (e.g. private military companies, such as the Wagner Group) and the disinformation campaign, too.

• Read also: New Decade of European Innovation?

The main reason why Russia is spending so much money and paying so much attention to these smart strategic moves is because Moscow is far behind their self-declared rivals, such as China, the US and even the EU when it comes to the access to Africa’s resources. [6] Russia decided to use the disinformation campaigns to strengthen the position of their few allies on the continent, which in turn would take care of Moscow’s interest. Therefore, the aim of such an extremely supportive and manipulative media backup is to help figures that can guarantee that for a long period of time. That we can see in several African countries. However, as we can see nor the Russian private military companies (PMCs) can lead to a clear success (e.g. Libya, Mozambique), nor the disinformation campaigns can stop the citizens to overthrow a leader (e.g. el-Bashir in Sudan).[7]

The methods of these disinformation operations are almost always the same each time. Each time we can find a foreign suborganism of the Prigozhin-led, St. Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency (such as the Seth Wiredu-led EBLA Group in Ghana), which recruits administrators for their fake ‘troll’ accounts on social media from third countries (e.g. from Germany, the Netherlands, etc.), whose main job then to use the basic tools of disinformation. These fake accounts usually share any news from the Pro-Kremlin media without any source criticism. These accounts help to boost the number of clicks on these articles, which then appear on the sites of reliable media sources – through deception – and finally end up among the consumers – the regular citizens. Then the deceived population is more likely to act as Moscow wanted to in their local politics.[8]

However, not all plans go as well as the Kremlin imagined. For example, the Libyan disinformation campaign backfired and made the population even more divided, creating two huge groups between the people who got informed from Russia-supported media. One of these groups supports Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the leader of Libyan National Army, who controls most of the North-African country’s Eastern coastline. Haftar’s Russian media backup consequently share the view that under his leadership security and peace is waiting for Libya. However, we can also find another group, which evolved from the Russia-supported media, that can be called the ‘Gaddafi-nostalgy group’. 90% of the followers of these pages share the desire to turn back to the pre-2011 Libyan reality and 10% of them support Gaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam’s endeavor to get into power. The Russian disinformation campaign thanks to this fault became unable to transfer a clear and unified message towards the people. According to local social media expert, Khadeja Ramali, these attempts, thanks to their division, became directly repulsive to the population.[9]

Even the earlier mentioned EBLA Group has failed: on the 6^th of February 2020 its office in Accra was stormed by Ghanaian security forces, after their cyber defense department noticed the organization thanks to its intensive foreign financial support and server connection.[10] Their leader, Seth Wiredu was arrested and charged of money laundering. Later it became obvious that the businessman had serious connections to Russia, he even had a permanent declared address in the city of Novgorod.[11]

Conclusion

Russia reacted well to its situation in the continent: despite their delay, their intent to join the “scramble for Africa” is serious. They realized that they have to create such tools for their aims that are creative and effective enough but do not require such resources that their rivals are using. The disinformation operations are one of the many new methods that help Russia extend their sphere of influence efficiently – not just in Africa, but as we can see in the Central and Eastern-European region, too (e.g. Ukraine). In this Russian infiltration the main point is not their success, since it’s only in its experimental period, but the message that is clearer than ever: Russia has returned to the African continent and their intentions are more serious than ever.

Author: Róbert Gönczi

Róbert Gönczi is visiting fellow from the Mathias Corvinus Collegium in Hungary. He joined the Warsaw Institute through the MCC’s Fellowship Program. He currently studies in the Faculty of Military Sciences and Military Training of the National University of Public Service in Budapest, and in the School of Social and Historical Studies of the Mathias Corvinus Collegium. He currently works for the Budapest-based think-tank, the Migration Research Institute as a Research Assistant and also as a foreign policy journalist for the Hungarian Jewish online newspaper, Neokohn.hu. Earlier he worked for 2 years at the Hungarian civil conservative online newspaper Mandiner.hu as a news editor, reporter and foreign policy fellow writer. His main topics are the post-Soviet and post-communist states, disinformation, hybrid warfare, migration, defense- and security policy.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

More information:
www.warsawinstitute.org/support/

72 years ago, on April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington, D.C. As a result, NATO, the most important defense organization in the world, was officially established. After the Cold War, despite initial skepticism, the organization gradually began to open up to new members. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were the first countries of the former Eastern Bloc to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization following the fall of the Iron Curtain. This was possible thanks to, among others, the effective and successful reforms that these countries implemented in the 1990s.

