After weeks of internal debate and public speculation, on July 7th, the U.S. reach a consensus about providing Ukraine with thousands of highly controversial cluster bombs. The cluster munitions are included in a new $800 million package of military aid the U.S. will send to Ukraine.

Decision met with mixed reaction, on one hand being supported by Republicans, on another – criticized by some Democrats. President Joe Biden defined the step as a „difficult decision” and admitted that he obtained Ukrainian guarantees to use the bombs carefully. As Biden emphasised, „the Ukrainians are running out of ammunition, ” hence the cluster bombs might provide a temporary fix to help stop Russian tanks.

• Read more: A Rather Flexible Partnership. An account on U.S. – India relations

A cluster munition, or cluster bomb, is a weapon containing multiple explosive components. As some experts describe, „[c]luster munitions are dropped from aircraft or fired from the ground or sea, opening up in mid-air to release tens or hundreds of submunitions, which can saturate an area up to the size of several football fields.” Consequently, anybody within the strike area may be seriously threatened with being killed or getting a severe injury.

This weapon seems to be perilous for civilians who accidentally find themselves in the munition striking zone. It is estimated that since World War II, cluster munitions have killed 56,500 to 86,500 individuals. Therefore, over 100 countries, including the UK, France, and Germany, have prohibited the munitions under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, however, some key actors, such as the U.S., Russia, China, or Ukraine, are not signatories to the ban.

• Read more: U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken Visited China in a High-stakes Trip Aiming to Dial a Tensions

On Twitter, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy highlighted that a munition transfer is a „broad and much-needed defence aid package” that will “bring Ukraine closer to victory over the enemy, and democracy to victory over dictatorship”.  From Ukraine’s perspective, the munition bombs would bolster the Ukrainian offensive pushing Russian through the front lines. In addition, the weapon could occur highly effective in plaguing Russian supply lines, as part of the outgoing attrition war.

According to the Pentagon, the last large-scale American use of cluster bombs dates back to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Moreover, this weapon played the most significant role during the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, as reported by Human Rights Watch. In the first three years of that conflict the U.S.-led coalition dropped more than 1,500 cluster bombs in Afghanistan.

Author:

Szymon Polewka is a student of international relations at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, specializing in the history of international relations, the Eurasian region, DACHL countries, intercultural relations, and the energy sector. He is currently on a scholarship at the University of Bremen. He has gained experience organizing the 2020 Economic Forum in Karpacz and numerous youth and student associations, such as AIESEC or Koło Naukowe Wyzwań Zielonego Ładu.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

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Last June, the visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the White House, hosted by President Joe Biden's administration, marked the beginning of the U.S.-India Comprehensive Global and Strategic Partnership. While the visit was significant in strengthening strategic alignment and discussing the future of regional security in the Indo-Pacific, it also raised concerns regarding democratic values.

In 2021, Modi's initial visit to the White House unveiled a vision to enhance the strategic partnership between ASEAN and the Quad members, fostering shared interests in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. The State dinner, an honor typically reserved for the closest of allies, has been extended to only a select few, including French President Emmanuel Macron and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol. Modi's visit, thus, becomes the third state dinner hosted by the White House.

A notable highlight of the Strategic Partnership is the chapter on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), which was introduced in January 2023, setting a significant milestone in U.S.-India relations. This development comes at a crucial time, as Chinese authorities recently implemented new export control regulations for minerals crucial in microchip manufacturing, such as germanium and gallium. In response, leading U.S. semiconductor manufacturer Micron Technology announced a substantial investment of $825 million in a new chip assembly and testing facility in India.^[1] The assembly, testing, and packaging (ATP) sector, primarily concentrated in East and South Asia, represents the largest segment of the industry. The United States and India eagerly anticipate the next iCET meeting, scheduled to take place in New Delhi later this year.