NATO had to revise its aims, principles and areas of activity with the end of the Cold War. This involved a redefinition of relations with the Central and Eastern European nations and ultimately also involved the opening up of the Alliance to potential new members. This was due to, among others, the democratization processes taking place in certain countries of the region. “And the windows having opened in the closed societies of Eastern Europe, the Allies do not intend to let them slam shut again,” said the former Secretary General of NATO Manfred Wörner in the fall of 1989. A few weeks earlier, US President George H. W. Bush had visited Poland and Hungary to verify the sustainability of these changes. At the beginning of the transition period in the former Eastern Bloc countries, NATO leaders were skeptical about the region as they feared the reaction of Moscow to the activity of NATO near the borders of the Russian Federation and perceived the post-Soviet area as a conflictual one.

• Read also: New Decade of European Innovation?

Since the security situation in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, among others, had improved, on June 8, 1990, during a session of the North Atlantic Council, the ministers of foreign affairs of NATO member states extended an invitation to the Warsaw Pact countries “to cooperate in the spirit of freedom, democracy, and justice.” A few weeks later, these countries received further proposals for partnership, building relations and direct contacts. Simultaneously, during the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the USSR, and later the Russian Federation, issued warnings to the former members of the Pact regarding their accession to NATO.

Since February 1991, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the most advanced countries in terms of implementing the reforms, began to collaborate on European integration. In December 1991, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established. The members of the newly established Commonwealth of Independent States were also invited to join this forum. The NACC was expected to be a body allowing for cooperation on security issues between NATO and non-NATO countries. The members of the NACC were informally divided into three groups: countries wishing to join NATO as soon as possible, those striving for dialogue without formal declarations as well as the neutral ones, without clear expectations. On May 6, 1992, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia (the Visegrád Triangle) signed a declaration, in which they announced joint efforts to become members of NATO.

In 1993, during a meeting of defense ministers of the NATO member states at that time, a proposal concerning the “Partnership for Peace” program was adopted. Its purpose was the collaboration of Alliance and NACC members, in addition to the establishment of a new security framework in Europe. For this reason, in 1994, US President Bill Clinton outlined the principles of the scheme to the leaders of the Visegrád countries in Prague. The plan was adopted, although initially the former People’s Republics perceived it as NATO’s attempt to temporarily “satisfy” their transatlantic ambitions and a way to postpone the actual accession. Nevertheless, in the following years, the Alliance expressed interest in and a specific consent to the membership of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in the future. In October 1994, the US Senate adopted the so-called Brown NATO Expansion Amendment, under which the US president could establish a military aid program for Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. During the NATO summit in Madrid (July 8-9, 1997), Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were officially invited to accession talks. Upon receiving the invitation, the countries were included in NATO’s defense planning process (NDPP). In September of the same year, the three countries officially began accession talks. Slovakia was not a part of this group because it did not meet the requirements due to discrepancies between constitutional law and political practice.

• Read also: A Hero to Poles and Americans Alike

During a ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council on December 16, 1997, NATO foreign ministers signed the Accession Protocols – identical, yet separate documents for Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Consequently, cooperation on the preparation of these three countries for their membership was intensified. Since January 1998, they were able to participate in the proceedings of the allied bodies – without the possibility to vote, but with an opportunity to express their opinions. The ratification process of these documents by the members of the Alliance was finalized at the end of 1998.