• Read more: U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken Visited China in a High-stakes Trip Aiming to Dial a Tensions

Despite carefully orchestrating a display of unity, several challenges persist in U.S.-India relations. One such challenge lies in the closely monitored upcoming elections in Bangladesh, as the United States, India, and China closely observe developments. Given Bangladesh's strategic location on the economically active Bay of Bengal, with a shared border with India, it holds significance for Indo-Pacific competitors. Washington sees India as a strategic counterweight to China. However, analysts worldwide note that “despite deepening strategic ties with the U.S., India remains hesitant to align fully with America, although China's growing assertiveness may compel it to abandon its neutral stance.”^[2] India's longstanding policy of non-alignment, predominantly focused on the military domain since 1950, is transforming due to recurring border disputes with China. The Indo-U.S. relationship's key lies in maintaining a balance of power vis-à-vis China. Nevertheless, India aims to retain access to the Chinese and Russian markets. Although India became the U.S.'s ninth-largest trading partner in 2021 and continues to engage in more joint military exercises with the U.S. than with any other nation, India remains the top buyer of Russian arms and the largest purchaser of Russian crude oil, accounting for 12% of its total imports since last September.^[3] Hence, India, with the potential to emerge as a significant power in the Indo-Pacific, opts for flexible partnerships rather than cemented alliances.

Moreover, India's regional position in the Indo-Pacific has gradually stabilized, despite complexities in its relationship with the Quad. Notably, India's response to Moscow's invasion of Ukraine showcased the country's flexibility in a multipolar world order when  “New Delhi refused to condemn Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine”^[4]. Furthermore, India's ongoing modernization of its ground and air forces demonstrates its ability to navigate between Russian and American equipment and training.

Joseph S. Nye asserts, "Given its substantial population, nuclear weapons, a large army, growing labor force, elite education, entrepreneurial culture, and influential diaspora, India will remain a significant actor in the global balance of power."^[5] However, we must consider whether the cost of maintaining such a stance outweighs the potential expenses on democratic values.

• Read more: America’s Pivot to Asia

India's active participation in global discussions on democracy faces scrutiny, particularly regarding policies that target Muslim minorities, suppression of dissent through the imprisonment of journalists, activists, and civil society organizations, and the exercise of judicial influence against political opponents, most notably Rahul Gandhi. Despite facing criticism, Modi enjoys enduring popularity among the Indian American diaspora and is poised to secure a third term next year. The support for Modi within the Indian American community in Congress has become a topic of discussion, as notable figures like Ro Khanna, Shri Thanedar, Ami Bera, and Raja Krishnamoorthi openly signed a letter denouncing Modi's democratic backsliding regime. Indian Americans constitute the second-largest immigrant group and the fastest-growing voting bloc in the U.S.^[6] With a population of nearly five million, Indian Americans have the potential to become a significant influence in upcoming U.S. presidential elections.^[7] This context suggests that democratic backsliding may polarize the Indian American electorate, with some supporting Modi's efforts to elevate India's global role while others criticize domestic policies that may adversely affect the population.

In conclusion, the U.S.-India partnership reflects both shared interests and challenges as the two countries navigate the complex landscape of global politics. India's growing influence, along with its commitment to democratic values, necessitates a careful evaluation of the costs and potential consequences associated with its strategic stand.

Author:

Katja-Elisabeth Herrmann works as a research fellow at the Warsaw Institute. She graduated with an MA in Transatlantic Affairs from the College of Europe (Warsaw, Poland) and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, cross-registering as a student at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government (Boston, MA). Additionally, Katja-Elisabeth holds a BA in International Relations and International Organizations, which she combined with a degree in International and European Law (LLB) from the University of Groningen. Her research is mainly devoted to transatlantic security and defense topics, particularly emerging and disruptive technologies. She was recently awarded the Squire Patton Boggs Foundation public policy fellowship in 2022 to conduct research on U.S. domestic politics and the Three Seas Initiative. She is also interested in cybersecurity and crisis management. She recently presented her research at the Fletcher School on semiconductor technologies’ political and industrial landscape in the U.S. and the EU. She will continue her research, focusing on the challenges and opportunities for military procurement for NATO allies.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

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On June 18-19th U.S. Secretary of State, Antony J. Blinken, travelled to the People’s Republic of China for meetings with President Xi Jinping, Director of the CCP Central Foreign Affairs Office Wang Yi, State Councillor and Foreign Minister Qin Gang.