On January 29, 1999, the NATO Secretary General sent a formal invitation to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to join the Alliance, and on March 12, 1999, the three countries officially entered the organization and thus completed the first stage of NATO’s enlargement after the Cold War. On the other hand, Slovakia was formally invited to become a member of the Alliance during the NATO summit in Prague in 2002 – the accession took place two years later.

22 years after Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and later also Slovakia joined the Alliance, it could be stated that the Visegrád countries used their NATO membership to strengthen their security. The accession was also a symbolic rejection of the Russian influence and a step towards the West. Accordingly, the armed forces were modernized and met the standards of the allies. Entering NATO had also significantly contributed to the cooperation within the V4. As a result of the Kroměříž Declaration of 2004, members of the Visegrád Group determined common objectives to be accomplished within the framework of the Alliance. These included consultations, structural cooperation, strengthening transatlantic solidarity and cooperation on combating terrorism. Additionally, thanks to the membership and cooperation with NATO, relations between the countries of the region and the United States of America have improved. The US has also become the guarantor of security of these nations internationally.

Author: Maciej Tyburski

A graduate of Diplomacy and a student of Eastern Studies with a specialization in China and Russia. He gained his professional experience in the NGOs and public sector. His areas of interest include the politics of the Visegrad Group countries, the Three Seas Initiative, geopolitics and foreign languages.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

More information:
www.warsawinstitute.org/support/

In March 2020 the prospects for the majority of businesses around the world were grimmer than during the financial crisis of 2008. Worldwide lockdowns halted economic activity in most sectors, leaving many people jobless and with no hope for re-employment. In Europe, these unprecedented circumstances added momentum to the already happening transformation sparked by Brexit. Nevertheless, European start-ups may be not as worried as one may think.

When full lockdowns hit Europe in late March last year, the European economy experienced a huge supply shock. The demand for workers as well as goods and services plummeted, dragging GDP with it. Everyone was rightfully expecting a recession, with economic indicators confirming the predictions.

The huge downturn was quickly at the forefront of policy debate. Notably, unlike any other recession, the halt in production happened to entire markets and industries suddenly and at the same time. Besides the economic consequences of large-scale unemployment, the psychological ones could have been magnified by the peculiar nature of the crisis. With the rapid transition of entire societies towards the remote, digital world came the need for new, innovative solutions on a scale not seen before. On the other hand, governments aware of the potentially disastrous scenario had to implement appropriate protective measures – the fiscal stimuli reached record levels, their aim to boost the demand for labour and support the overall money flow. Monetary policy brought interest levels close to or even below zero in the hope to incentivise investment and bring the economy back to life.

• Read also: Winter Storm in Texas and Green Energy

For start-ups, however, these circumstances are of key significance. Firstly, entirely new markets emerged with no existing actors to suffice the demands. Secondly, there was strong institutional and governmental backing of such projects.

It is now common knowledge that the pandemic has largely increased the pace of digital transformation that would inevitably occur anyway. Therefore, it has brought forward the need for innovation and already existing demand for its products. This was noticed already in March 2020 when first lockdowns were imposed in Europe, and the shares of online meeting platforms rocketed up, with the share price of Zoom Video Communications Inc. reaching up to 560 USD in October compared with its pre-pandemic value of between 70 and 90 USD. Businesses have been forced to design contactless systems of communication and maintaining business relationships without the need of physical presence. Professional trainings, work induction programs and external audits have all pushed executives to explore new digital tools. In many cases these precautionary measures have turned out to be at least as effective as the traditional ones, yet costing significantly less time and money to the employers. Therefore, it is highly probable that this ‘new normal’ will become just normal, and the private sector will continue to use systems that enable remote communication. There is certainly room for improvement in terms of making the digital experience even more realistic and capable of evoking in users psychological reactions similar to those created in real-life meetings. Developers have also been creating solutions to let people experience their usual social activities, such as movie nights, board games, and dance parties, yet remotely. Perhaps virtual reality will be applied not just in entertainment, but also in professional and personal communication services. This might be one of the trends that will shape the new decade of technological innovation.

Another trend we are likely to observe in 2021 and the next few years is the increasing digitalisation of health care services. Research shows that over 80% of primary care services can be delivered virtually. This is likely to go hand in hand with the progressing automation as AI-based diagnosis is cheaper and more accurate than doctors. At first, however, we will see a growing market share of telehealth, which has expanded by 50% compared to pre-pandemic. In this scope, the largest challenge for innovators is to provide develop automated solutions not deprived of the human aspects of empathy, care, supportive gestures and expressions.

• Read also: Donald Trump’s second impeachment trial – how did it happen?

Likewise, governments are likely to engage more in state digitalisation. Lockdowns have had a drastic effect on the working of state agencies due to the volume of traffic they usually involve. Many countries unprepared to tackle this issue have been forced to do so and experiment with different solutions which will be invaluable when state digitalisation is brought to the policy debate, probably in the post-pandemic reality. When it comes to innovation, the pandemic might not be a terrible start to the new decade.

When it comes to education services, the widespread lockdown has prompted people, especially pupils, students, and teachers, to appreciate technology as a tool for learning. Therefore, although a systemic change in education is rather unlikely, there will be a rise in edtech applications and solutions, perhaps even endorsed by ministries and academic institutions.

The sudden halt of industrial production and transportation has caused drastic disruptions to the supply-chain across all sectors. This has forced companies to shift resources to developing stable systems capable of withstanding the shocks that inevitable affect human workers. The already rapidly progressing automation has been given a boost in a form of sudden market demand and general public awareness. Indeed, we have already observed a surge in contact-free deliveries to end-users. Producers and intermediary companies have also been developing such solutions yet those are much more difficult to implement. The invention process of logistics ecosystems will now forward at an increasing pace, with the Three Seas Initiative’s Smart Connectivity project being a great example thereof. The program intends to create an entirely new ecosystem of digital networks, automated processes and AI-based transportation systems that will enable a swift, nearly human-free exchange in goods between the member countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

Due to most of our activity moved online – be it personal or professional – the issue of cyber security has been brought to light. Not only have we been sharing more vulnerable data, but the Internet providers have been challenged to sustain the increased online traffic. We will therefore see a rise in cybersecurity solutions, to all end-users, small and medium-sized enterprises, as well to government agencies, educational institutions and other service providers, making room for innovation in the ISP, telecommunication, and financial sectors. The volume of contactless payments is likely to remain high after the pandemic, with new, modern banking services emerging on the market.

Given the above, the European Union could become the newest global leader for innovative solutions. In recent years European start-ups have already enjoyed increased interest of American VCs and investors. The growing prestige of Silicon Valley and immigration of global corporations have made the region even more expensive and thus unreachable for young firms. Brexit has also contributed to the relatively optimistic prospects for European start-ups. With London no longer part of the EEA, large companies have been moving across the La Manche to Paris, Amsterdam, and Berlin. This, however, is not only of a matter of capital and foreign investment, but also of discontinuing the brain-drain caused by the excellence and long tradition of British education. With university fees for EU students now thrice as much as before, bright minds are more likely to choose universities in the Netherlands, Germany, France, or Scandinavia. Consequently, they will be more likely to stay within the EU after completing education, realising their innovative ideas within the borders of continental Europe.

The pandemic caused immense demand for innovation and an environment supportive thereof. With the European Union encouraging of products and services dedicated to the public welfare – including education and health, the region will lure socially responsible start-ups. This will further reinforce the image of the region as innovative, business- and innovation-friendly, which will contribute to keeping bright minds within the borders of continental, united Europe.

Author: Jędrzej Duszyński
Alumnus of Worth School, a British Independent School, where he pursued Sixth Form education on a full academic scholarship. Alumnus and Volunteer at United World Colleges Poland. He gained professional experience during a research internship at Institute of Economic Affairs and a consulting work placement at Oliver Wyman, London. He currently works as a Project Assistant at the Warsaw Institute think tank.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

More information:
www.warsawinstitute.org/support/