The trip was initially scheduled four months ago, but finally occurred after the Chinese spy balloon incident over the U.S., as well as the Nancy Pelosi visit to Taiwan.

From a Chinese vantage point Blinken's visit occured when the "China-U.S. relationship is at the lowest point since its establishment". As President Xi Jinping emphasised, "The world needs a generally stable China-U.S. relationship." Moreover, the Chinese argued that the "Planet Earth is big enough to accommodate the respective development and common prosperity of China and the United States."

The U.S. Secretary of State focused on maintaining a "bilateral relationship on a range of global and regional issues." Furthermore, on the official level the visit aimed for concrete progress on disputes that include Taiwan, Hong Kong, trade, human rights, and fentanyl drugs issue. The efforts, however, came to nothing. Blinken emphasised that "the United States will always stand up for the values".

• Read more: America’s Pivot to Asia

The intensity of the talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang is ideally reflected by the fact that they took more than seven and a half hours, which is an hour more than scheduled.  Despite ongoing intensification of the dispute both adversaries expressed a desire to stabilise relations. They agreed that Qin would visit Washington to continue the conversation, although the date has not been announced yet. The Qin’s visitation could set the stage for the meetings between Xi Jinping and President Joe Biden this autumn at G20 and APEC summits.

Blinken’s visit to China and the U.S.-Chinese "Komondo" drills bring some hope for stability in the region. This might be considered a signal for the Asian-Pacific countries apprehensive about their growing tensions that the main players are trying to dial down pressure.

Author:

Szymon Polewka is a student of international relations at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, specializing in the history of international relations, the Eurasian region, DACHL countries, intercultural relations, and the energy sector. He is currently on a scholarship at the University of Bremen. He has gained experience organizing the 2020 Economic Forum in Karpacz and numerous youth and student associations, such as AIESEC or Koło Naukowe Wyzwań Zielonego Ładu.
 

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

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The US-Taiwan Initiative of 21st-Century Trade was unveiled last year in June. Less than a year after its announcement, representatives from Washington and Taipei concluded prime negotiations in May 2023. The Initiative represents a significant step forward in strengthening the U.S.-Taiwan economic relationship and is aimed to increase Taiwan's ability to resist economic coercion from China.

"We look forward to continuing these negotiations and finalizing a robust and high-standard trade agreement that tackles 21st Century economic challenges," Ambassador Katherine Tai said.^[1]

Representatives from the U.S. and Taiwan signed the first part of trade agreement on the eve of Singapore's high-level global security summit. The agreement is the first official trade agreement of the island since Taiwan was excluded from the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) launched by Biden last year. In 2022, the US's refusal to include Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) triggered a wave of domestic criticisms about U.S. policy toward Taiwan. However, this rejection can be attributed to Taiwan's international status. As a WTO member, Taiwan is recognized as "The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu." Including Taiwan under the same designation within the IPEF could be interpreted as confirming a less favorable status.

• Read more: A MONTH AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF SILICON VALLEY BANK, THE U. S. BANKING SYSTEM IS STILL WORKING

The agreement comprises eight areas: trade, agriculture, labor, environment, standards, state-owned enterprises, digital trade, and non-market policies and practices. Despite excluding tariffs, the agreement is expected to increase the flow of digital trade, particularly of new technologies and innovative processes.

Taiwan is a vibrant hub for emerging technologies, particularly for semiconductors. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) is Taiwan’s biggest asset contributing to almost 15% of the island’s GDP.^[2] Taiwan’s dominance of the chip industry has recently turned wary as tension with China rise.

In July 2022, U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan escalated tensions in the Indo-Pacific region, triggering a broader security discussion beyond the semiconductor industry. An April meeting between the new U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Kevin McCarthy and Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen in Los Angeles set a new tone for US-Taiwan relations to the further detriment of that between China and Taiwan. Following the bilateral meetings, US-China relations adapted to accommodate their respective security concerns, resulting in multiple military drills and exercises on land and at sea, prompting heightened alertness from military bases. For instance, Taiwan's defence ministry said it had spotted nine Chinese ships and 26 aircraft, including J-16 and Su-30 fighters, carrying out combat readiness patrols around the island in April.^[3] In consequence, the US reiterated its commitment in the Indo-Pacific agreeing with Japan to host to a major U.S. air force base in the the Japanese island of Okinawa.

For Taiwan, the new trade agreement represents a solid economic opportunity that decreases Chinese capacity to economically oversee and coerce Taiwan.  To this day, Chinese power lies in its ability to mantain and exploit a degree of economic leverage in the region. A potential blowback from Beijing on the trade agreement would regress the efforts pursued last week by US Secretary Antony Blinken's meeting with China's leader, Xi Jinping, which Blinken called "candid, substantive, and constructive."

Author:

Katja-Elisabeth Herrmann works as a research fellow at the Warsaw Institute. She graduated with an MA in Transatlantic Affairs from the College of Europe (Warsaw, Poland) and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, cross-registering as a student at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government (Boston, MA). Additionally, Katja-Elisabeth holds a BA in International Relations and International Organizations, which she combined with a degree in International and European Law (LLB) from the University of Groningen. Her research is mainly devoted to transatlantic security and defense topics, particularly emerging and disruptive technologies. She was recently awarded the Squire Patton Boggs Foundation public policy fellowship in 2022 to conduct research on U.S. domestic politics and the Three Seas Initiative. She is also interested in cybersecurity and crisis management. She recently presented her research at the Fletcher School on semiconductor technologies’ political and industrial landscape in the U.S. and the EU. She will continue her research, focusing on the challenges and opportunities for military procurement for NATO allies.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

More information:
www.warsawinstitute.org/support/

^[1] Ambassador Katherine Tai comment on the U.S.-Taiwan Trade Initiative USTR, May 18, 2023.

^[2] The Economist Special Report, “Taiwan’s dominance of the chip industry makes it more important” (March 6th, 2023).

^[3] Lee Yimou and Ben Blanchard, “China continues 'combat training' around Taiwan after drills end” Reuters (April 11, 2023). https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-president-says-china-military-exercises-not-responsible-2023-04-10/

On the June 5-8, 36 countries including US, China, Russia, India, and Pakistan participated in the 4th “Komodo” Multilateral Naval Exercise 2023 in Sulawesi – Indonesia. 

The drills occurred right after so-called "unsafe interaction" in the Taiwan Strait, in which a Chinese warship crossed in front of a U.S. destroyer in the crucial waterway. Moreover, it is interesting to note the involvement of Russia's fleet despite the ongoing war in Ukraine and the Indian and Pakistan navies, which is known for mutual distrust.

This year was the fourth edition of the “Komodo” drill, held in waters between Borneo and Sulawesi. Indonesia's navy, which is the initiator of the exercise, highlighted that routine “Komodo drills” were a "non-war" exercise aiming to "strengthen relationships between the navies" of 36 countries. 

• Read more: The Federal Case Against Trump and the U.S. 2024 Presidential Election By Katja-Elisabeth Herrmann

The Chinese navy engage its destroyer Zhanjiang and frigate Xuchang, both equipped with guided missiles, in the exercise. The name of the American ship has not been officially announced.

Through the drill, Indonesia, which leads ASEAN (The Association of Southeast Asian Nations), is trying to become the presumed mediator between China and the U.S. In addition, the event took place the day after the Asia security summit, during which Taiwan and the South China Sea issues were discussed, together with an ongoing war in Ukraine.

Despite the tense situation in the South China Sea, joint drills involving both the U.S., China and even Russia show some stability in the region.

Author:

Szymon Polewka is a student of international relations at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, specializing in the history of international relations, the Eurasian region, DACHL countries, intercultural relations, and the energy sector. He is currently on a scholarship at the University of Bremen. He has gained experience organizing the 2020 Economic Forum in Karpacz and numerous youth and student associations, such as AIESEC or Koło Naukowe Wyzwań Zielonego Ładu.

This article was written as part of the statutory activities of the Polish think tank Warsaw Institute. If you appreciate the content prepared by our partner, we appeal to you for financial support for this non-profit organisation.

More information:
www.warsawinstitute.org/support/